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The
WILL TO FULLER LIFE

by

J. H. BADLEY

Headmaster of Bedales School

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TO THE MEMORY
OF
G. LOWES DICKINSON
WHO, ALIKE IN HIS LIFE
AND IN HIS WRITINGS,
WAS EVER A SEEKER
OF THE TRUE, THE BEAUTIFUL, AND THE GOOD

P R E F A C E

IN a previous book, *The Will to Live*,¹ I attempted to trace the development of those modes of behaviour, conscious and unconscious, with which Psychology is mainly concerned. There is, however, a further line of psychological evolution that was there only touched upon. This is the development, from the inherent sensitivity of all living things to what is helpful and harmful in experience, of a sense of values by which we come to appreciate the quality of different kinds of experience, finding some better worth seeking and others to be avoided. Through the growth of this sense of values we are led to pass beyond our immediate needs to the pursuit of ends which, though developed from these needs, come to be independent of them and are felt, as enlarging or transcending the bounds of self, to be of a higher order. They find their embodiment in activities of many kinds, in systems of knowledge, in the arts, and in all our relations with our fellows. It is this quest of intellectual, aesthetic and moral values that constitutes the life of the spirit; and these values we account the highest, since in the pursuit of them we experience the fullest and richest life.²

To trace this development of the sense of values, and of some of the forms in which the pursuit of the higher among them has found expression, is the aim of the present book. Like the one above mentioned, it is the outcome of weekly discussions carried on with boys and girls, mostly in their last year at school, in the belief that it is good for them at that stage to begin to take a wider view than the school curriculum usually allows of interests and problems which

¹ George Allen & Unwin, 1931.

² In a book treating of spiritual values some will wonder that there should be no mention of what they may feel to be the greatest of them all, religion. As the book was first drafted, it contained chapters on religion as expression of another spiritual sense, that of the divine; but since their inclusion would have made it too long, this subject has been left for separate treatment.

are the most important that life brings, and which in adolescence are not yet obscured for them by its other demands.

As regards the treatment of the subject, a few words may serve to make clear both what is and what is not attempted. Though concerned with philosophic, aesthetic and ethical questions it is not the purpose of the following chapters to put forward solutions to these problems or to pass judgment on particular systems in these various fields. I am well aware how inadequate a cursory discussion of them by one who is not a specialist must be; yet I believe that it may be of some service to give a general view of them, such as may at least show what they are concerned with, and may enable the would-be student to go on to explore them further. This being the aim, technicalities are here avoided as far as possible. It is probable, of course, in dealing with matters of such complexity, that some terms are used in a way to which the specialist might take exception; but not, I hope, to such an extent as to make the general survey that is attempted misleading.

In making this survey, however, there is a definite standpoint from which it is approached. This is the standpoint of emergent evolution, regarded as a continuous process of development from matter to spirit. In one aspect a living being may be appropriately spoken of as 'body-mind', and in another as 'mind-body', if in either case the order be taken to imply that the first member of the pair is the more important. The study of the one aspect is Physiology and its kindred sciences, in which attention is directed to bodily structure and function; though even here the presence and influence of mind should not be altogether ignored. The behaviour of 'mind-body', on the other hand, is the subject-matter of Psychology; in which similarly the influence of bodily conditions cannot be left out of account. A third aspect is that to which the term 'spirit' is here applied, though not, it should be noted, in any spiritualistic sense. The study of the line of spiritual development—and this is what is here attempted—is concerned not, like Psychology

(regarded as one of the natural sciences), with what may be called the organs of mental life and their mode of functioning, but with the goals to which mental activity is directed and the values which emerge in the course of psychological evolution.

In brief, then, the intention of the book is, first, to make clear the nature of values, and of those in particular that have come to be held as highest; then, to show the character of the pursuits in which they find expression and the problems that they raise; and finally, to suggest a point of view from which these problems may be approached, and the need of an attitude of faith and purpose if we are to take the part in the evolutionary process which seems now to rest with us. The point of view is summed up in the title. All life is a striving, and its inmost impulse, in Schopenhauer's phrase, the will to live. In man it is no longer a blind striving; he has learnt to distinguish between better and worse and can look forward and seek to realise the values that he feels to be higher. The further development of the life-impulse into spiritual growth is the will not merely to live but to live 'more abundantly'.

J. H. BADLEY

BEDALES SCHOOL

June, 1933

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THE WILL TO FULLER LIFE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

§ 1. BODY, MIND, SPIRIT

Life is at once the most familiar and the most mysterious of the facts of experience. How it came to be on this earth is a question in reply to which myth-makers, philosophers and men of science have made their guesses; but of its origin, as of its destiny and purpose, there can be no assurance except such as faith can give. All that we know is what we can observe of its behaviour and what we can learn of its history. We see that all living things normally act in such a way as will maintain their life in spite of an environment which constantly threatens them with destruction, but which they can so far master as to make it afford them sustenance and the means for the enlargement of their powers. Inanimate matter is at the mercy of its surroundings, acted upon by whatever forces it is exposed to, and following the line of least resistance until some state of equilibrium is reached. Living organisms, on the other hand, offer resistance to such forces; they seek not only to maintain themselves from dissolution but to extend their powers and the scope of their activity by continual exercise of effort. The outcome of this 'will to live' is to be seen in the immense variety of forms and of powers that living things have developed in the course of organic evolution.¹

The evolution of life from its simplest to its most complex forms can be viewed under two different aspects. The study of the first, or strictly biological, aspect is concerned with questions of form and function in living things. It seeks to discover the nature and purpose of their structural differences, and to trace the development of the varied and often

¹ This is more fully discussed in *The Will to Live*, chapter ii, § 1.

extraordinarily complex bodily mechanisms that ensure, first, the maintenance of the life of the individual and of the species through adaptation to their environment, and then such mastery over the environment as these advantages can give. The other is the psychological aspect. This study is concerned not with structure (except so far as bodily structure, and in particular the development of the nervous system and brain, is closely connected with mental development) but with the behaviour of living things as expressive of the inner activity of mind; and with all the variety and complexity of the psychic mechanisms—or, if that seems to imply a mechanical view of mental experience, let us say of the modes of psychic activity—that have been developed in the struggle to ensure the maintenance of life and the extension of its range and scope.

Of these two aspects of evolution it is the second only with which we are here concerned; and this, again, only from one particular point of view. For psychological evolution itself has two aspects: the one the development of the various modes of mental activity which we are aware of in our own experience or infer from the behaviour of those with whom we come in contact; the other the development of the values that are found in experience and decide the ends to which our activities are directed.¹ The aim of the present study is to trace this second line of psychological development: the growth, that is, of a mode of apprehending experience whereby we are enabled to pass beyond the material needs of the individual self and to pursue further ends which, though developed from these immediate needs, come to be largely or wholly independent of them, and are, for this very reason, felt to be of a higher order.

The growth of this apprehension of value may be called spiritual development in distinction from the mental development that has been so important an instrument for ensuring self-maintenance. Not that the two lines of development are to be thought of as wholly distinct, for both spring from the fundamental needs of life. The maintenance of the

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter ii, § 3 (especially p. 37).

life of an organism depends not only on its awareness of its surroundings and perception of the situations to which it has to respond, but no less on the feelings of satisfaction or discomfort to which these situations and responses give rise, and which lead it to seek those that bring the one and to shun such as bring the other. Some discrimination of value, therefore, in this elementary form of ability to distinguish between satisfaction and discomfort, is a psychological necessity of self-maintenance. But this is not all that life means. We see living things not merely endeavouring to maintain their individual existence by resistance to external conditions and by subduing these to their needs, but also striving to extend and enlarge their life in every possible direction and by every means. This they do even at the cost of self-sacrifice: the single cell, for example, by giving up some of its functions, can better serve the needs of the larger organism of which it is now a part; similarly the individual has to give up some of his freedom in the interests of the social group through which, and by means of this sacrifice, his life is vastly enlarged. In bringing about development along this line the chief instrument has been the apprehension of value in experience. The elementary feeling of satisfaction of need has developed in association with the perceptive powers; and in so doing it has revealed more and more satisfactions to seek, of different kinds and of finer quality. Thus from the very nature of life has come an apprehension of needs and satisfactions other than those that are solely biological; objects of desire have emerged, such as beauty, justice, love, that pass beyond the material limitations, and are freed from some at least of the elements of finality within which evolution in its other aspects is confined.

This spiritual development and the values which it has disclosed are the subject of the present study. But before proceeding to the discussion of value and the different values, primary and secondary, lower and higher, that we find in experience, there is a question raised by the distinction that has just been emphasised; the distinction,

that is, between the two aspects, mental and spiritual, of psychological evolution, and between these, again, and the strictly biological aspect of the evolution of bodily structure and function. If we find ourselves forced to see evolution under these three aspects, and life, at least when it has reached our level, as in some way combining activities of body, mind and spirit, what, we cannot help asking, is the relationship between them? The question is as old as human thought—at least as regards the distinction between the outer and inner life, for at first no distinction was drawn between what we are here calling mind and spirit. An outward behaviour, shown in all the various movements of the body, and an inward experience, associated with, but felt as something other than, the bodily movements, could always be distinguished; and from the time that man first became an object of interest to himself the relation between them has been one of the main objects of his thought. Body and soul (to make use of a term that may be held to include both mind and spirit) are seemingly distinct, yet plainly in some way interdependent. Bodily injury can produce unconsciousness; joy can give added bodily vigour;—anyone can name a score of ways in which the one affects the other. And the more exact our knowledge of their working, the closer do we find the dependence. We must have nerves if there is to be feeling, and a brain for thinking; what, then, is the connection between them? Is it casual or essential? If it is one of cause and effect, which stands in this relation to the other? Is there a correlation somehow brought about of things radically different, or are both, however different seeming, in reality the same?

Such questions have always been asked, and many different answers have been given to them. The tendency of religion has been to regard soul and body—the immaterial and material elements of which we are conscious in ourselves—as two separate existences, utterly unlike and even antagonistic to one another. Many philosophers and men of science have also accepted the duality of soul and body,—or, as they would rather state it in more general terms, of

mind and matter. To those to whom they are thus quite distinct the only question is whether they affect one another, and if so how? For there is here a choice between two possibilities. Some postulate an alien element introduced into the material universe, shaping and using this for its own ends, but itself thereby subjected, during the period of this connection, to limitation of various kinds. The difficulty with which they are confronted is to explain how things essentially different, immaterial and material, with no conceivable points of contact, can interact. This difficulty has led others, following Leibnitz,¹ to assume that mental and bodily activity, though essentially different and for that reason unable to affect one another, are in some way bound together so that the functioning of the one is parallel to that of the other without either being cause or result. To make clear how his views differed from those of earlier philosophers, Leibnitz used an illustration which is worth recalling. He compared mind and body to two clocks which, though different in structure, keep exactly the same time. This, he said, can be brought about in one of three ways: "the first way consists in the mutual influence of each clock upon the other; the second, in the care of a man who looks after them; the third, in their own accuracy."² The first way, that of interaction, was the explanation given by Descartes.³ Some of his followers, realising the difficulty of attributing interaction to two wholly unlike things, adopted the second explanation, and regarded the correspondence between mental and physiological processes as due to the continued interposition of divine action. This doctrine of 'occasional causes', no less than that of interaction, was rejected by Leibnitz, who maintained the third

¹ Gottfried Leibnitz (1646-1716), a German philosopher, who held that the universe is composed not of material atoms but of spiritual substances (which he called 'monads'), independent and self-developing, any change in one being accompanied by (though not causing) corresponding changes in others.

² The illustration is given by Prof. W. McDougall in *Body and Mind*, chapter 4.

³ René Descartes (1596-1650), a French philosopher, with whom the modern development of philosophy began.

explanation, of a harmony pre-established at the moment of creation, under which there is a continual parallelism without interaction.

Such parallelism, having the appearance of interaction,—which, however, is ruled out, or at least not postulated, owing to the impossibility of discovering a mode of contact between what is material and what is non-material—was the accepted doctrine of science so long as science was dominated by the mechanistic conception in biology as in physics. But though it has been accepted for lack of an account of interaction that would satisfy mechanistic requirements, it carries no conviction to common-sense. And to many philosophers also such an inexplicable duality is unsatisfying. There is a strongly marked tendency of thought to seek some unity in which apparent differences can be reconciled, and this has led to various 'monist' solutions to the problem. These have taken one of two lines, either the elimination of one of the apparent diversities, or the reconciliation of both in some unity. To revert to the illustration used by Leibnitz, either one of the clocks has been held to be real, the other being merely its reflection, or both are held to be reflections, or partial presentations, of some reality otherwise unknown.

If the first solution is adopted, there is still a question as to which of the two is real and which the reflection. Materialist schools of thought, whatever their differences, agree that there is no such thing as psychic energy as distinct from physical, and that all the phenomena of living behaviour, whether conscious or not, are to be accounted for solely by chemical and physical processes. Thought, the physician Cabanis declared a century ago, is as much a secretion of the brain as bile is of the liver. Others have spoken of it as similar to the phenomenon of phosphorescence. Thus to T. H. Huxley¹ conscious experience was an 'epiphenomenon' arising from physical processes in the cerebral and nervous system. On the other side, idealist

¹ Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895), biologist and early supporter of Darwin's theory of evolution.

schools of philosophy, following Berkeley, have held that it is the materiality of things that is unreal; they exist only as phenomena of mind, physical events being only a mode of mental experience.

Neither of these solutions can be said to carry complete conviction any more than that of parallelism without interaction. Another view is that put forward by Spinoza,¹ who held that the parallelism between mental and bodily activities is due to the fact that psychical and physical phenomena are both of them aspects of one underlying reality, a single mode of being which to us is unknowable directly, but which, having as two of its attributes thought and extension, takes on these two appearances of mind and matter. Some modern thinkers regard them as representing in our experience a neutral actuality which is both mental and material according as it is viewed from within or from without. Some such view would seem, judging by the present developments of the physical sciences, to be one towards which science as well as philosophy is now tending.

The immense prestige of modern science, both in the extent and practical value of its applications and in the striking success of its methods in the discovery of new truth, has naturally had its repercussions on philosophy. No philosophical system can now hope to win acceptance that does not include in its scope the accepted principles upon which science is based and the conclusions that have been reached by the application of these principles. Thus in the last half-century new lines of thought have been opened up by the acceptance of evolution as such a basic principle. Let us see how the old problem of the relation between mind and matter looks when regarded from this newer standpoint.

§ 2. EVOLUTION AS EMERGENCE

Evolution is the term used to denote the process whereby, in the struggle for existence in a crowded world and against

¹ Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a Dutch philosopher (of Portuguese Jewish descent).

surrounding difficulties, living things tend to change in the direction that will make life more assured. If they can win any advantage, whether by better adaptation to existing conditions or by trying some new way of life under other conditions, they hold on to the advantage and make such further modifications as may increase it. In this way, it is assumed, have come into existence all the differences between the innumerable species of animals and plants. Each of them, though quite distinct to-day, has branched off at some date in the past from a stem from which have also branched the other species that are most clearly akin to it. This stem is related in the same way to others, though the connection may now be hard to trace; all are to be thought of as springing from a single root, and all life, however complex, as derived from original forms so simple as to show no distinction even of animal from plant.

This view of the development of more complex forms of life from simpler forms is strongly confirmed by three lines of scientific investigation. The first is that of Comparative Anatomy, which reveals an identity of structure shown by many living things in spite of the most complete diversity of appearance. The second is Embryology, which shows, in the early development of the single fertilised cell from which each living thing—the most complex no less than the simplest—begins its life, temporary structures still functional in organisms belonging to lower orders, thus giving an at least partial recapitulation of the whole course of evolution. The third is Palaeontology, which finds ample confirmation of the theory in the fossilised records of previous forms of life, and has laid bare many links between now widely divergent species.

For these and other reasons that point in the same direction the theory of evolution is now almost universally accepted as one of the firmly-based principles on which science rests. Properly speaking, it is concerned only with the organic world,—with the development, that is, of the different forms that living organisms have come to take. As applied to these, few men of science would now be

found to question its general truth. But it is plain that the idea of evolution is one capable of much wider application. Before organic evolution began there had already been a vast sweep of cosmic changes by which the existence of living things upon the earth was eventually made possible. If we apply the conception of evolution to the physical changes that have resulted in making a habitable world, it is plain that we are not using the term in the same sense as that defined above. The ideas of adaptation to environment and of natural selection and the struggle for existence have no place here. To use it thus is, therefore, to extend the term to a process very different from that of organic evolution. This, however, may still be a legitimate and fruitful use of the conception if we clearly understand what the use is.

Evolution in its widest sense may be used to express the fact that nothing in the known universe appears to be fixed, but all things change and tend to pass eventually into something different. If we accept the postulate of modern physics that *time* enters into the very stuff of which the universe is composed, then, since time is only to be measured by change, evolution may be thought of as the time-element in the passage of unorganised energy through matter to spiritual energy; of which process the appearance of life and the course of organic evolution are a part. Evolution would thus be regarded as a universal principle and a necessary condition of the presence of matter.

When we consider the immensity of the stellar universe in which this planet on which we live is but an insignificant speck of matter, we must not, of course, assume that all the vast cosmic changes of which astronomy tells us are concerned only with the process of organic evolution with which we are familiar. But if we confine ourselves to the series of events that led to the birth of our solar system, and of our own planet in particular, and to the further changes that have made its surface habitable, these at least we may regard as showing a continuous development from simpler to more complex conditions to which the term

evolution may well be applied. Here, beginning with the form of energy that we call physical, taking shape as electrons, atoms, molecules, elements, and the various chemical compounds that go to the making of the physical world, the non-living has gradually prepared for the appearance of the living, the inorganic for the organic, 'matter' for life and—when the psychical element becomes predominant—for mind and spirit. To the earlier stages of this continuous progression we may well extend, if only metaphorically, the concept of organic evolution; and indeed, according to the view of the universe advanced by one of the most distinguished of living thinkers,¹ such an extension may not have to be regarded as merely a metaphor. Instead of regarding living matter as something without antecedents appearing, at a particular stage in the history of our planet, from non-living materials, we may think of the distinction as one between more-living and less-living, and of life as a special manifestation of the primal energy at work in the physical universe.

Even in this wider use of the term, it must be remembered, evolution does not profess to be an explanation of the origin of life, or of the mysteries of *Whence* and *Whither* and *Why* with which man has always been haunted and perplexed. It is merely a description of the way in which, so far as we can trace, life—or, in the larger sense, the universe—has come to be as we know it. We can at least dimly discern what has taken place on our own planet; but we can only try to guess how it has come about. As to this there are three main theories, or types of theory: the purely biological theories advanced by Lamarck and by Darwin, and the philosophic theory of 'creative' or 'emergent' evolution. In each the aim is to account for the immense variety of form and function that we find in living things on the assumption that they are all derived from some simple original. How can some living speck, simpler even than an amoeba, have given rise to all the diversity of plant and animal life, and to man with his

¹ Professor A. N. Whitehead, in *Science and the Modern World*.

mastery of nature and his range of thought that can embrace the universe itself?

The whole theory of evolution is closely associated with the name of Darwin,¹ so closely, indeed, that Darwinism and evolution are often taken to be synonymous; for though his theory was not the earliest to be put forward, it has won general assent as being based on a great mass of careful observation and reasoning, and as providing an explanation of the process that seemed adequately to account for the facts. Starting from such facts as the extreme fecundity of life and the consequent struggle for existence, Darwin accounted for the evolution of new forms by the agency of natural selection. In the struggle with other competing organisms, whether of its own or other kinds, any slight advantage in suitability of form or performance of function gives to the one that possesses it a better chance; this individual is therefore more likely to survive and to propagate descendants, while others without the advantage get crowded out and ruthlessly destroyed. It is plain that this presupposes two things—variability as a characteristic of life, and the transmission of variations to descendants. Darwin assumed variability to be universal and entirely random in its manifestations. Slight variations, he thought, must necessarily occur in any organism and at any time owing to slight fortuitous differences in the surroundings and life-conditions of different individuals. Any that are harmful to the organism lessened its chance of survival—of leaving descendants, that is—while such as proved to have a survival value would be passed on by heredity working, he supposed, through some influence on the germ-cells from that part of the body affected by the variation; and thus in the course of many generations by very slight individual changes a considerable change might gradually be brought about.

This account of the working of evolution through the instrumentality of natural selection has needed modification

¹ Charles Darwin (1809–1882). The *Origin of Species*, in which his theory of natural selection is set forth, was published in 1859.

owing to the discovery of further facts than were known to Darwin. More, for instance, is now known about what may be called the mechanism of heredity, through changes that take place in the germ-cells, and the behaviour of the several 'genes' which are their chief constituents, in the twofold process of maturation and fertilisation by means of which reproduction is brought about. Connected with this mechanism is the fact that novelties appear usually to arise not by gradual minute changes but by sudden 'mutations', when a whole jump, as it were, is made at once. But whatever modifications of the theory in matters of detail such discoveries have made necessary, they do not invalidate Darwin's main contention: variations, however they may arise, have then to run the gauntlet of natural selection, and are accepted for survival or not according as they give their possessor some advantage in competition with others.

This explanation of the way in which evolution has been brought about is now generally accepted; but there is still a question whether it can be held to account for all the facts of evolution. Changes occur, for instance, and are preserved, besides those that have an immediate survival value. Thus the amazing multiplicity and beauty of shell-forms found in certain species have no imaginable utility to account for their persistence. It looks as though the evolution of living forms is due not merely to pressure from without but also to some urge from within. Some think that once a change in a certain direction has been started there is an innate tendency for it to continue along that line. It certainly seems as if such a tendency, explicable by natural selection only as long as the further change is beneficial, can be carried beyond the point of serviceableness (as can be seen at times, for instance, in the growth of horns) so that it can become useless or even a hindrance. Others go further and see in this inward urge the main explanation of evolution. That was the view of Lamarck¹

¹ Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), French naturalist. His *Histoire Naturelle*, giving his theory of evolution, was published in 1815.

who, long before Darwin, had accepted the fact of evolution and suggested, as the way in which it came about, that new characters were acquired in response to the pressure of the environment and the 'need' of the organism to adapt itself to this. New conditions bring new needs and make new demands on an organism; and this, he thought, tries to respond to the demand either in a new way or by extending the use of an existing organ, and if successful passes on the gain to its descendants. The use of any organ tends to increase the growth and efficiency of that organ, while disuse causes it to atrophy or allows it to be turned to some other purpose. This is so much a matter of common experience in ourselves that it seems a reasonable explanation of other stages of development; but it presupposes two things, both of which have been questioned: first, spontaneous activity on the part of the organism to meet the need, and secondly, the transmission of the powers thus acquired.

On these points opinion is much divided, and only further investigation can decide both what are the relevant facts and what is their importance. But whatever view is held as to these questions, or as to the validity of natural selection as a sufficient explanation, there is still much that any of these theories of evolution leaves unaccounted for. They start, for instance, with life as a going concern and have nothing to say about its appearance in a world of inorganic matter; and while in Darwin's theory there is nothing whatever to account for the appearance of mind or of consciousness, even Lamarck's postulate of effort in response to need, while it may account for the efficiency of adaptation that we call instinct, does not seem sufficient to allow of all the higher developments of mind and spirit. Modern philosophic theories of evolution have therefore gone beyond them in the endeavour to include these further considerations.

To Professor Lloyd Morgan is owing the conception of 'emergence' as the most striking feature in evolution. He pointed out¹ that in the course of evolutionary advance we are constantly faced with the appearance of something new;

¹ See *Emergent Evolution* by C. Lloyd Morgan.

new, that is, not only in the sense that it had not existed before but in the further sense that knowledge of previously existing properties and conditions would not have enabled us to predict its appearance. Thus, to take an example from the inorganic world, a knowledge of the properties of hydrogen and oxygen taken separately would not have enabled us to guess the properties of the substance, water, that results from their union under certain conditions. Whereas the calculable combinations of existing forms and conditions may be called 'resultants', these new forms of existence with their previously incalculable properties he calls 'emergents'. As salient examples of such emergents he adduces the advent of life, the appearance of mind, and that of reflective thought.

The theory of emergent evolution has been criticised as though it necessarily implied the sudden appearance, already in its fully-developed form, of something entirely unrelated to anything that had preceded it. It does imply the appearance, from time to time, of something new, in the sense of being unlike in some respects to anything that had previously appeared; but the actual emergence can be of the most gradual character before the new form of activity is fully apparent. This is exactly what happens in the development of each human being. Nothing that we can call consciousness seems to be present in the germ-cells that unite to give him life, or in the embryo directly after conception has taken place. But at some point—who can say when?—in the growth of the foetus consciousness comes into play; and so too mind in its fuller forms in the course of the growth of the baby and the child. Because we cannot say just when or how it takes place, this does not alter the fact that at various stages in our development something has emerged which was not apparent at an earlier stage.

Nor need this conception of emergence be regarded as applying to organic evolution alone. Professor Whitehead has suggested¹ that a philosophy which has readjusted its outlook in conformity with the present trend of scientific

¹ In *Science and the Modern World*.

thought may see in *organisation* an essential characteristic of the whole structure and history of the universe. In place of the old conception of matter, we should rather think of energy manifested in rhythmic successions of events, the slower and more regular constituting the structure of existing things, and the more rapid and variable forming the series that make up a process. The distinction between organic and inorganic would thus resolve itself into different degrees of organisation. The atom itself is an organisation of individual electrons that by their behaviour maintain or change its constitution and permit of various combinations. At each stage of more complex organisation something new emerges. First in the physical world the different combinations of elements and their various susceptibilities and reactions lead—with the heightening of susceptibility into sensitivity and of reaction into responses which tend to keep the particular organism in being—to the emergence of forms that we recognise as living; and at a further stage, when sensitivity has been differentiated into sense-perception and feeling, controlling and directing impulse, we have the emergence of something we can definitely label mind.

This point of view has been elaborated into a philosophic system by Professor Alexander,¹ who sees all existence as an evolution of 'matter' into 'spirit'. From the beginning of the universe in something that is not yet material, but only a continuum of space-time, he traces the emergence, first of material substance and physical processes of increasing complexity, then of life, and eventually of mind, first on the animal then on the human level; and, higher still, of spirit, leading up to something as far beyond the present attainment of mankind as humanity seems to us to have advanced beyond the earlier forms of life, to be distinguished from human as divine. The universe, in such a view, may be pictured as a pyramid rising from its base of formless energy to its apex, God.

It must once more be insisted that, in philosophy as in

¹ See *Space, Time and Deity* by S. Alexander.

science, any theory of evolution can only be a description of the manner of its working, not an explanation of its cause or more than a guess at its meaning. A system based on the principle of emergence takes into its purview more of the facts than one based only on natural selection, and by giving more coherence to the process as a whole makes it more intelligible; but it does not explain it in any other sense. We may take it as showing the way in which life has come to be what it is, but not as showing why. If we accept evolution, in any of the forms above outlined, as a true description, it is still open to us to account for the process in whatever way may seem to us most reasonable. We may regard it, if we will, as the gradual unfolding of a predetermined purpose in the mind of a Creator, pre-existent before our universe came into being, who in each stage of the process reveals Himself more clearly to us and raises us a little nearer to Himself. Or we may regard it as a process self-determined and self-sustained, without beginning and without end,—itself, as Bergson has called it, creative of each new stage of its advance from a blind urge towards continually fuller consciousness; the energy of chaos seeking to embody and express itself in order, beauty, love,—a God, so to speak, struggling to birth. We may even, if we choose, regard it as the result of chance, a meaningless disturbance in a meaningless universe, a blind movement that leads nowhither. That this is intensely repugnant to ordinary feeling does not, of course, make it impossible to accept it as an admission of intellectual and moral defeat. To most people, however, it is impossible to believe that a world that seems to us so full of meaning, however difficult to interpret, should in reality be meaningless. Since by the very constitution of our minds we are forced to arrange experience in some orderly relations, it is in a very real sense unthinkable that these relations are merely an illusion of our own devising. What ultimate meaning we can find in them is for philosophy and religion to suggest. It lies beyond our knowledge, to be apprehended only by intuition and by faith.

It must not, of course, be supposed that evolution, however regarded, has been a continuous advance, and that every change has been in the direction of fuller life. Such a view would be no more true of psychological than of biological evolution. Progress along both lines has been irregular, with periods of apparent stagnation and sudden spurts, it would seem, of creative activity. There have been false starts, blind alleys leading only to elimination, and many instances of degeneracy from higher back to lower levels of life. It is only along a comparatively narrow line that progress has been maintained and that higher forms of activity have emerged. And, further, life, of which so comparatively small a part has reached these higher levels, may itself play but a tiny part in the total energy of the universe. It is possible—astronomers¹ tell us, indeed, that it is likely—that organic evolution is confined to our own planet; for life, as we know it, can only exist in conditions that may not occur on any but this tiny fragment of matter, utterly insignificant in comparison with the gigantic suns and systems moving in immensities of space beyond our power to imagine. It may be so. But though we cannot conceive the purpose of these systems and of the energy at work in them, we know that here, on our earth, life does exist; here at least, whatever its scale and meaning, evolution, organic and psychological, has unfolded itself; new emergents have appeared, bringing new and higher forms of life, and may continue to appear, bringing something higher yet.

This earth of ours has long been dethroned by science from its proud position as centre of the universe, and with it has gone also the central place of man in the scheme of things. We can no longer suppose that all things exist only for our benefit, and that the depths of space, with their millions of suns, are only the backcloth of a stage for the drama of human life to be played on. Yet however insignificant man must now seem when viewed in relation to these immensities, to himself he remains the most significant

¹ See, e.g., *The Mysterious Universe* by Sir J. Jeans.

thing that the universe contains—the one thing, indeed, of which he can hope to realise the significance. Though we no longer think of a stationary earth with the heavens revolving round it, we must still behave as though the old belief were true. We take no account, in the affairs of life, of the fact that we are being whirled through space at some prodigious rate and with several simultaneous kinds of movement. All our doings are based on the assumption that the earth is stable, and that all on it and around it is there for our use. It is true that we no longer think that the stars exist to exercise an influence on human life. What they exist for we cannot even guess. But our concern is still with human life—the way it is affected by its surroundings and can affect them in turn. And just as the lily or the spider best serves its purpose (whatever that purpose may be) in the scheme of evolution by making itself as perfect as it can, utilising to this end all with which it comes in contact; so we best help the unknown purpose of the universe by treating human life and its values as the centre and main aim of existence, even if it may seem destined sooner or later to perish. Just as each one of us in his own consciousness is unescapably the centre of the whole, so in our thoughts man's life and destiny must remain the central significance of all experience. However small the theatre in which it is staged, yet the issue of this drama of human evolution is the greatest thing we know. Here we seem to trace a continuous development from inanimate to living, from unconscious to conscious, from the life of instinct to the life of the spirit. Each new stage in the advance is dependent on that which precedes it for the conditions under which it can maintain itself, and utilises previous stages as material to be employed. Thus life depends upon, and exerts some degree of mastery over, inanimate matter; mind at once depends upon and utilises the life of the body; and spirit in like manner only shows itself at a certain level of mental life which in turn it directs to its own ends.

If some such presentation of the facts be accepted, the

old problem of the relationship of body and mind takes on a new aspect. There is neither illusion nor parallelism without interaction; and while there is a sense in which mind and body are different aspects of an underlying identity, this is true in a somewhat different sense from that intended by Spinoza and other thinkers. Viewed in the light of emergent evolution, mind is another form of activity brought about by the same urge that shapes the physical elements into a living body, the two being different aspects of the energy at work everywhere in the universe. The presence of mind depends upon certain physical conditions; but while thus depending upon the body, mind directs the body's activities and passes beyond them. And similarly when mental development has reached a certain level further qualities of mental activity appear, which we call spiritual. These also, while depending for their appearance on activities of body and mind, pass beyond these and direct them to their own ends. Body, mind and spirit are thus all to be regarded as manifestations of the same urge of life, but at different levels of being, each depending for its emergence on the lower levels, and each in turn bringing new conditions that allow a yet higher potentiality to emerge.

This, then, is the point of view from which the present survey is approached. Taking the emergence of the values of the spirit as showing the highest level that psychological evolution has thus far reached, it is the object of the following chapters to trace the development of those values and of the forms in which mankind has sought to embody them.

CHAPTER II

VALUES

§ I. THE NATURE OF VALUE

'Value' is a term that can be used to denote several different things. When we speak, for instance, of the value of a motor-car, it may be its utility as a means of getting about that we intend by the word, or the pride and pleasure that we take in it, or the sum of money that we gave for it or might expect to get if we sold it. Again, we can apply the term to a purely objective standard, capable of scientific measurement, as when we speak of the food-value of an egg or a potato, or to one purely personal such as the sentimental value we attach to some trifling memento. And again we distinguish between face value, intrinsic value and exchange value. The face value of a banknote, for instance, is the sum printed on it; its intrinsic value, as so much paper, is next to nothing; and its exchange value varies between the two, according to circumstances—whether, for example, it is genuine or a forgery, the solvency of the bank of issue, the national credit, the presumed honesty of the person passing it, the place where it is offered, and so forth. Its value for us on any given occasion, however, consists in the particular things that we want for which it can be exchanged; and it is the immediate or potential satisfaction of our wants that gives to the note its actual value.

Apart from certain purely technical applications of the term (as for instance to 'values' in painting), the meaning common to all its uses would seem, then, to be the power that anything has, or appears to us to have, of satisfying our needs and desires, whether directly, as with objects of immediate utility and delight, or indirectly, as with tools of any kind or any form of money.¹ Anything that can

¹ Value is here regarded from the human standpoint. It is, of course, possible to regard it from some other standpoint. Thus when the biologist

bring such satisfaction seems to us *good* just in so far as we feel the need or desire for it. We say that a thing is good to eat, for example, if it satisfies our hunger and our palate, or morally good if it satisfies our moral sense. 'Good' and 'value' are thus correlated terms.¹ Anything that we regard as good, for whatever reason and in whatever respect, has a value for us.

But 'good' is merely a general term which does not in itself give us any clue to the meaning of value, as it includes values of so many different kinds. It may mean no more than 'pleasant', with its opposite of 'unpleasant', as when we speak of a good or bad smell or taste. When we say 'good to eat', however, we mean something more than merely pleasant; things are good or bad for us according as they are helpful or harmful, even if the helpful thing should be unpleasant and the harmful one pleasant. True and false, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, are other pairs of contrasted values that can be included in the general terms 'good' and 'bad'. Some of these, like 'pleasant' and 'beautiful', may seem to be mainly matters of individual feeling; others, like 'true' and 'helpful', seem rather to apply to things that can be measured by an external standard. Value, if it includes anything that we regard as good, thus seems to have an objective status that can be considered apart from the feeling that enters into it. In approaching the subject we must keep both aspects clearly in view.

speaks of the 'survival value' of some means of adaptation in a plant or animal, he is regarding it from the standpoint of the needs of that particular species. In the present discussion we are concerned only with human values.

¹ The recognition of anything as 'good' implies a contrasted 'bad.' Value, therefore, has a negative as well as a positive aspect. But though, properly speaking, things that we dislike, no less than those we like, may be said to have a value for us, to be measured on the negative side of the scale instead of on the positive, it is more convenient to adhere to ordinary usage in which the term is applied only to experiences that give us some kind of satisfaction. Value, therefore, is here used in the positive sense of that which makes some kind of experience desirable, or of something that is enjoyed or desired.

Value is one of the modes in which we apprehend existence; it is experience becoming conscious as feeling. Experience furnishes the raw material out of which the mind fashions its values. Wherever a feeling of pleasure or unpleasure is present, the experience has for us some value, positive or negative; or, to put it the other way, the value for us of any piece of experience is in the quality of the feeling that it brings. But this does not necessarily mean that value is a purely subjective phenomenon, dependent solely on something in ourselves. Just as knowledge implies (at least, to most of us it does so) something objective to be known, and is an awareness of some kind of reality apart from ourselves, so also our feeling, with its quality which determines for us the value of any experience, is occasioned by something apart from ourselves and having no less reality than that of which we are aware through the senses.

That this quality of experience is not purely subjective is shown by the fact that all human beings,—and, judging from their behaviour, we may say the same of many other living things—feel some kind of pleasure in the satisfaction of their needs. Both the degree and the kind of pleasure felt may vary with different individuals; here the subjective element in value has full play. Some feel it most keenly in connection with the satisfaction of one kind of need, others with another kind; but that there is a value of some sort in all such satisfactions is a constant of normal experience. Some sense of value, in short, is present in us all as one of the fundamental data of experience. We are aware of 'good' and 'bad'—whatever differences of content may be given to them by the course of experience and by training—just as we are aware of any other kind of reality; and the value that we feel, however much it is affected, in the apprehension of it, by subjective conditions is not to be thought of as merely the product of our feeling, any more than the external world is merely a product of our perception of it and without objective existence. In a word, while our individual valuations are largely subjective, the value that

we feel has also an objective reality.¹ It is something that we find in experience, not something that we read into it.

Value, then, as a fact of experience depends upon two factors: the one the objective element in value—the utility, as we may call it if we use the word in the widest possible sense, of the thing,² whatever it may be, to which the value attaches; the other, the subjective element in value—how the thing in question affects our feeling. The source of value is thus partly external, in the ‘nature of things’,—how far they are capable of satisfying the various needs of our bodily mental and spiritual life,—and partly within ourselves, in the extent to which we feel these needs and in the quality of the satisfaction that we enjoy or desire. This twofold nature of value accounts not only for the different senses in which the term is used but also for much of the difficulty that we find in dealing with problems of value in the guidance of conduct.

¹ The two aspects of value have their analogy in sense-perception. Colour, for example, though we may be said to create it for ourselves out of the wave-lengths of light, is not merely a matter of subjective experience, but is implicit in the structure of the eye and the way in which, owing to this structure, we are able to apprehend light. In spite of individual differences in the colour-sense and cases of colour-blindness, an apprehension of colour is a normal part of vision to all human-beings, and also, we may assume, in some degree to all living things that have eyes constructed on the same general pattern as ours. But it is not to be supposed that all see colour alike, either in range or in subtlety of the shades distinguished. Moreover, the sense of colour undergoes development. If we consider how few words expressive of different shades of colour the classical languages, as they have come down to us, contain, it would seem that our present powers of perception can appreciate more differences of colour and greater nicety of shade than was possible only a few thousand years ago. If the sense of colour, which is dependent upon something in the external world as well as upon the subjective element in perception, is thus subject to individual variation and to development, it offers a close analogy to the sense of value in which also, in spite of differences in our appreciation of values and of the fact that many are ‘value-blind’ in one respect or another, there is an objective reality which spiritual growth enables us to apprehend more and more clearly.

² The use of ‘thing’ here and elsewhere in this connection, is not to be understood as confined to *objects* possessing some value for us. The value is in our experience, in which objects play a part ‘Thing’ therefore must be taken as a short-hand expression, denoting anything that is experienced, and including situations, actions, purposes, and so forth, as well as actual objects that we find useful.

Thus value is neither merely enjoyability nor yet merely enjoyment;¹ it is not to be defined in a purely objective sense as what is desirable, nor yet in a purely subjective sense as what is desired. However great the real—or utility—value of a thing may be, yet, if I am unaware of it, or if there is something about the thing that I dislike so much that this is my dominant feeling with regard to it, so long as this is the case it has no value that I feel as such. In other words, there may be value without any sense of value, just as a child may tear up a banknote in ignorance of its value, or may refuse wholesome food of which he has not learnt to like the taste. Food that we dislike can, of course, do us good, and so has a value, just as suffering may be said to have a value if we become the better for it. In such a case the value that we feel is the realisation of the resulting well-being or the assurance of the good that will be ours; as long as no such realisation or assurance is felt there is no sense of value however beneficial the experience may ultimately prove to have been.

If, on the other hand, there is little or no actual value—utility value, that is, in the wide sense above given to the term—any value that is felt will be precarious and short-lived. However delightful our day-dreams may be we have sooner or later to face less pleasant realities. If what was pleasant to the taste proves poisonous, the value, though real enough to us at the time, turns out to have been small compared with the price to be paid for it. It is true that an imaginary value may sometimes appear to be as efficacious

¹ The use of such terms as 'enjoyment' and 'satisfaction' in defining the nature of value must not be taken to imply that *value* is merely the same thing as *pleasure*. While the satisfaction of a need is normally accompanied by pleasure and leads to a pleasant result, the actual process of satisfaction need not be felt to be pleasant at the time, as we see in the case of the coming back to life of a numbed or frozen limb. When we look back upon some painful experience we can see, perhaps, that it had a value; or we may even be conscious of its value at the time, if we realise that it will eventually bring good, and we can find a satisfaction in bearing the pain bravely and so overcoming it. In such cases the good seen to have resulted, or looked forward to in imagination, is extended to include also the means by which it is attained. 'Enjoyment' must be taken to include the process of satisfaction (which may not itself be pleasant) as well as the result.

as a real one, as we see in some cases of faith-healing or in the effect of good news even if it has little foundation in fact; and the history both of religion and of science shows that a false belief may have a high value not only in the feeling of those holding it—as long, that is, as they do not know it to be false—but also in its practical results. But in such cases there is some element of real value present—the power of mind over body which the imaginary value calls into play, or some degree of truth in the belief which is productive of good even if overlaid with much that is false; otherwise purely imaginary values, however vivid to those feeling them, could have no more efficient validity than hallucinations.

The total value of any object or experience, as a means of material and spiritual life, though we can conceive it, can never be fully known to us. Just as a burglar through ignorance or haste or some other distraction may fail to take away the most valuable part of what he finds, we constantly miss what should be of the utmost value to us. Even if we recognise the presence of a supreme value we may not at the moment feel this strongly enough for it to be an actual value to us. We can see the better course and know it to be better, and yet not feel the good in it enough to make us choose it in preference to some lesser good which arouses a stronger immediate feeling. There is, in fact, nothing in which we differ more, not only from each other but also in the various 'selves' combined in the make-up of each of us,¹ than in our sensibility to values of different kinds. It is partly a matter of temperament (the outcome, as would seem, of glandular and emotional balance²) and partly of psychological development. The child's values are different from the adult's owing to their differences of experience. If the value that any experience has for us is what we feel about it, such differences of valuation are inevitable, for we can only feel what at a given stage of development we are capable of feeling. The full 'potential'

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter xii, § 3 (pp. 203–5).

² *Ibid.*: chapter xii, § 4 (pp. 206–7).

value could only be known to an omniscient being to whom all hearts were open and who could see the future as well as the past. But though to us such fullness of apprehension is not possible, our sense of value will be sounder and more trustworthy as a guide to action the nearer it can approach to it. Ranging as it does from the satisfactions experienced in sensation and in simple forms of emotion up to those of thinker and artist, lover and mystic, it is enlarged and enriched by the growth of knowledge and experience. In this way our sense of value, like our other powers, can grow in range and in certainty.

§ 2. THE EVOLUTION OF VALUES

Like sensation and emotion, the sense of value is a development of the sensitivity to experience that is one of the fundamental characteristics of life.¹ Living things are able to discriminate between situations that promote or threaten their well-being, and to react to them by attraction or repulsion. The first awareness of this difference may be no more than a vague sense of discomfort or satisfaction; but with the development of the sensory system has come the sharper distinction of pleasant and painful as a tone attaching to much of experience; and later still, with the further development of the cognitive powers and the formation of ideas, the distinction of good and bad. Only when this last stage is reached can we properly speak of a conscious sense of value; for while it is fundamentally a matter of feeling it is feeling enriched by knowledge derived from past experience. But though the sense of value cannot be fully developed until there is some power of reflection on the past and of imagination that can look forward, it originates in an immediate apprehension of bodily and emotional states that is certainly common to the higher animals as well as to man. There is nothing illogical, therefore, in speaking of values as felt by children and animals, so long as we bear in mind that in their case values are confined to immediate enjoyments and desires that furnish

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter iii, § 2.

motives for action; whereas to a more developed sense of value remote results and the means to achieve them may be recognised as greater values than immediate satisfactions. The actual values that any one of us is capable of feeling will depend on how far his sense of value is developed beyond that of the child or animal.

Since the fundamental apprehension of value is to be found in the satisfaction of our primary needs—in whatever, that is, proves needful for the maintenance of life—our earliest values are sensations of repletion and warmth, relief from tensions of any kind and the pleasure given by any normal activity. From these it is an easy extension to the objects from which such satisfactions are immediately derived. To primitive man, in addition to his sensations of well-being, value would also soon attach to such things as the patch of sunlight in which he lay, the cave that gave shelter and safety, the fire that meant home, his bed of leaves, the food and water that sated his cravings. Thus 'good', first vaguely apprehended as a quality of the physical and mental state resulting from the satisfaction of bodily needs, comes also to be a quality, like hardness or sweetness, that seems inherent in things which directly contribute to this satisfaction and bring about sensations and emotional states of pleasant tone. And this quality is felt to belong not only to the objects that bring about a pleasant state but also to the successful conations by which it is obtained. Possession of the object desired and mastery of opposition or escape from discomfort and danger are, at every stage of development, among our most clearly-apprehended values.

Experiences that are thus associated with satisfying primary needs form our primary values. They are primary in two respects: as being the first enjoyments of which there can be any apprehension on the part of animals, and of children while still in the mainly instinctive stage of development; and also as being desires that must normally, at all stages, be first satisfied before we can attend to others or pursue other ends, even though occasions may arise when

they are overridden by other later discovered values that have come to seem of more importance than the physical life and its needs.

It was in the pursuit of these primary satisfactions that man developed his intelligence and imagination, connecting effects with causes and planning future activities. He thus became aware of other values than immediate satisfactions and the things from which they were directly obtained. When once he had begun to break away from reliance upon instinct only, to experiment for himself and judge by the results, he found that what was immediately pleasant to the senses was not always to be accounted good. Things good in this respect might prove bad in the sequel,—the tempting food might bring about nausea and illness, or too much ease might mean a hungry day; while things bad in immediate sensation, like endurance carried to the point when effort becomes painful, might be necessary as a means to future good. 'Good', therefore, had to be judged not merely by immediate satisfaction but also by something yet to come. As man learnt to look beyond the present moment, his sense of value was enlarged from immediate good to include good that is deferred, looked forward to in imagination and worked for as a result. Things stored away to meet future needs also become objects of value; and things come to be valued as means to ends,—not so much, that is, for being good in themselves, but for the uses they can serve and the things they can help to obtain. Thus tools, weapons and utensils of all kinds, and all that can be used as material for making them, came to be recognised as secondary needs.¹

In things that thus give not immediate satisfactions but the means of obtaining them we find what may be called

¹ This extension of interest from primary to secondary needs is one of the main things that distinguish life that can rightly be called human from the merely animal life from which it developed. Our primary needs are shared in some degree by all living things; these secondary needs are no doubt felt to some extent by the higher animals, but in the great extension of them by man is to be seen the first distinctly human characteristic.

our secondary values. It must not be supposed that in calling them secondary a feeling of inferior worth is implied as compared with that attaching to the primary values. The reverse, indeed, is often the case; for the sense of value in the satisfaction of any need is normally heightened by the effort needed to attain it, and these secondary values are greatly enhanced by the extended range of effort required for their attainment. The construction and use of tools of all kinds demand the application of mental even more than of muscular activity. In the exercise of ingenuity, and of the perception, judgment, imagination and reasoning on which the triumphs of human ingenuity depend, as well as in the persistence needed to overcome obstacles and to be undaunted by disappointments, is to be found a great part of the strong emotional satisfaction that attaches to the formation and working out of purposes no less than to their actual accomplishment.

But here a further kind of value shows itself. Whereas both primary and secondary values are mainly centred in the possession of material goods of various kinds, the value that is felt to lie in constructive effort, even if such possession is the end to which it is directed, may be to a large extent independent of the result. Thus the finest work of the craftsman is inspired by his delight in the exercise of skill, just as the greater part of the pleasure of a game is found in the struggle rather than in the victory. Nor is it only the effort which brings success that is valued. Effort also that meets failure may be felt to be good; and the forlorn hope, the attempt upon a still inaccessible peak, the tragic failure to reach the Pole, rank high among human values. It is evident that we are no longer here concerned only with the satisfaction of primary or secondary needs. We find a further value in experience not only as bringing or promising to bring these satisfactions but as satisfying another need—that of affording a means of self-expression, and thus enabling us to live more fully by spending life instead of hoarding it.

This further value, though later to come into conscious-

ness, is no less fundamental in origin than the others. Just as they arise from the urge to maintain life by self-preservation, so does this arise from the urge to enlarge it at any cost. It is thus connected with the need for reproduction and for cooperation, both of which involve some kind of self-sacrifice.¹ With values of this kind, found in self-expression and in ends that are no longer concerned only with the individual self, is associated development that may properly be called spiritual. Although we think of this, and rightly, as the highest stage of human development, we must not suppose that the range of feeling in which it takes its rise is a solely human prerogative. The behaviour of the higher animals gives evidence of an emotional life that finds delight in self-expression. It is difficult to believe, for instance, that the song of the birds or their behaviour in courtship has not in it an element of conscious delight. In such half-instinctive half-conscious art, as also in the pleasure found in comradeship, in the care of the young and in cooperation for the common welfare, all of which have their beginnings in animal life and are only more highly developed in man, we see the basis in experience of a sense of values beyond those associated only with the maintenance of the individual life.

The various kinds of experience in which we find these further values, like those that give us our primary and secondary values, include both immediate enjoyments and such as are sought in imagination and purpose; but they belong to another and (as we call it) 'higher' level of development.² They are the expression of a superabundance of vitality that seeks its outlet not only in growth up to the limit allowed by the conditions of the environment, and in reproduction—a way of extending the physical life beyond the limits imposed on the individual; it finds outlet also in cooperation with others (in this way, too, securing a fuller kind of existence than was possible for each one alone) and in some kind of creativity expressive of indi-

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter v, § 2 (pp. 85–6).

² This use of the term 'higher' is explained in the next chapter. See p. 53.

vidual variation, whether in new powers or in otherwise useless ornament or in the form of play and of art. In these various modes of self-expression we have the source of our 'higher' values. It would hardly be possible to overrate what we owe, in this respect, to sexual reproduction, with the range and intensity of emotion and sentiment associated with mating and with parenthood; or to the sublimation of the sex urge in the exertion of creative power, the imposing of form upon intractable material, the bringing of order and beauty out of chaos and giving purpose and meaning to what was inert and useless. So, too, from social cooperation springs a wider range of affections and loyalties and the sense of moral obligation. The development of these higher values as manifestations of man's growth will be the subject of succeeding chapters.

Throughout, it is life that is the source of value. First, the physical life bracing the muscles and tingling in the veins.

How good is man's life, the mere living, how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses for ever in joy.

Exultation in health and bodily strength that is able to master obstacles, and in all the joys of sense and use of one's powers, is the earliest and remains always one of the greatest of values. And then in the life of human relationships and purposes, affections and loyalties in all their forms, and in the doing of things that enhance the welfare of others as well as our own, we find satisfaction no less keen and with a finer quality in that they are not limited to self alone. Thus values of many kinds that have come into consciousness at various stages of our development; and since the needs and values of each stage persist throughout those that follow, they may sometimes prove to be incompatible with those of another stage, and so may be the source of conflict. This growth of the sense of value is the process of spiritual development. Like evolution in its other aspects, it has been no continuous advance but stumbling and uncertain, with periods of stagnation or relapse and at times the sudden

emergence of something higher. Yet from the blind urge driving living things to seek escape from discomfort and satisfaction of their physical needs up to the quest of truth and beauty and love, is an evolution no less stupendous than that from the first speck of living protoplasm up to the unimaginable complexity of man's body and brain; more so, indeed, in that it passes beyond the bounds of material existence and of self and seems able to free itself from the limits that these impose.

§ 3. THE MEASURE OF VALUE

To the animal, life is a comparatively simple matter. Most animals may seem to us to lead an existence that is, in the words of Hobbes, 'short, brutish, nasty', and full of dangers; but at least there is little room in it for uncertainty. The animal lives mainly in the impulses of the moment, each need met by instinctive response, and its satisfactions free from doubts and regrets. In human life, on the other hand, with its vastly extended range of choice and purpose, there is comparatively little of this immediacy. A great part of what we do is not done to satisfy an immediate need, but for the sake of some remoter satisfaction which may or may not result from it. In the multiplicity of ends and means of which we are aware as open to us, we are constantly confronted with the need for choice. And here the instinct which was sufficient for the needs of the animal is often useless or only a blind guide. For not only have we, through trusting to intelligence, lost the certainty of instinct,¹ but in all the range of human experience that belongs to a later stage of development instinct is no longer applicable, and may only conflict with the new loyalties and purposes that have come to take so great a part in the direction of life. In this frequency of conflict and constant need for choice lies the importance of our sense of values.

If the choice were only between a recognisable good and a recognisable bad it would be easy enough. But it is seldom

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter vii, § 2 (pp. 115-16).

as clear-cut as that. Sometimes the values are so disguised or of so mixed a quality that we find it hard to tell which has more of good in it. Often the conflict presents itself as one between two goods, each desirable in itself but at the moment incompatible. The choice may lie between an immediate and a remoter value, a present satisfaction, for example, or some future gain; or between a primary and a higher value, some satisfaction of the senses or of the spirit; or, hardest perhaps of all to decide, between two that are felt to make an equal claim, whether conflicting duties or desires. In such cases, when the choice will lead to different lines of action, by what scale can we measure them in order to decide their relative value, and so have something that we can trust to take the place of the no longer trustworthy guidance of instinct? Is there some objective test that we can apply, as in selecting a motor-car we should go by the size and horse-power required for our needs, and by the price that we could afford? Or must it be a purely subjective matter, as in choosing a colour when we have nothing to guide us but our personal taste?

One objective measure of value we may at once dismiss as inadequate, though it is one adopted, consciously or unconsciously, by many,—namely, to reckon the value of things by the amount that you have to pay for them. This measure of value is unsatisfactory for two reasons. It cannot be applied in a large number of cases, and those the most important. The things that we value most in life, such as love and health and happiness and the joy of creative effort, have no price and cannot be bought; at best only some of the conditions that make them possible can be paid for in money. And even when the money-scale can be applied, it is very far from reliable. A necessity of life, such as wheat, may at times have so little money-value that it pays the farmer better to burn it in his stove than to sell it; while a high one may be given to something of little intrinsic worth, an old postage-stamp, for instance, merely by its rarity, or even, by a defect, like a misprint in a first edition. Market price has thus little relation to real value. If we

measure by this scale we may, as the wit said, "know the price of everything and the value of nothing".

Where, however, value is given by properties that are scientifically measurable, as in the nourishment-value of food and the heat-value of fuel, we have here an objective scale which is, within its limits, entirely reliable. But though trustworthy in certain respects, it does not give us the measure of value that we need. In the first place it can only be applied to properties of material objects that can be measured and compared with others like themselves. As the value of an object depends also on the manner and conditions of its use, the purpose to which it is applied, and all manner of personal considerations, much which helps to determine the full value necessarily eludes our scientific method of measurement. Science, in fact, does not deal with value, in the full sense of the term, but only with some of the factors of value. All that it can tell us about the things that are necessary or helpful to life—food, clothing, housing, sanitation and so forth, and the most efficient means for getting these things—will help us to adjust our values in regard to these things more rationally. But it cannot give us a scale which is applicable in all cases and under all circumstances. And secondly, it applies only to such things as are measurable by material means; it does not apply to the imponderables of life, which are the main factors in value. If science can tell the value, as nourishment, of the food that you set before the hungry tramp, it cannot tell what may be the spiritual value of the act either to him or to yourself. In this science has no more help to give than has the scale of money-values.

If value consists, as was suggested above, in the satisfaction of our needs, bodily, mental and spiritual, the only complete objective measure of value would be the knowledge of the extent to which any experience could serve the needs of life and bring their fullest satisfaction. If we could fully know this in any given case, we should undoubtedly have a measure of value independent of all merely momentary and personal considerations. But this would require a

complete knowledge not only of all the circumstances involved but also of all the results that would follow from any choice to be made and any decision to be taken. Seeing that this lies beyond our reach, a complete measure of value such as it would give is also unattainable.

But even if we cannot fully know how far any kind of experience serves the needs of life, this, so far as we can know it, remains the one objective measure of value. Though only an assumption, it is an assumption that we cannot help holding—resting as it does on intuitions more fundamental than any reasoning—that life is the thing of greatest value in the universe, and that of all the forms of life which we know human life is the fullest. If this be granted, however, it may still be asked: Is it the life of the individual or of mankind as a whole that is to furnish our standard of measurement? And life as it is—or might be—now, or in some imaginable future? Common-sense would probably decide that to each of us his measure of value will be found in his own life and its needs, not as an isolated individual but as a member of a community—of many communities, indeed, in widening circles—and as trustee for the welfare of those after him. Whichever way we look at it, our knowledge of the life-value of any kind of experience can be at best only partial and tentative. We can only make a rough calculation and say that in this or that particular respect, and under certain conditions, it has, so far as we can tell, so much value and is to this extent desirable. Such a conclusion, uncertain though it must be, with the partial knowledge on which it is based, is the most reliable objective standard that we can apply.

Although, therefore, it is advisable, if we are not to be at the mercy merely of custom or caprice in establishing our personal values, constantly to bear in mind the objective aspect of value that we have been considering, the attempt to find a strictly objective standard by which to measure the value of experiences can never be fully successful. But, as we have seen, the value that we feel does not depend only on what is in itself desirable but also on how far we

ourselves desire it. If, then, we take this subjective aspect of value as our starting-point, can we find here the reliable and easily applicable measure of value for which we are seeking? Can we, for instance, if value is a matter of feeling, measure it by the intensity of the feeling that is aroused? This may at first sight seem self-evident: the value that we find, say, in a kindly action or a gift or in some satisfaction of the senses does seem to be proportional to the strength of the feeling aroused. But is this true when the feeling is most intense? Not only, as we know, may excess of feeling endanger life or reason, but any thrill of intense sensational or emotional excitement, although at the moment it may seem to be life at its fullest, acts as a mental intoxication, removing for the time all power of thought and conscious direction (which are elements in the fullest apprehension of value) and necessarily bringing as its result a corresponding reaction. And even if, in less extreme cases, there is usually a correlation between intensity of feeling and the sense of value that it gives, there is still the question whether all values are alike and can be measured by this scale alone. Even if the intensity of satisfaction got from a plunge in a river pool and from the making of a difficult choice is equally intense at the moment, it does not follow that the values are to be accounted equal. Between different degrees of a like satisfaction the intensity of the feeling may give a measure of value, but between satisfactions of different quality intensity alone, even if in each case we could measure it accurately, does not give the standard of comparison that we want.

Depth of feeling, if we could measure this, would be a truer criterion of value than intensity. A sensational thrill, however intense at the moment, is only on the surface, and its effect soon passes. But a feeling by which we are deeply moved, even if in itself less intense at the moment of experiencing it, is evidence of far greater value both in the extent to which it affects us and in the more lasting nature of the impression. Depth of feeling might therefore be taken as a test of value if it were always possible to recognise it.

But it is easy to mistake intensity for depth and think ourselves profoundly moved when it is no more than the first shock of surprise. And mere duration of feeling is not in itself a proof of high value. We can find a lasting satisfaction in the possession of something whose real value we may ourselves admit to be only small. Duration, in fact, like intensity, is only a condition, though an important condition, of value—an extension of whatever value is already present, which may in itself be of poorer or finer quality.

If, then, we are brought to the conclusion that it is in the quality of experience that we must rather look for a measure of the value that it has for us, does this mean (since quality of feeling is not a thing capable of scientific measurement) that any such measure is just a matter of individual taste? Do values differ only in the way that colours differ, with nothing but personal preferences to decide between them?

In one sense this is true enough. Value, to each one of us, is what he feels to be good; and he alone can say what is the quality of the particular feeling experienced as compared with other feelings aroused by other kinds of experience. But though quality is a matter of individual experience, this does not mean that there is no common standard of value by which our individual measures can be judged. Because the drug-addict's craving for his drug, and his satisfaction in obtaining it, have to him, at a given moment, as much value as to a mother her feeling for her child or to a statesman his ideal of social justice, this does not show that all these feelings are of equal value, with no question of greater or less, better or worse, both in themselves and in their results. On that point the common-sense of mankind has long been agreed. Looked at in the objective aspect and measured in terms of life-value, the difference is obvious enough. And even regarded subjectively, as a matter of feeling, there is an obvious difference. All feeling gives some degree of value to experience, for feeling is the means through which we became aware of life, and life,

as we have insisted, is the source of all value. To the one experiencing it the quality of the feeling depends on his stage of development; for on this depends both how much he can feel and of what kind is the experience of which he is aware.

This, it is plain, is partly a matter of sensitivity and range of feeling, and partly of the meaning that experience comes to have for us. In so far as quality of experience is the criterion of value, quality can be apprehended only by feeling. But feeling is informed, enriched and educated by experience; by that which comes to us directly in the contacts of life, by all that thought and imagination can teach us, and by all that comes through sympathy and suggestion from those, living and dead, under whose influence it is our fortune to come. Thus feeling develops with our growth; and while through every fresh advance the earlier values persist, with each increase of sensitivity and each enlargement of purpose, sympathy and understanding, come new values in which we feel that we live more fully than in the old. In fullness of life we have a standard that is at once objective, in that it can be applied to others besides ourselves and is concerned with all that helps or hinders life, and is also subjective, in that it is given in feeling and affords a criterion of value which each of us directly apprehends. The common-sense of mankind, as said above, has long agreed that there are values in themselves of greater worth than others. This agreement rests partly on common experience as to what promotes and what in the long run destroys the welfare of life; and partly on the discovery, by those who have gone furthest along the path of spiritual evolution, of possibilities of life richer than those of common experience. What the great teachers, the creators and discoverers of beauty and truth, and those who have most loved and best served their fellows, have felt to make life fuller, each of us is able to feel also in some degree; and we thus have, in our own feeling, a standard, however uncertain compared with theirs, by which to measure the value of our own experience.

CHAPTER III

SPIRITUAL VALUES

§ I. FULLNESS OF LIFE

Value, then, as a fact of experience is what we feel to be good; and good, regarded objectively, is whatever makes for life at its different levels. Life is thus at once the source and measure of value. The value that it has to all living things, even at a subconscious level of feeling, is the inner aspect of their outward behaviour in seeking to maintain life as long and as fully as possible. When Wordsworth declares his faith "that every flower enjoys the air it breathes", the statement is not to be dismissed as an example of poetic licence merely because we do not know what feeling means in lower states of consciousness than our own. And further, the compulsion at work in all living things, urging them not only to maintain life but also to enlarge it as much as possible, has its psychological counterpart in the apprehension of different qualities of experience and so of higher and lower values. Value, whether as a fact of individual or of universal experience, grows with the growth of the feeling that apprehends it and with the extent of the good that is apprehended. A little consideration will make both points plain.

'Feeling' means something very different at different levels of development, and consequently at these various levels so also does the good of which it makes us aware. In order to understand how good can come to mean such different things as it does at different times of life we must bear in mind the stages through which feeling has itself developed.¹ The simplest and most fundamental form of consciousness is to be found in the general internal feelings of well- or ill-being which give their tone, pleasant or painful, to other feelings and sensations and thus form our first

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter iii, § 2.

standard of value.¹ Sensation, in which we become aware of contacts of various kinds with the external world, may be regarded as the development of feeling from within outwards. Apart from those inner sensations by which we become aware of our own activities and of the changes affecting internal organs of the body that are the physical basis of emotion, sensation is dependent on sense-organs on the surface of the body through which we come into conscious contact with the external world. The most primitive are those of touch and taste, which are most directly concerned with the satisfaction of the primary needs. The senses of smell, hearing and sight were developed as helps to bringing about this satisfaction by giving to the organism a greater range of awareness and greater power of discrimination, from among its surroundings, of those things that are necessary to support its life and those that must be avoided. It is thanks to their greater externality and the wider range of perception which they make possible that these senses, and that of sight in particular, have played so large a part in intellectual development.

So, too, from the simpler internal feelings have been differentiated, in conjunction with this widening of the range of perception, the various emotions that accompany and intensify the main lines of instinctive response. These range from diffused feelings of satisfaction and discomfort, and emotional states of rage, fear and sexual excitement in which there may be little cognition of any definite object for the feeling to centre upon, up to the more specialised emotions aroused by distinctly perceived situations. While the more primitive are purely self-regarding, the latter imply an apprehension of something other than self. In connection with the parental or cooperative instincts they may even be associated with a sacrifice of self to the needs of others, and thus bring about a subordination of values and the replacement of a lower by a higher.

¹ This is the primary determinant of behaviour which Freud has termed the 'pleasure principle', as opposed to the later developed 'reality principle', furnished by external perception, with which our activities have to be brought into accord.

In these different stages in the growth of feeling we have a corresponding development of the sense of values. The fundamental element in value—value, so to speak, in its lowest grade—is to be found in the initial distinction of pleasant and unpleasant in sensation; but as feeling is enlarged and differentiated by association with increased perception, so also is there an increased discrimination of values. Some arise directly from the satisfaction of primary needs, others less directly, being associated rather with the means of satisfaction; and yet others from the satisfaction not merely of one's own immediate needs but of those that are recognised as having a higher claim. The more perception is combined with feeling, the fuller is the sense of value; most of all in those complex combinations of ideas and emotions for which 'sentiment' is the psychological term.¹ Sentiments furnish the commonest and usually the strongest motives of conduct, even overcoming instinctive tendencies or turning them to their service; and they also present different degrees of value according as they are limited to personal interests or pass beyond these to something that is felt to be larger than self and independent of merely personal considerations.

It is this enlargement of feeling by the apprehension of other than primary and personal needs that gives us our higher values. 'Higher', as a biological term, means no more than that the stage of development to which it is applied has been reached after other stages, of a simpler kind, have been passed through; the higher development thus depends upon and arises from the lower. As applied to values, in addition to this meaning there is also the further implication that the higher development is associated with a fuller and richer kind of life than the lower, and in particular with life on the spiritual instead of merely on the physical level. Thus food as a means of immediate satisfaction, food stored for future use, the jar which makes this storage possible, and the decorative pattern put upon the jar by its maker as expression of his pleasure in the

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter xi, § 1.

making of it, represent a range of values each of which is in the one sense higher than the last; while the last named is also higher in the second sense as carrying a value that transcends the needs of life on the physical level. Even if higher values are not directly evolved from the lower they are conditioned by these, and in this sense are dependent upon them even while they transcend them.

While all value, therefore, is ultimately dependent upon life, it is by fullness of life—by all, that is, which gives significance to life—that the higher values are to be distinguished. As feeling, at first a matter of sensation only, then of emotion also, is further enriched with an intellectual element, the sense of value is continually deepened and finds greater significance in experience. The full value that any piece of experience has for us is not feeling alone but feeling enriched by all that enters into it through knowledge; and even so it is not complete until it is expressed in some kind of activity and enters into the outer as well as the inner life. Our highest values are those in which these acquirements are most fully satisfied. In them we live most fully because they lead us to something beyond what is already actualised, and in them we discern a significance beyond what, as yet, life actually possesses—life as it may be rather than merely as it is.

In calling some values 'higher' it must not, however, be supposed that the lower are to be despised or condemned. All satisfactions, of whatever kind, are just as real to the one who experiences them: the delight given by some pleasure of the senses or by winning a well-fought game as well as the joy of the creative artist or the rapture of the mystic. It is in the direct apprehension of experience that we are aware of value; and this is just as true of the child sucking a sweet as of the thinker solving some long-pondered difficulty. Anything that brings satisfaction is to that extent good; and the thrill of pleasure may be as great in one kind of satisfaction as in another. But there are very different qualities of satisfaction, whether, for instance, it is experienced in connection with a momentary sensation or with

some deeply-felt emotion or engrossing interest. Keats, when tasting "the delicious coldness of claret in all its glory" after covering his tongue with Cayenne pepper (if indeed he ever did so, as Haydon declares),¹ and when first looking into Chapman's *Homer*, had two experiences of intense pleasure, but of very different quality, and to him, we may be sure, of very different value. Pleasant is not in itself the same as good: in good something more is involved which heightens value, and there are degrees of good according to what this something more may be. If value is to be measured in the fullness of life of which we become aware in any piece of experience, the meaning which we find in the experience contributes not a little to its value; for it is by this apprehension of meaning that the feeling is deepened and enlarged beyond a merely momentary sense of pleasure.

The full meaning that any object or event has for us is made up of three elements. These are, first, what we know about it; secondly, the interest that it awakes in us; and thirdly, the activity, actual or potential, to which it gives rise. We are too apt to assume that meaning consists in the first of the three only. Something may, no doubt, have a meaning for us and yet be almost devoid of interest and lead to no activity of any kind. The present discussion of value, for instance, may be a case in point, if it does not succeed in holding the reader's interest or induce him—whether by agreement or disagreement with the position here taken—to consider the subject further and to test the conclusions reached by application to his own experience. But some degree of interest there must be, or he would not even have troubled to read thus far; and the fullness of the meaning apprehended is largely dependent on this and on the further mental activity to which it leads. Without some resultant activity, whether in the form of external response or of some mental process of thought or imagination, the meaning of anything experienced has little reality for us but remains a mere abstraction; just as an architect's plan

¹ Quoted in Sidney Colvin's *Life of John Keats*, p. 380.

of a house is a mere pattern of marks on paper unless we realise it as representing a house to be built and lived in. But much as interest and consequent activity add to meaning, they do not themselves constitute it. A sudden noise close at hand may make us jump in fright; but however intense the interest, the experience does not get meaning until such cognitive processes as memory, imagination and inference are brought to bear on it. In the apprehension of meaning it is this cognitive element that plays the chief rôle, though, as just said, the others must also be present.¹

In the apprehension of value the same elements are to be found, though with a different emphasis. The value to a boy of his motor-bicycle lies mainly in the feelings to which it gives rise: delight in the sensation of speed, pride in the sense of possession, satisfaction in the feeling of power and skill and in the pleasant occupation it provides both in actual use and in imagination. But the satisfaction felt would be far less if the feeling were not associated with the activity, actual or contemplated, to which it leads; and the value is also considerably heightened by a familiarity with the actual machinery, and an understanding of the principles that underlie its construction and working, sufficient, for instance, to enable its possessor to take it to pieces for repair or merely for the satisfaction of being able to put it together again. While immediate feeling plays the chief part in the apprehension of value, feeling is largely determined and enriched by the cognitive element which gives meaning to the experience and makes it something more than merely the sensation of the moment. It is possible that some experience—a harmony of sound or colour, for example, or a general feeling of happiness—may bring with it a strong sense of value though otherwise destitute of meaning. Yet even so the presence of value depends upon recognition of something relating it to familiar experience and capable, on reflection, of interpretation by thought as well as feeling. Aesthetic enjoyment or ecstatic exaltation,

¹ For a fuller discussion of 'meaning' see *The Will to Live*, chapter viii, § 2 (pp. 128-31).

even if they seem independent of intellectual apprehension or subsequent activity, do in fact rest upon much previous experience, both perceptive and responsive, and much of their value depends on the thought-associations that surround them and the further activities to which they lead. 'Good', in fact, differs from 'pleasant' just in this, that it passes beyond mere sensation and involves some perception of meaning and some claim on future action.

Value, then, implies emotional apprehension of the facts of experience, informed and enriched by some awareness of their meaning. It is thus not merely a register of feeling but has also a considerable cognitive content. The fuller this content, the more trustworthy does value become as guide as well as motive to action; for only then does it pass beyond a casual and transient enjoyment—too dearly bought, perhaps, by entailing some harmful consequence—and become the apprehension of a known and tested good. This may come by intuition, without conscious analysis of the grounds or results on which it is based. Some people have, as we say, natural taste and insight. By this is meant that they have a fine sense of values even though they may not be able to give any reasoned explanation of the preferences and motives on which they act. But taste and tact, intuition and insight, and the quality of mental life, that we call wisdom, (just as often found in simple folk as in those of great learning or culture)—these things, though largely temperamental, the gift of a fortunate heredity, are not merely matters of feeling. They are the outcome of accumulated experience, conscious and unconscious, on the part both of the individual and of previous generations. From this, under happy conditions of temperament, surroundings and up-bringing, is distilled an apprehension of the meaning and value of whatever is experienced, quicker than can be reached by the slower processes of reflective thought and surer than can be given by feeling alone.

Such considerations make it plain that fullness of life, which was said above to be the final criterion of value, implies a high development of feeling accompanied by

apprehension of the meaning of experience, and freedom of activity in accordance with the meanings and values thus apprehended. In youth, when we are keenly conscious of the narrowness of such experiences as we have already had, and are hungry for more, we are ready to believe that anything that will widen its range must be good in so far as it enlarges our knowledge and gives a fuller experience of life; and this seems then to be of far more importance than considerations of good or bad in the moral sense, or even of whether it is wholly pleasant or not. Some continue to accept this as a sufficient philosophy on which to base the conduct of life. Most, however, find that it is with experience as with food: if we act on the assumption—as at one time or another all of us do—that because we come hungry to a meal the more we eat, and without regard to the wholesomeness of the food, the better, we discover that, so far from ensuring an increase either of vigour or enjoyment, the result is eventually some loss of both. We have indeed enlarged experience, but at the cost of diminishing the real fullness of life to which not every kind of experience makes equal contribution. Life becomes fuller in proportion as we enlarge our mental horizon and pass beyond immediate and personal claims to apprehension of values which, because they free us from the limits of self, we place higher than satisfaction of the primary needs.

§ 2. TRUTH, BEAUTY AND GOODNESS

If good is measured by fullness of life, our highest values are to be found in the things in which, for us, life is most fully experienced. These may include any gathered intensity of feeling or of effort; of the accepted lover, for example, or of the mountaineer on an all but impracticable rock-face. Each of us now and again finds life meaning most to him—coming to a head, as it were—in some particular kind of experience. It is not always the same. It will be of one kind while the blood runs hot and the senses have not yet explored all possibilities of satisfaction, and of another when the mental horizon has widened to larger purposes and we

live more fully in the life of others. But in the gathered heritage of mankind certain kinds of experience have emerged as affording, in the long run, the fullest and most lasting satisfactions; and these have long been felt, by those who are looked up to—at least throughout a great part of the world—as the highest types of humanity, to rank as supreme. One is the sphere of knowledge, having for its goal the discovery of truth both in our surroundings and in the world of thought. Another is the sphere of beauty, whether apprehended through the senses in external nature or created by imagination in the various arts. The third has its sphere in the conduct of life, in our relations with our fellows and in the claims and promptings of the moral sense.

That we should find our highest values in these spheres of experience is the outcome of psychological evolution in its spiritual aspect. Just as the original sensitivity which is the main characteristic of living things has been evolved along the line of sense-perception and differentiated into the various bodily senses as a means of apprehending our material surroundings, so also has this same sensitivity in another aspect been evolved along the line of our sense of values as a means of apprehending another kind of reality. Along this line also it has been similarly differentiated into various 'senses', from the sense of pleasure in bodily and mental satisfactions up to its fullest development in the sense of truth, the aesthetic sense, and the moral sense. These are the means by which we apprehend spiritual experience. Through them we come into touch with what is still beyond our complete apprehension but not beyond the possibility of some degree of realisation; and it is through this development of the sense of values that we recognise certain kinds of value as higher than others, and find our ultimate values in truth and beauty and moral good which the human spirit seeks as naturally as a plant grows towards the light.

To some, perhaps, these terms are only abstractions, labels that convey little or nothing of actuality. To others

they denote whole spheres of human experience, covering between them the greater part of life and holding for us values that, in moments of insight and richest experience, we feel to be the highest that life has to offer. Before proceeding to consider in detail the forms under which, throughout man's history, they have been sought, and activities to which the pursuit of them has given rise, it will be well to make a brief preliminary survey of the ground to be covered in order to see what, in each case, is the meaning this particular kind of experience has for us and the way in which it affects us.

The first, then, is the apprehension of truth. By this is meant an intuition—an undifferentiated state of thought and feeling, that is, varying from expectation or mere surmise to a sense of complete certainty—of agreement on the part of our perceptions and ideas both with the external world of objects and events and also among themselves in the inner world of thought. The need of the first kind of agreement is one of the earliest lessons of experience. If, for instance, we mistake water for solid ground, or expect a stone to furnish nourishment or to offer no resistance to the foot, or if we do not perceive that a flame is too close to an inflammable object, or do not realise that dirt breeds disease, the consequences to us may be serious. The first aspect of truth, therefore, impressed upon us by its vital importance in its practical bearings, is correspondence between fact and idea, between the external object or event, whatever it may be, and its meaning for us.

That our ideas and the judgments which they enable us to make are true if they are in close correspondence with the actual facts with which they are concerned is the most obvious meaning of truth as it presents itself to common-sense. But there is a philosophical difficulty involved in what at first sight seems so evident. This lies in the nature of the correspondence. In order to be comparable, two things must be of essentially similar nature; otherwise there is no measure by which to compare them that is applicable to them both. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to admit,

either that ideas are in some way material or facts in some way mental in their nature, there is no means of comparison or correspondence between them. The difficulty is the one already touched upon in the introductory discussion of the apparent duality of mind and matter, and will seem insuperable or merely imaginary according to the philosophic position that we adopt as to the relation between the two.

Those who feel the difficulty most strongly, and for this reason cannot accept any theory of 'correspondence', would rather say that an idea or judgment, or a system of ideas or judgments, can only be true if it is coherent. By 'coherence' they do not mean mere logical consistency—the absence of contradiction between its parts—but rather whether it fits in with the whole body of experience and the rest of our knowledge and belief that is based on this. Such coherence seems to be an obvious condition of a conception of truth; for if two parts of our experience are in contradiction to one another, the mind cannot accept them both as being true at the same time. But this account of truth also raises a difficulty. To a child, with very limited experience, things may appear coherent, and therefore true, which with wider experience he will find to be mutually impossible. And since, however much our experience is enlarged, it is still strictly limited, the same thing holds good for each of us, and for mankind as a whole. Truth, therefore, is necessarily temporary and changeable unless we assume some all-embracing experience, an 'absolute' in which complete coherence, and therefore complete truth, is possible. This also is a philosophic position which all cannot except; and the reaction from such a line of thought, with its demand for an absolute of which we cannot have any experience, has led others to adopt the pragmatist standpoint that truth is that which has been found in experience to work, and its only test that of practical utility for the needs of life.

Whatever ultimate truth may prove to be, one thing is certain: we cannot at present grasp it with our limited

mental powers, we can only, as the pragmatist insists, make approaches to it that must change with enlarging experience. We have to recognise, in fact, that there are different kinds of truth. There is a truth of the senses,—an exact report of what our sense-impressions tell us, as that the sun moves across the sky between sunrise and sunset, or that objects decrease in size as they get further from us, and change their shape as we look at them from different angles. Then there is the truth of reason. We can convince ourselves, against the apparent evidence of our senses, that it is we who are moving, not the sun, and that the earth is spherical although we should actually suppose it to be flat; and that in four-dimensional space things might happen of which our senses cannot give us evidence. There is a further marked distinction between truth of fact¹ and truth of imagination, in which the inner meaning of events and of personality is given by an imaginative presentation of happenings which, even if they took place, may not have taken this precise form, or which are frankly imaginary and yet may convey a true impression by means of symbols and images better than the most painstaking attempt to adhere to fact. And there is also a truth of faith,—meaning thereby not the truth of any particular creed or dogma but a conviction of certainty that rests not so much on the evidence of the senses or on any process of reasoning as on intuition and feeling.

If, then, we are asked what we are to take to be, in the French phrase, 'the true truth', all we can say is: that is true for us which brings a conviction of certainty without meeting contradictions in experience, in logic and in feeling. But we must always admit that truth is conditioned for us by the very constitution of our bodies and our minds. Our ideas, therefore, must be imperfect representations of the

¹ 'Truth of fact' is a short-hand expression. Strictly speaking, a fact cannot be true or false. If it is a fact, 'true' and 'false' have no meaning as applied to it, but only as referring to some statement about it, or to our understanding of it. What is intended by the expression here is the assurance that the thing narrated did actually happen in the time, place and manner set forth.

actual realities of material and spiritual existence; for only a direct apprehension of these such as we have of our own experience, instead of their partial apprehension through this medium, could give us the certainty of truth. Meanwhile, we must trust such intuitions as we have, ordering our lives, both in the material and spiritual sphere, as if these were true, but ready to admit the enlargement of truth by new knowledge and further experience.

That we have come to find so great a value in truth is not strange, in view, in the first place, of its practical utility, both on the level of ordinary life and for scientific knowledge of any kind; and secondly, of the necessity that we feel for harmony, unity and logical consistency in our ideas, which makes of it, even apart from its utility, an end in itself. It is less easy to see how beauty has come to hold a similar place among our highest values. The apprehension of such qualities as proportion, harmony, rhythm and the like has a less obvious biological value than the accuracy of perception and inference by means of which we direct our reactions to the external world and gain some mastery over it. And yet the perception of qualities such as these, together with the specific emotional thrill given by experience of beauty and by the emotional states, such as joy, rapture, melancholy, longing, aspiration, that are commonly associated with it, can be among the most intense of experiences. They often seem, indeed, like the apprehension of truth, to lift us above ourselves and to give, as Wordsworth has expressed it,

a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.

Such a feeling is plainly something more than the normal emotional accompaniment of instinctive impulse.

But although beauty may seem to be independent of our practical needs, these needs have nevertheless played some part in the development of the sense of beauty in us.

Thus certain shapes, for instance, seem more beautiful than others through being easier to handle, and so aiding a better adaptation of tools, weapons and utensils to practical ends. So too with colours and sounds and movements, through their association with the satisfaction of our desires. Hence the beauty that we find in ripe fruit, in spring flowers, in the skins of animals used first for comfort and then also for ornament, in tunes and dances that fitted with various moods, in all that is associated with sex-satisfaction and with the winning of a mate;—anything, that is, that gives added efficiency in use or makes appeal to pleasurable emotions. As the range of man's perceptions and experience increased, the sense of harmonious adaptation also took new extensions. When his power of satisfying his bodily needs was greater, and his energies were therefore less fully absorbed in these, he had more time and energy to give to the satisfaction of his mental stirrings. He could let his fancies play pleasantly round natural objects and discover fresh beauties in them; and in letting fancy play round the objects of his own creation, and adding touches to them that pleased his growing sense of beauty, conscious art was born.

Shall we be content to say, then, that our sense of beauty registers former steps in the extension of life, some new discovery or achievement associated with the satisfaction of needs or the heightening of enjoyment, some conquest of our surroundings or of our fears, like the modern discovery of the beauty of mountains which used only to inspire dread? This will, no doubt, account for much in our perception of beauty; but does it account for the astonishing wealth of beauty that we find everywhere in nature? Even if we regard beauty of form as the necessary expression of perfect adaptation to an end, what are we to say of beauty of colour in the sunset or the gem? Or of the still more amazing beauty of pattern in living things, as, for example, in the sea-shell or the bird's plumage? Are we not forced to think of beauty as comparable to time and space and gravitation,—something inherent in the

'nature of things' or at least in our apprehension of their nature? And if we think of it not merely as the external loneliness of nature but as including intellectual and moral beauty also, is it not one of the ends of evolution, a goal to which the whole universe and all that it contains aspire?

Whether we feel able to answer such questions or not, we can at any rate see how closely beauty is connected with the delight in self-expression that is a fundamental characteristic of living things. Whether it serves any utilitarian end or not, it is thus an end in itself, of value for its own sake. To many the apprehension of beauty gives a profounder clue to the meaning of things than the logic of thought. At least we can hardly deny them an equal validity. Science and Art represent attitudes of mind towards our surroundings that are not, as they may sometimes seem, antagonistic but rather complementary. Science constructs a logical universe by means of abstractions drawn from data presented to us by our senses, ignoring everything else except these abstractions and their logical relations with one another. In this way it makes a connected whole of knowledge, complete and harmonious within its limits, which, when applied to the external world, is found to give us a high degree of control over our surroundings. Art, on the other hand, is concerned with a quite different aspect of the external world, and with our own subjective reactions to it, with which the abstractions of science have nothing to do. This aspect, however, and the feelings that it evokes are just as real as any of the 'facts' of science. Any interpretation of the universe is incomplete, and to this extent untrue, if it does not include, as equally fundamental in experience, the sense of beauty also.

Moral good also is like truth and beauty in having a value that is self-evident and justifies itself to apprehension as seeming ultimately to transcend experience; but, as with them, our apprehension of it is a gradual growth, the product of experience throughout the course of human evolution. Just as the consciousness of truth has been developed by the need of adaptation to the physical environment, so

also has the moral sense by the teaching of social experience. Duty, justice, loyalty, self-sacrifice and the other ideas and sentiments that go to form our conception of *right*, are derived from social life. Only in the light of the feelings developed through social experience do we become aware of a struggle between higher and lower impulses: a struggle in which the moral sense comes into consciousness as an 'ought' of greater authority than the urge of instinct that makes us put our own good first or blindly follow the crowd. And then we discover that obedience to this 'ought' brings with it a satisfaction comparable to that given by the apprehension of truth or beauty.

So large a part of our lives is made up of social experience that it is no wonder if moral values have always occupied a great place in the estimation not only of the philosopher but of the ordinary man and woman. Beauty and truth we are apt to think of as being mainly the concern of rather unpractical folk such as artists, thinkers, and students. But right or wrong, by whatever standard we measure them, are the concern of every member of the community, if only as a matter of not getting on the wrong side of the law and of living on fairly good terms with our neighbours. So much is this the case that, alike in ordinary language and in the language of the philosophers, 'good' and 'goodness' are commonly used as meaning moral good—the social virtues such as kindness, justice, and doing what is right.

But though our earliest rule of conduct is found in the approval and disapproval of those about us, from which we draw our first conception of right and wrong, this early conception does not, for most, remain the only one, nor is it one that satisfies a more developed moral sense. In the growth of the moral sense our own judgment of our actions plays no little part. Besides the approval or disapproval of others and the external good thereby gained or lost, we are increasingly conscious of our own approval or blame of what we do, and of an inner sense of gain or loss which, in the end, may come to count for more than the other and offer a standard of right and wrong that we feel to be of

higher validity. Dependent at first on the judgment of others, and especially of those whose judgment we value most, this inner sense comes to have an authority of its own, which is all the stronger because in this, as in the development of will,¹ our self-respect is involved. It thus becomes a court of appeal whose findings we can only disregard at the cost of self-contempt.

Many moralists have held that this second and more personal aspect of the moral sense is not a later development from, or in any way dependent upon, the moral sense in its social aspect, but is the primary form from which social morality is derived.² In this view moral good, instead of being a value that only gradually emerges as the outcome of experience, is from the first as immediately apprehended as pleasure. To many conscience has seemed to be a direct revelation of some "power that makes for righteousness": and idealist philosophy has always found in the moral sense its strongest argument for some kind of existence beyond that of the material universe. But whether sprung from heaven or earth, its development and history belong to our life on earth. Even if these highest values are something more than the outcome of human experience, it is only through experience that we come to know them. We may believe that they are a revelation of something beyond our world of time and change; but even so this very revelation has itself been a matter of gradual psychological growth.

That truth, beauty and moral good are amongst the highest values that man can apprehend few, probably, would deny.³ Some, however, consider them to be mere abstractions

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter xii, § 3.

² For a recent statement of this view, see Prof. J. Laird: *A Study in Moral Theory*. He is, however, throughout, discussing the ultimate basis of morality rather than its psychological development; and his statement (p. 238) that "the way in which we come to appreciate values tells us nothing essential concerning their constitution" shows the point of view of the philosopher rather than of the psychologist.

³ Even a writer, for instance, who inveighs against "those wearisome, fussy, gregarious ideals of the True and the Beautiful", and any "idea of helping humanity forward", cannot avoid giving practical contradiction to his words. He is just as much concerned as any of the philosophers

that can be apprehended only by those few who are fortunate enough to possess sufficient culture or sufficient leisure to enable them to acquire it. Most people, they would urge, trouble themselves little about truth and beauty and ideals of any kind. All of us, on the other hand, desire happiness: this, therefore, is surely to be accounted as the highest value of mankind.

There is here a double misapprehension. In the first place, it is true that we all desire happiness just as we all desire pleasure; but it does not follow that we should make its attainment the conscious goal of effort in the same way as we strive for the discovery of truth or the creation of beauty or showing kindness to those about us. For though happiness, like pleasure, is the sign by which we know that certain values have been or are being attained, it is not in itself one of the values in question but something additional that these confer; and so, if it is substituted for them as the end to be striven for, since we are now neglecting the very thing that could confer it both alike will be lost. Just as pleasure is the normal accompaniment of all satisfaction of our needs and of all activity to that end, but if sought for its own sake or unduly prolonged is apt to elude us or turns into satiety, so is happiness the accompaniment of the functioning of our powers of mind and body in the service of purposes and sentiments and values that command our fullest adherence,—the feeling, in a word, of spiritual health. And spiritual health is like bodily health: while it comes of itself as the accompaniment of vigorous life, if it is made our constant preoccupation we are likely to miss it altogether. However high, therefore, the value we set upon happiness when it comes (though we probably

whom he derides to urge the truth of his own conception of life,—the difference being that he bases truth on feeling rather than on reason. So, too, a great part of the happiness that he enjoins us to seek is to be derived from moments lit up with some penetrating beauty, or from memories of scenes so illuminated in the past; and in his gospel of lonely happiness he includes the practice of kindness, sympathy, pity, as an indubitable good, and hatred of scorn, cruelty and malice as its opposite. (*In Defence of Sensuality* by J. C. Powys: Victor Gollancz, 1930).

shall not fully realise it, any more than we realise the full value of health until we have lost it for the time), we are only likely to find it if we set our minds on other values and expand our energies in seeking these.

The other misapprehension lies in the assumption that beauty and truth and moral ideals are products of abstract thought or of exceptional conditions of temperament and development, and so can only be enjoyed and pursued by those few who are thinkers or artists or saints, and mean nothing to ordinary people. It is true that the thinker, the artist and the saint most clearly apprehend them and follow them most fully; for these live on heights which the rest of us can only attain at rare moments if at all. But that does not mean that we are debarred from lower slopes leading to these heights, and cannot feel something of these values or know them to be the highest. We may care nothing for philosophical, aesthetic or ethical problems as such, and yet may respond to the spell of beauty in earth and sky and in living forms and actions, may realise the need for accuracy and coherence in thought and word and deed, and feel how infinitely better, for him that gives no less than for him that takes, are justice and kindness in all our dealings than cruelty and greed. These things are values that all alike can share and feel to be the things that matter most.

And there is a further reason, implicit in the very constitution of the mind, why we should find our highest values in the apprehension of truth and beauty and moral good, and in creative effort directed to their attainment. So far from being merely a matter of individual preference or of chance, it would seem to be as necessary an outcome of psychological evolution as are our limbs, nerves, sense-organs and so forth, the product of organic evolution. For these three values represent goals to which our psychic life, in its three main modes of activity, cognitional, emotional, conational, is directed. Under the double stress of the urge of the will to live from within and the pressure of the environment from without, mind has forged its instruments:

intellect, feeling and will. Each is the outcome of a need that has shaped its use, and each has a goal at which to aim. The need of intellect and the purpose to which it is directed is the discovery of truth. The fullest manifestation of the responsive feeling that experience awakes in us, is the love that goes out to all that is lovely; its need and its goal are beauty, in the full sense in which beauty has been understood both by poet and philosopher. The need that underlies the urge of conation is the striving towards the utmost of life that is attainable; its goal is the best that thought and feeling can reveal as attainable in aspiration and act; and these are moral good.

§ 3. ABSOLUTE VALUE

So far as sense-experience is concerned, there is nothing that is not merely relative and transitional. All that is known to us in this way is found by experience, or revealed by the more penetrating analysis of science, to be in a state of perpetual flux and to vary with the varying conditions on which it depends. Even such seemingly universal characteristics of actuality as time and space are found to be themselves relative and conditioned. In such an unstable world of changing appearance, philosophy and religion—thought and feeling, that is, confronted with the mysteries of the universe and of life—have always sought something that is fixed beyond the reach of change, an eternal and an absolute behind the transitory and relative which is all that empirical experience discovers. What they could not find in the external world they have believed they could find in the inner world of the mind, in principles revealed by reason or by intuition, exemplified, indeed, in mundane happenings and in the data of experience but existing independently of these. As being principles of that kind, possessing absolute existence and validity and not merely relative to some person or purpose or to the conditions under which they occur in experience, truth and beauty and the claims of morality are commonly termed absolute values. In what

sense, we may ask, if at all, is this attribution of 'absolute' to value to be justified?

It is evident that most values, as apprehended by us, are relative. A hammer is of value for one purpose but not for another. Water to drink is good only for the thirsty and under certain conditions of quantity, temperature, cleanliness and so forth. Nor is it only material goods that are relative. Even the value of truth-telling depends on the occasion; and any kind of affection can be misdirected and lead to unhappy results. This relativity of value is brought about in two ways. In the first place, whenever it is apprehended by us in connection with material objects and physical events, the value thus apprehended participates in the conditions that these impose upon experience. And secondly, value is necessarily apprehended in the feeling of individuals with all the difference in power and range of sensibility, and of the knowledge with which it is enriched, to which individuals are liable.

But though the various values as felt by us and as actualised in the external world are necessarily relative, this does not show that there is no sense in which value can be held to be absolute, apart from the circumstances in which it is realised and apart from the personal idiosyncrasy of the one who feels it. Truth as we know it is conditioned by the limitations of our senses and our mental powers, no person or natural object or work of art appears to us to be absolutely beautiful, nor can we assert that any action is absolutely good, affected as all action is by human weakness and by external circumstances: yet all forms of truth and beauty and goodness that we apprehend seem to us to point to something yet greater—something that exists apart from our imperfect apprehension and independent of the conditions under which alone they can be actualised. Just as we must believe, for instance, that mathematical relations hold good whether embodied in actual forms and whether present to some individual intelligence or not, so also we cannot doubt that this holds good of what is apprehended by feeling rather than by thought.

Such forms of moral good as fidelity and justice and self-sacrificing love are, like truth and beauty, good in themselves even if owing to adverse conditions they cannot always be fully realised or, owing to insufficient development of the sense of value in ourselves, cannot always be fully apprehended.

Just here, in fact, in the sense of value, imperfect as it yet is, even more than in any reach of thought, we find our deepest apprehension of Being. In these highest values we seem to come into contact with something that, because it is beyond full human attainment and comprehension, we can only call divine. This has been the object of awe and aspiration embodied, however crudely, in the various forms of religious worship; and the absolute existence and validity of certain truths and moral principles have formed the main part of religious doctrine, accepted as a revelation from the divine source of all value, either through the lips of some inspired prophet or given to the believer himself through his own intuitions of truth. Philosophy similarly has found an absolute in the universals of thought, and no less in the 'categorical imperative', the 'ought' of man's moral apprehension;¹ while to many thinkers, from Plato onward, beauty also has seemed an essential part of the absolute good that includes truth and moral goodness. From the standpoint of emergent evolution, to which each further stage of psychological development is an emergent from preceding stages—consciousness from living organisation, as that from inanimate matter—these values are spiritual emergents, and necessarily appear to be absolute in that they are the furthest reach of which our minds are capable, the goals to which in thought and feeling and will we aspire. However strongly we feel their attraction and compelling force, there is necessarily much in them that still lies beyond our reach and that seems, therefore, to give them a standing and validity beyond actual experience.

¹ The 'categorical imperative' is the famous phrase by which the philosopher Kant denoted the ultimate and unconditional moral law revealed in the dictates of conscience.

Seeing that our apprehension of such constantly enlarging possibilities and our ability to realise them in practice are still only partially developed, these objects of our striving can only come to us as revelations of something of which full experience is not yet possible, or at least possible only at rare moments when life reaches a fullness that cannot as yet be long maintained. In this sense, then, we feel such values to be absolute, as far transcending those of ordinary and habitual experience.

Moreover, they command our allegiance in all circumstances, whatever may be the issue of following them. Other kinds of good are good only for particular purposes and so long as they lead to desirable results. All merely sensuous values bring satiety, and thus quickly lose their value, or even, if pursued beyond the satisfaction of actual need, become productive of harm. But the highest values have no such limit. At present the truth and beauty that we can hope to make our own is limited in range, and we must recognise how imperfect is our conception of goodness; but we cannot doubt that there is more and more to be apprehended as our powers grow, and that such enlargement of our sense of values brings no danger of satiety or of reversal. And whereas other goods are valued according as they lead, or seem to lead, to material well-being, these values are absolute in that they seem to us to claim our allegiance even at the cost of all that makes for well-being in this sense. The martyr will go to the stake for his beliefs, and the devotee will sacrifice all to what he deems right as readily as the mother will sacrifice herself for her child; and so also will the seeker after truth and the creator of beauty give up everything that the average man values in life in furtherance of their quest.

Nor do these values lose any of their claim in face of the possibility that, so far from ever being able fully to attain them, we may be doomed to annihilation with the goal unreached. To some thinkers, indeed, this does not admit of doubt. Across all human effort falls the shadow of an inevitable end. For man as an individual death is certain.

Even if we think not of the individual but of the race, what assurance have we of survival or of continued advance? The record of evolution hitherto shows too many instances where factors that once gave predominance have been unable to save their possessors from degeneracy or annihilation, whether from changed conditions of environment or from excess of specialisation, to allow us to feel assured that a like fate may not, in one way or the other, await mankind. And even should man have the intelligence and the luck to keep him from such a fate, yet if an end must come, whether by swift catastrophe or when the sun has cooled and any form of life upon the earth becomes impossible, of what avail is such advance, material and spiritual, as he can win?

But however inevitable such an end of organic life may seem, is it necessarily the end of all? All life is a mastery over physical conditions, a continual contradiction of the law of degradation of energy that holds good in the physical world. In its higher forms it is continually increasing mastery of spirit over the matter with which it is associated. And when we realise how small a part of our total being is the life of the body, and how much greater, ever since man became conscious of it, the rest of his experience has seemed to him both in extent and in importance, it is difficult to believe that life cannot continue, on this new level of spiritual existence, apart from the bodily machinery of which it makes use. From the very dawn of consciousness of self the idea of survival after death has haunted the imagination of mankind. To primitive and civilised man alike, to the simple as well as to the philosopher and the prophet, it has seemed impossible to believe that personality—that inmost self with its powers of thought and feeling and will that is the highest product of evolution hitherto—could be completely annihilated by death. And to those to whom the meaning of life is to be sought most of all in its psychological evolution, does the possibility of survival seem less credible than the fact that from the primal protoplasm have been evolved beings capable of producing a 'Hamlet' or a 'Choral Symphony'—a chain of

living growth that overwhelms the imagination no less than the immensities of the physical universe as reckoned by astronomers? Is it not at least conceivable that life as we know it, the life of organic forces, may be only a midway stage between a state of existence below the level of life and a further state as far beyond this level?

But whether this is the meaning of evolution or not—and this our knowledge is equally powerless to affirm or deny—in either case the value of truth and beauty and love is no less absolute. For in these the spirit of man is at its furthest reach and attains its fullest life. Even if, therefore, all will be over when the final curtain falls on this present stage, we can still feel, as at the end of some great tragedy, that all is not lost when heights of effort and thought and feeling such as these have been attained. The artist in us, no less than common-sense, urges that we should play out the play to its culmination, acting in every way as if our values are absolute, and thus lose none of its possibilities. And if this is not all, but when organic evolution has played its part there is still a spiritual evolution to which no limit can be set, it is in these highest values, with the absolute claim which they make upon us, that we can most clearly see the direction in which further advance is to be won.

CHAPTER IV

TRUTH AS KNOWLEDGE

§ I. ASPECTS OF TRUTH

'True' and 'truth', as ordinarily used, have many different shades of meaning. These fall into two groups: one has moral connotations, as in 'telling the truth', or 'being true to one's leader or to one's principles'; while the other has merely cognitive meanings, as when we speak of a watch keeping true time, or discuss the truth of a statement or theory. In the first group there seem to be three main uses of the term, according as it is truth of word or of thought or of behaviour that is denoted. (1) When we speak of making a true statement, the meaning usually intended is that more properly conveyed by the word 'truthful': i.e. that the statement as made is in accord with what the speaker knows or believes to be the facts of the case. It is plain that a statement may be true in this sense and yet not true in the fuller sense of being actually in accord with the facts, since these may not be fully known to the speaker. When applied not merely to statements but to a person's character or to his actions, the meaning is somewhat different. (2) In the one case it is sincerity that is denoted,—the degree, that is, to which his thoughts and feelings and real motives are in accord with his professions and outward show; (3) in the other case, it is rather what we should call his honesty or his loyalty,—the extent to which his actions correspond to his undertakings and the code that he professes, or show him to be faithful to his promises and to those to whom he is bound by duty or affection.

In the second group, with cognitive meanings, there are also three main usages to be distinguished. (1) In matters of workmanship we use the word 'true' to denote accuracy and proper relation between parts. Thus we speak of a true joint, when the parts are well fitted together, and of a machine running true when there is no irregularity or

avoidable friction; a drawing is said to be true when it accurately gives the features of whatever is represented, and a musical note is true when it is produced cleanly and without blurring. (2) We also use it in the sense of 'genuine', to denote that the thing of which we are speaking is of the same nature as the norm or standard by which we are judging it. Thus a true Englishman is one who conforms with what we consider most typical of the nation, and a true Holbein is a picture that we have every reason to believe was painted by the master himself. (3) And lastly there is the fullest sense of 'truth', in which it denotes accordance with reality, so far at least as reality can be apprehended through our senses and through the exercise of our reason or through some power of intuition. Whereas all the others are matters of common experience, this last, on the other hand,—except in so far as we all have a common-sense intuition of reality, or at least assume that we have—is a more philosophical conception, in which most of us soon find ourselves out of our depth, and even the most profound thinker cannot hope to solve all its problems.

The common element in all these meanings of 'true' is a sense of accord between the thing, whatever it may be, to which we apply the term and something else which we feel to have an assured validity. The fact that some meanings have a moral connotation shows that, in their case, the standard used for comparison and judgment is one that possesses not only some certainty but also a certain kind of value in our eyes. Truthfulness, sincerity, honesty, loyalty, all are qualities to which we attach a high moral value, first of all because they are essential for any satisfactory social relations with our fellows, and then also as factors in the moral good that we come to value for its own sake. The other aspects of truth, although they are not so closely associated with the moral sense and have not so definite a moral value, also have a value of their own, and that a high one. This is evident enough as regards accuracy of workmanship, on which so much of the con-

venience of practical life, and indeed much of the provision of its necessities, depends; and it is hardly less important that the nature, whether material or mental, of whatever we happen to be dealing with should be what we suppose it to be, so that we can rely upon it to behave in the way that we expect. We must be sure, for instance, that an aeroplane or airship is planned upon sound lines and in accordance with sound principles, that the material employed is sound and will stand whatever strain is required, and that the workmanship throughout is sound and the whole accurately fitted together, if it is not to fail us and cause disaster.

It is easy to see the value of truth in this utilitarian respect as well as in the moral implications of the term. But the satisfaction of both these needs does not constitute the whole of the value that truth has for us. It has also an intellectual value. In the conformity of our perceptions, of the inferences that we draw from them, of our ideas and organised systems of knowledge, both with each other and with something that seems to us, in spite of all changes and tricks of appearance and illusion, to have a real and independent existence, we find the satisfaction of one of our deepest needs. In addition to the immense gains, in the continually enlarging control both of the forces of nature and of our own lives, that are brought about by the quest for knowledge, there is still higher value, for the sustenance and enlargement of the spirit of man, in the pursuit of truth for its own sake and in extending the bounds of knowledge, even though we realise that it can never attain full completeness or entire certainty.

When, therefore, we include truth amongst our highest values (and necessarily so, as was urged above, since truth is the underlying need and the goal of all mental activity in its cognitive aspect) it is not only for its moral significance that we do so—an aspect of truth which is rather to be included in moral good,—nor yet for the practical utilities that it puts within our reach. Still more is it for the intellectual satisfaction that we find in the pursuit and discovery

of truth; a delight which transcends the satisfactions of our secondary needs that are thereby made possible, in that it seems to lift us above the limitations of space and time and self into a fuller kind of experience. It is this that gives to the quest of truth its supreme value.

Truth, in its more philosophic character of assurance of reality, may be considered under two aspects, as *knowledge* or as *belief*. Distinct as these are, both ultimately rest upon the same foundation, the direct apprehension of experience. Whether this comes to us in the form of perception, either of our surroundings through the medium of sense-impressions and judgments on our part, or of the relations between ideas by means of intellectual activity, or in the form of awareness of our own physical and mental states in the form of feeling, or in that immediate sense of certainty that we call intuition, in each case it is our own personal experience of which we are aware. The sensation or feeling or thought, however it is occasioned—whether by something in the external world or by something happening in ourselves—and however we interpret it, is known to us only as something that we experience. That fact of personal experience is all that we have to go upon; the one thing of which we are convinced and need no further proof. We know that we have had the experience, and we believe, as the result of previous experience of a similar kind, that we can interpret it as meaning something with which, in all probability, we are familiar, and about which, therefore, we know, or think we know, a good deal. The ultimate fact in all cases is the having some kind of experience. Through whatever channel it comes the apprehension of experience is the starting-point, the thing 'given', beyond which we cannot get. It is in the nature and interpretation of the experience that differences arise, and the distinction between knowledge and belief can be drawn.

Knowledge is based on sense-perception and inference. Sense-impressions alone do not give us knowledge, but only the raw material of knowledge; as the result of experience we interpret them as implying objects and events involving

certain relations, spatial, temporal, causal, and so forth, and also certain logical relations in our own way of perceiving these and drawing conclusions from them.

Both our sense-impressions themselves, and still more our interpretations and inferences, are liable, as we soon find, to error; and so, before the conclusions drawn from them can be accepted as knowledge, they have to be tested in every possible way. When they are found to be always the same when the experience in question is repeated under similar conditions, and to be similarly apprehended by different individuals, and most of all when we find that by relying on them we can foretell what will happen and can bring about foreseen results, we regard them as certain. In this way each of us acquires a mass of cognitive material—facts of his own experience or records of the experience of others and conclusions drawn from them which have been found to stand the above tests; this is his knowledge, which has been tested and found, so far as it goes, to be trustworthy.

When, owing to any uncertainty either in the experience itself, in the record of it or in the conclusions that are drawn from it, or, owing to insufficiency of facts to go upon or of tests applied to them, we cannot arrive at complete certainty, but only at some degree, low or high, of probability, we cannot properly speak of this as knowledge but only as opinion. Opinion is to be regarded as knowledge in the making: for whether it proves reliable, when put to the test of practice, or has then to be rejected, in either case we thereby gain some certainty; and it is no less necessary to know clearly what can not be taken to be reliable than what can.

Besides knowledge which has been arrived at in this way, there is also much as to which we feel no shadow of doubt, even though we cannot submit it to tests such as those just mentioned. Such certainty is based on personal conviction which cannot, in the nature of the case, be shared by others equally, but only by those whose mental development and individual experience have been largely similar

to our own. Thus while to all who have normal senses and mental equipment the sky is blue, ice cold to the touch, and two and two make four, some of these same persons may be sure that all that happens is the doing of a divine providence, while others are no less convinced that it is the outcome of mere chance; some may hold that the best government is that which is concentrated in the decision of a single ruler, and others that it must rest on the consent and will of the whole number of the governed. Convictions such as these are matters not of knowledge but of *belief*. This may vary in range and intensity from an exalted religious faith, which is ready to go to the stake rather than yield a single iota of its belief, to the ordinary common-sense assumptions on which we base our daily life without ever questioning them,—that things happen, for instance, and will continue to happen, in familiar sequences of cause and effect, that the sensible world is real, that human beings may be expected to act in certain ways, partly rational but liable to all manner of aberration, and so forth. We also hold many floating 'beliefs'; mere feelings, that is, about persons or things, based on intuition rather than on tested experience, and inclinations to think this or that, which have not sufficient foundation in assured fact to be definite opinion. Intuitions of these kinds, however, furnish much of the material of opinion, and when they have been subjected to sufficient practical test, may come to be accepted as knowledge. If they cannot be thus tested, they remain beliefs that carry different degrees of conviction.

The approach to truth by way of belief will be considered in the next chapter. In this we are concerned with the approach by way of perception and inference, by means of which we form opinions—working hypotheses, as we may call them, or provisional 'facts' on which to base our actions; when thoroughly tested and accepted as certain, the results thus reached we may rightly call knowledge.

§ 2. THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE

'Knowledge', like 'truth', is used in different meanings. In the first place, there is the constant confusion—as with so many words describing experience, such as 'memory', 'thought', 'feeling' and so on—between the activity of knowing and the thing known. Taking it first in the former sense, knowledge is sometimes used to cover all that in psychology is expressed by the term 'cognition'—any kind of awareness, that is, whether conscious or not, on the part of an organism of the situation in which it finds itself, as shown by its resulting behaviour.¹ For this meaning the term 'cognition' is much more suitable, and 'knowledge' should be kept for awareness that is, or at least can be, conscious. Although for a thing to be known in the fullest sense it must be present in the stream of consciousness² and we must be aware that it is so present, only a tiny part of what we know can be so present at any moment; and yet, since we can recall a great deal more at will, and recognise still more when it reappears, we can be said to *know* all this, though for the greater part of the time the knowledge is subconscious. It should not, however, properly be called knowledge unless its content can be brought into consciousness. Knowledge, then, is not the same as cognition, but a specialised form of it, only possible where there is a high degree of consciousness.

A common use of the term is to express practical familiarity with or mastery of a thing, knowledge of carpentry, for instance, or of horses. A great deal of such knowledge, however, may be instinctive and subconscious. To know how to do a thing is by no means the same as knowing how we do it, so much so that if we try to think how we must proceed we may find ourselves quite at a loss. One who knows what the weather is likely to be, or how to handle a restive horse, does not necessarily know what are the signs by which he judges. So also much of the practical

¹ For a fuller account of cognition, see *The Will to Live*, chapter iii, § 3.

² *Ibid.*: chapter iv, § 2 (p. 73).

knowledge on which we constantly act, such as avoiding obstacles in our way, may be entirely subconscious. Doing is not the same as knowing, though it furnishes the basis of knowledge and, in the form of skill, may be the outcome of knowledge. While it is best to keep the term knowledge for conscious cognitive experience, we must remember that it rests on earlier stages of unconscious perception.¹ So also, in considering the meaning of truth as applied to knowledge, we must look for its beginnings in the preconscious stage of perceptual experience.

What, then, does the fuller sense of the term knowledge imply?² We can be said to know a person or a fact when we are familiar with them by personal experience, and also when we know a good deal about them at second hand. Thus we can have some real knowledge of the rivers of Yorkshire even if we have never seen them. We may know their names merely; we know them better if we can recognise them on the map; better still, if we have heard or read much about them. Such second-hand knowledge may be called information; and this, no less than personal acquaintance, goes to make up our full knowledge. To deserve the name in this fuller sense, there must be not only familiarity, whether in the form of first-hand acquaintance or information, with facts, but also some understanding of their relationships—of the how and the why, as well as the what, of the subject-matter of experience. Knowledge of this kind, when fully organised, we call science; and scientific knowledge, ultimately based on actual experience, and tested by experimental application under selected conditions, is the fullest and most exact kind of knowledge.

¹ *The Will to Live*, chapter iv, § 2 (p. 65).

² One use of the term may be mentioned to be dismissed. When the poet makes Abt Vogler say: "The rest may reason and welcome; 'tis we musicians *know*", it is a certainty of intuition of which he is speaking, which we are here classifying as belief rather than as knowledge. So too the vision of the mystic, though to him it may seem to be the sum of all knowledge, cannot, since it is ineffable and incommunicable, be accounted more than a personal conviction beyond possibility of proof.

To speak of information and science as knowledge is, of course, to use the term in the second of the two meanings which were said above to be liable to confusion, in the sense, that is, of what is known. This may be some isolated piece of information, as, for instance, the name of the American President; or it may be a mass of facts and their relationships organised into a whole, such as the physical Geography of Scotland, or the French Revolution; or it may be knowledge as a whole, meaning the sum of everything that can be known. It is quite impossible to avoid such uses of the term, and when they occur the meaning should be plain enough to avoid confusion. But in considering truth as knowledge, it is not so much the content of knowledge with which we are concerned as the mode of attaining what we may hold to be true, or at least the closest approximation to truth that is possible for us to reach.

In the development of mind in its cognitive aspect—a development so important and so far-reaching in its achievements as to make this aspect seem to us the supreme manifestation of mind—we can see three well-marked stages: the first merely perceptual, the second dealing also with ideas¹ as well as with percepts, and the third the stage in which formal reasoning is possible. Corresponding to these are different kinds of knowledge. The first kind is the outcome of practical experience, which recognises the more obvious properties of things and sequences of events, and utilises them, so far as it can, for the satisfaction of the needs of life. In this stage primitive man was but little removed, except perhaps in a wider range of perception, from the higher animals. When, however, he could form ideas as well as the pictures called up by memory and imagination, and could use language as a means of recording and communicating past experiences and planning future action, he had already got far beyond the highest of the animals; he could share his knowledge with others and test it by comparison with their experience, and so make it

For the meaning attached to this term, see *The Will to Live*, p. 127.

at once more precise, fuller and more available. Finally, when he could reflect upon his experience and form generalisations from particular incidents, and when he could draw conclusions not only from sense-experience but also, by the use of symbols, as in mathematics, from the treatment of concepts, his knowledge was no longer merely empirical or confined within a framework of irrational belief, but could seek to grasp the larger principles that underlie phenomena, and so became more rational and, as we call it, scientific.

Knowledge, at all stages of its growth, is a mode of experience. All that we know is derived from experience, whether our own or that of others. First there is the primary knowledge of direct experience, through our sensations, perceptions and feelings; then the secondary knowledge, by means of inferences drawn from the first. These are the two ways of finding things out for ourselves; both being available not only at the time but also subsequently, thanks to memory. There is also the knowledge derived from indirect experience; this is made possible by language, art and all other modes of communication from one individual to another, by which we can get to know things that have been found out by others. All such second-hand knowledge was, of course, originally the outcome of direct perception and of inference on someone's part. It is equally liable to the errors of apprehension and interpretation to which direct experience is liable, and also to further errors of recording and communication. Before, therefore, we can accept anything at second hand as certain knowledge it must be checked and tested in three respects: we must satisfy ourselves, first, as to the accuracy of the original perception of events and relations; secondly, as to that of inferences drawn from them,—of the facts themselves, that is, and the reasoning about them; and thirdly, as to the accuracy of statement by which they are recorded. Let us consider these requirements somewhat more fully.

(1) Whenever we experience a sensation-pattern¹ we take

¹ *The Will to Live*, p. 58.

this as evidence of what we call a fact—some object or event, that is, to which the experience can be referred. The only thing of which we are actually certain is the experience in question; but as we are accustomed to refer all sensations to objects and events that we associate with our various sensation-patterns, we speak of these objects and events as 'facts' of which we thus become aware. So certain are we of their existence that we proceed to act in accordance with their requirements, having found that if we do not do so we soon get into difficulties. Sometimes, of course, we find ourselves mistaken; either the sensations were illusory or, more often, we have misinterpreted them. But however frequently this is the case, we still do not doubt that they were indicative of *some* fact; and the more often we find our interpretation justified by the success of the response we make, the more certain we feel of the fact as one that we already know,—and still more when we find that others feel the same certainty. Knowledge is thus not a matter of sensation alone but of perception, dependent on comparison of present experience with similar previous experience, on recognition of the object or event as in some way familiar, and on expectation, justified in practice, of a further familiar sequence of events. A baby, though aware of certain kinds of experience, cannot at first be said to know what they indicate; but as soon as it begins to recognise certain facts in its surroundings, this recognition is the beginning of real knowledge.

Not only do we become aware, by direct experience of this kind, of an immense number of 'facts', but these facts are seen in various relations and grouped in continually enlarging patterns. We become familiar with the spatial and temporal relations of objects and events, with similarities and differences, and with fixed sequences that we interpret as showing cause and result. When once we have become aware of such a pattern, henceforward even if only a part of it is presented, imagination is able to supply the rest, and we find ourselves constantly drawing conclusions from the facts of experience, taking for granted that such a result

will follow, or that such an appearance implies the presence of such and such other facts. When we have found by experience that we can trust these inferences, we accept them as 'facts' of another kind, mental constructions derived from things that are immediately perceived.

(2) When once we have advanced from the merely perceptual stage of recognition to the conceptual stage at which we can not only trace the relations between actual objects and events, and between the mental representations that we form of them, but also between concepts and abstract ideas that are drawn from these, and can substitute symbols such as words for our ideas, there is a further change in the knowledge thus acquired. In much of it—as for example in a mathematical problem—the perceptual experience out of which it has grown may now be of little importance, and the mental constructions themselves become the main thing. It is therefore essential that these should be coherent and logically related if the knowledge that they give is to be reliable when used in directing activity.

There is, however, here a danger. So far from logic being the guarantee of truth, we have to be on our guard lest formal logic should, in practice, become a means of distorting it. One who prides himself on a logical treatment of every matter, and on always following out a line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, is only too likely to take a narrow view and to leave out of account much that is equally relevant. For the principles of formal logic to be applicable, a proposition must be isolated from others and treated as self-sufficient; otherwise too many other considerations come in to allow of any certainty of reasoning or any clear-cut conclusion. In actual life, however, it is seldom possible to isolate one train of events or course of action from others. By insisting on doing so, and reasoning about it independently of other considerations, we are apt to make the conclusion invalid, even though it may have been logically reached. To push everything to its logical conclusion is as though a doctor, hurrying to a sudden call, should stop (it being his vocation to help the suffering) to

raise and comfort a fallen child, and by so doing perhaps sacrifice a life. Relative values are amongst the things that formal logic is apt to overlook.

(3) We soon come to realise that, although our own experience can only bring us into contact with a limited range of material for knowledge, there is an immense amount of material which we must take on trust from those who have, in one respect or another, a wider range of experience. This we do readily enough from parents, comrades and teachers in childhood, when suggestion is especially potent. All through life, indeed, we are inclined to accept as fact anything that we hear authoritatively stated, or still more anything that we see in print. We have to learn caution in this respect, to sift evidence and assure ourselves of the reliability of those on whose statements the accuracy of the facts in question rests; but a large part of our knowledge has always to be acquired in this way, and is accepted by us as no less certain than that obtained by our own experience.

If knowledge, then, is based on perception and reasoning, both immediate and accepted at second hand, certain necessary conditions are evident before it can be accepted as true. The first-hand evidence of the senses must be clear and accurate, not, for example, something dimly seen or half-heard or merely imagined; the facts must be clearly recognised, their relations duly perceived, and conclusions from them correctly drawn. If taken at second hand, the statement must be clear and not capable of different interpretations. There must be no unverified premises or logical fallacies in the process. Moreover, all facts and conclusions must be verifiable by fresh experience, and must prove conformable—or at least not incompatible—with the expectation we have formed from past experience. In proportion as these conditions hold good of any piece of knowledge, to that extent can we consider it true. The fact, for example, that an eclipse can be predicted with an extremely high degree of accuracy is a proof of a considerable certainty of truth in astronomical knowledge. If any of the conditions cannot be satisfied, it is only a still un-

verified opinion, of varying degrees of probability, or an unverifiable belief, and must not be accounted as knowledge.

§ 3. SCIENCE

Knowledge, as we have seen, is a mode of experience; experience alone, however, is not knowledge, but only supplies the raw material for knowledge. An accumulation of facts, however extensive, would be useless to us, and not in any true sense *known*, unless some of the relations between them were understood and so they could be interpreted and disclose a meaning. This is what we are always doing by the light of nature, and a large amount of common-sense knowledge is the result. To obtain knowledge, however, which is at once less patchy and more certain, we need an organised investigation and interpretation of phenomena. This is what we call *science*, which gives us the most complete and the most certain¹ kind of knowledge, so long as we are dealing with what can be observed and measured. Starting with sense-data given by observation and tested by experiment, it proceeds to deal with them in accordance with the laws of thought as formulated in mathematics and logic. In this way it seeks to discover what may be taken as fundamental facts and the relations between them, leaving out of account all that for this purpose is irrelevant. And besides such organised investigation, continually renewed and pushed further, we need also a record of past events; for without some knowledge of these much of our present experience would be unintelligible and we should have continually to rediscover facts which, once recorded, are readily available for further use. This record of past events is *history*; not merely, any more than science, an accumulation of facts, but facts treated in their relations to each other and organised, like the sciences, into systems of knowledge. In treating of the value of truth as exemplified

¹ The certainty of scientific observation and measurement, however, has its limits. Heisenberg's 'principle of indeterminacy' (see p. 220) is an example of a fundamental uncertainty which at present seems insoluble.

in knowledge we must therefore consider it under these two aspects.

Science—to begin with this—can include phenomena of every kind if they are subjected to observation that is not merely haphazard but organised for the purpose of investigating their nature and connection, the events that have brought them about and those to which they in turn give rise. Thus the properties and relations of material objects, events and processes in the external world, those that make up mental experience, and all human discoveries and institutions, are all capable of investigation by scientific methods. By this means we can obtain a body of highly-organised knowledge arranged in more or less closely connected systems that form the various branches of science. Each such body of knowledge rests in the first place on direct experience,—on such facts, that is, in the external world and in ourselves as we are made aware of by perception and perceptual inference. This is the basis of ‘common-sense’—the frank acceptance of things as they seem to us, and of phenomena as implying realities, without further questioning of the ultimate nature of appearance and reality. On this basis science is built up by closer observation of phenomena and comparison of appearances with one another, being throughout concerned rather with the *how* than with any ultimate *why* such as is the quest of philosophy.

This distinction, however, is one of later growth. To primitive man, as to the child, observation can only have been casual, dictated by the feeling of the moment rather than by desire for systematised knowledge. Many of the sequences of events thus noticed could not be accounted for except as due to the caprice of personal agents, a magic only to be mastered by some counter-magic. Out of beliefs like these, as well as the trial and error of practical experience, and out of accumulated observation, recorded and handed on by language, arose the first organised knowledge that may be looked upon as science, uncertain enough in its early stages and mixed with unwarranted

assumptions, but gradually subjected to the sifting of reason and put to the practical test of experiment.

The growth of science has gone through three stages, practical, dogmatic and experimental. The first was that of common-sense knowledge, the outcome of practical experience. Man soon discovered that things have certain fixed properties, and that actions or happenings bring about certain results. On the other hand things do not always turn out as we expect, nor can common-sense alone account for all that happens. There is something apparently capricious in the nature of things only to be explained by primitive man as the work of spiritual agencies, influence of the stars, and so forth, to be met by counteracting agencies known only to the few who are versed in such lore. Thus the approach to science was through a mixture of common-sense and magic; and so it remained even through classical and mediaeval times. It is scarcely more than three centuries since science has been able to emerge from this stage.

Meanwhile another factor had come in, for a considerable body of reliable knowledge had grown up as the result of recorded observation and experience. From the lore of farmer and craftsman passed on from father to son, from the recorded movements of the heavenly bodies and from more careful investigations into the meaning of phenomena, a body of traditional knowledge, of various degrees of reliability, had been gradually built up. This body of tradition, enshrined in books, was the accepted science of the learned, carefully guarded against meddlesome alteration. What Aristotle or Pliny; Galen or Ptolemy,¹ had laid down, was to be taken as unassailable truth, and any

¹ Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), one of the greatest of the Greek Philosophers and master of all the knowledge of his time. He wrote treatises on many branches of science as well as on philosophy. Pliny (A.D. 23–79), a Roman who wrote an encyclopedia (in 36 books) on 'Natural History', i.e. the natural sciences. Galen (A.D. 130–200), a Greek physician, author of various medical treatises. Ptolemy (also in the second century A.D.), a Greek astronomer and geographer, whose account of the planetary system (with the earth as its centre) was universally accepted till replaced by that of Copernicus in the sixteenth century.

questioning of it or attempt to replace it by other conclusions was heresy, no matter on what evidence it might rest. This worship of tradition means the death—or at least the suspension of life—of any intellectual or spiritual achievement. It is a fate to which all such achievements are liable, and science was for long content to entrench itself behind some great name, and refuse to admit that disturbing facts or novel theories could have any validity.

From the trammels of magic and tradition science was rescued by the new spirit of the Renaissance, when men once more ventured to think for themselves and to look out on the world with new eyes. Experiment took the place of authority; nothing was now to be accepted that could not be tested and shown to be in accord alike with reason, with observed fact and with other knowledge which could be held to be certain. It is in these points that modern science differs from what went by the name of science at other times, and is more deserving of the name of knowledge as resting on a surer basis.

The toil and the delight of helping to push forward the frontiers of knowledge are not for many. This in its fullness is given only to a few in each generation, the pioneers of science. With them work others, making useful contributions either of preparatory spadework or in verification of their results. Still more are occupied in tracing out the influence of the new discovery upon the general body of knowledge, and its possible applications in the practical affairs of life. To most of us, however, except so far as it must indirectly affect our lives, the advance of science is only something to stir our wonder and possibly to increase a sense of the uncertainty of knowledge no less than of its achievements. But this does not mean that science is something that concerns only a few special workers and has no value for the rest of us except as a fairy godmother to produce marvels for our entertainment. The spread of scientific knowledge, and of the training given by the study of science, is an essential factor in the apprehension, not only by the few but by all, of the meaning and value of truth.

Without such knowledge and training, quite apart from the practical disabilities entailed—which are hardly less, indeed, than those of a member of some primitive community in contrast with civilised man—we are cut off from our main approach to truth and from a touchstone by which to test the reality of knowledge. The need for such a touchstone increases continually with the increase of knowledge itself and the power that it brings. If we have only common-sense to trust to, we are liable to be misled at every turn by unproved assumptions, by the apparent evidence of our senses and feelings, and by erroneous conclusions, however obvious they may seem, that we draw from the evidence. Thus the assumption that we are acting, on any given occasion, entirely of our own free will and as the result of rational considerations and deliberate choice, needs to be modified by the realisation how large a part in our motives is played by subconscious desires and dislikes. We need no less to realise how liable we are to errors of observation and inference; how easily, for instance, we are deceived by appearance and how hard it is to be sure of the actual facts, since 'facts' are apt to appear different to each observer and to ourselves at different times; and how blind we are to the faults of one we love and to the good qualities of one we dislike. Common-sense is as easily mistaken about other things as about the movement of the sun or the shape of the earth, and is always jumping to conclusions on insufficient evidence.

All knowledge that is based on common experience needs to be corrected by close and repeated observation and tested by experiment in which particular errors are guarded against; and in the same way all the knowledge that is obtained by drawing conclusions from observed or admitted facts needs to be tested by the closest scrutiny of the steps by which the conclusions have been reached. These are the methods of science, for only by rigid observance of such methods can any kind of knowledge rest upon sufficient certainty to be accounted 'science'. In the acquirement of the scientific attitude towards knowledge, and the applica-

tion of scientific methods to experience and to the conclusions that we draw from experience, lies the greatest gain that science and scientific training can bring us. This is a habit of mind of which, as said above, the need grows greater continually with man's increasing power over his environment and over his destiny; and it is one that is an essential condition of the quest for truth.

The first aim of science is to state with the utmost possible exactitude all facts of observation in order to have reliable material for inference and a firm basis for the logical superstructure to be raised on it. For this purpose the language of ordinary use is highly misleading, since having been framed for another purpose, most of its words are vague in meaning and charged with a mass of emotional associations. It was therefore essential that science should create a special language for its purpose; and not merely one of technical terms distinct from the terms of common usage, but one that would allow the utmost possible flexibility of logical treatment. This is given by mathematical symbolism, which has been devised expressly for the purpose of exact statement and inference without any of the sense-connotations and emotional associations of words. It is the aim of science therefore to get all its data expressed in mathematical terms, as to the exact meaning of which there can be no dispute, and to treat them by mathematical processes, in accordance, that is, with laws of thought which are accepted as of universal validity. A science such as physics, in which this is possible, is thus regarded as the most exact kind of knowledge. Those, such as the biological or psychological sciences, in which it is less possible to do this, are for that reason the less certain in their treatment and conclusions; but here also the aim is to make them as mathematical as possible, by selecting data that can be so expressed and ignoring those that are not amenable to mathematical treatment.

There is, however, one proviso that must be borne in mind with regard to the scientific aspect of truth. In scientific method as much of experience as possible is reduced to

something that is capable of quantitative measurement and can be treated mathematically. Within its own field this method of dealing with experience is perfectly logical, and the knowledge thus obtained can be exact and, within the limits laid down, incontrovertible. But seeing that its first condition is to isolate the rational activity of the mind from emotional experience of any kind and to ignore all questions of value, the conclusions reached by this method are no more completely valid than are decisions reached by pushing an argument to its logical conclusion. Scientific truth, like the mathematical aspect of reality, however reliable within its own conventions, is only one aspect of truth. Experience is a whole of thought and feeling and action; and though by isolating one kind of thought we can get a more coherent system of knowledge and a more tractable machinery which gives us a greater mastery of our surroundings, it would be a mistake to suppose that science *alone* is sufficient either as a guide for the conduct of life or as a means of attaining truth in all its aspects.

When we think of truth as exemplified in knowledge, we think mainly of 'science', in the sense of organised and tested knowledge, and of the various branches of science,—each of these a considerable body of such knowledge, dealing with certain aspects of the physical universe or of living organisms and their behaviour,—in which, for convenience, knowledge is arranged, both for ease of reference and because no one can now be equally familiar with all. We may group these various branches of science in three main classes. First, there are those, such as logic and mathematics, that are more concerned with the fundamental laws of thought than with any particular subject-matter to which they are applicable. Secondly, there are the various experimental sciences that investigate the sequences of events that can be observed in the physical universe and in the processes of life and the behaviour of living things: the physical and biological sciences, that is, pursued partly for their own sake, as means of knowledge, but mainly for the practical control of nature that they give. And thirdly, there are the

applied sciences in which the knowledge thus obtained is used for the production of human requirements and the satisfaction of the various needs of human life: the various applications, for example, of mechanical, chemical and biological knowledge in productive industry, and of psychology (in addition to these) in such things as medicine and education and the other social sciences. In the earlier stages of the growth of organised knowledge it was external nature that was most closely studied, both as being easier to observe and more obviously helpful to the support of man's life. The importance of the study of human nature and human institutions is now better realised, as being necessary, if not for the further acquisition of power over our surroundings, at least for deciding under what conditions and for what ends this power can be used.

In our ordinary valuation of science it is usually the sciences that are most capable of practical applications that we think of as the most necessary kind of knowledge, seeing how closely these affect our daily life in every particular. It is in connection with these, and with the continual advance in the extent and accuracy of the knowledge they afford, and its application to our requirements, that we are most apt to recognise the value of truth. We do not always realise how much of their use as well as of their reliability depends on the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake in the domain of 'pure' science. In this domain most of all every advance in knowledge is fraught with vital consequences, not only in the practical uses that are sure, sooner or later, to flow from it, but even more in the enlargement of the human spirit and of the hope and assurance with which we can face our task of shaping the future of mankind. And there is one other result also. The keener our sense of the value of truth, and the larger the extent of the knowledge of which we can feel assured, the more plainly do we see that none of our knowledge, however scientific, can claim to be absolute truth. It is only true, we see, relatively to the standpoint from which we approach it, and to the conditions imposed by the limita-

tions of mind in the present stage of psychological evolution.

This does not necessarily mean (as some have thought) that there is no such thing as truth, or even that it is only relative and what we make it, because this is the case with truth as apprehended by us at any given moment. There is, we must believe, a constitution of the universe independent of our knowledge, even if it should prove to be ultimately unintelligible and irreconcilable with the postulates of logical thought. That it will not so prove we may firmly believe. If we remember that man is himself an integral part of the universe and that his perceptive and reasoning powers, no less than his eyes and ears, have been developed as the outcome of his relations with his surroundings, we shall not believe that such comprehension of reality as they can give him, however partial and uncertain it may yet be, is wholly illusory. Partial and uncertain it necessarily is. As Sir James Jeans has pointed out¹ a savage could grasp the phenomena of a wireless-set, since he is familiar with voices or music such as issue from it, and the atmospherics he would associate with thunder; but he is quite unable to grasp any explanation of the apparatus by which the sounds are produced or the scientific account of their mode of transmission. This, however, is not due to any innate incapacity of his mind, but only to lack of knowledge and training: given these, he may in time come to understand the working of the set and the principles on which it is based.

The position of any one of us in regard to truth is very much that of the savage in regard to the wireless-set. We can apprehend phenomena, and can even give ourselves a partial explanation of how they are produced; and though any complete understanding of the reality that underlies them is still far beyond our powers, this is due, we may well believe, with us as with him, to insufficiency of intellectual training rather than to any fundamental incompatibility between the real world and our mental processes. Just as our senses are adapted only to a narrow section out of the

¹ In *The New Background of Science*, p. 59.

total range of physical manifestations, just enough for the maintenance of life, but can be enlarged by the use of suitable instruments to apprehend a much larger range, so also our minds, being dependent on sense-experience for their material and use, have an equally narrow range of apprehension of truth, but one that, we cannot doubt, can be enlarged and made less imperfect by the growth of knowledge and also, as we may hope, by the emergence of further powers. Meanwhile, to be ready to face the truth, whatever it may be and however hard to reconcile with our wishes or our previous habits of thought, is part of the scientific attitude of mind.

§ 4. HISTORY

In addition to the direct observation of phenomena which is the basis of science, there is also, as said above, another source of knowledge to be found in the record of past events. If each of us had to gain all his knowledge for himself by his own discovery, every generation would have to repeat the discoveries of preceding generations, and little time for fresh advance would be left. But by the use of language, the greatest of man's inventions, not only can anyone communicate his knowledge directly to others, and so shorten for them the time spent in its attainment, but he can leave it behind him in recorded form, so that each generation, receiving the gathered knowledge of previous generations, and starting where they left off, can carry further the pursuit of truth. Books are the chief repositories of such knowledge; and since the record of past observation and of conclusions drawn from facts long ago noted or discovered is thus open to anyone who can read, a library is a storehouse of the knowledge that has been won by those before us, knowledge that is tested and accepted and ready for our use. Not that books can be regarded as the receptacle and dispensary of absolute wisdom. What they give us, in addition to items of knowledge or, it may be, summaries of the knowledge of their time, is a history of the growth of man's ideas and the development of his mind

Though all contain error mingled with truth—none of the giants in the history of knowledge, not Aristotle or Newton or Darwin, is infallible—yet the great books are landmarks in the ascent of man, lights by which men have steered and can still steer their onward course. So long, therefore, as we remember that error as well as truth has been recorded, and that much which once passed for truth has had to be retested and dismissed as error, or at best recognised as only partial truth, we are right in looking upon books as the great storehouse of recorded fact and inference, and the evidence furnished by their records as one of the chief means of getting knowledge.

In any library we shall, of course, find a great part of it given up to books that are of another kind—works of imagination, and all those that deal with matters of belief rather than of knowledge. With these at the moment we are not concerned; for though in our estimate of a man's knowledge we include his familiarity with the contents of books of various kinds, this is not the sense in which we are here speaking of knowledge as one of the avenues by which truth can be approached. Of knowledge in the more restricted sense—the record of facts and of reasoning based on facts—there will be much in any library which may be classified under the general heading of history. Properly speaking, there is no hard-and-fast distinction between history and science; for on the one hand past events can be investigated with the same accuracy of method and treatment as those of which we have direct experience, so that history is itself a branch of science; and on the other, every department of knowledge has its historical aspect no less than the series of events in the life of nations to which the name history is usually confined.

In all branches of knowledge this historical aspect is of great importance; for since the idea of evolution has won general acceptance, it is recognised how greatly our comprehension of the present position of knowledge of any kind depends on understanding by what steps it has come about. And especially is this true of those sciences that are

most directly concerned with the life of man as a social being, for in these it is most difficult to disentangle the facts from the mass of prejudice and custom that tend to distort or conceal them. Just as the psycho-analysts have taught us that repressed complexes can best be unravelled by bringing their origins to light, so also it is by an historical survey of past errors and attempts to overcome them that we can hope most clearly to see social facts as they are, and to draw sound conclusions from them. This is the field, then, in which science and history are most difficult to separate; but in general we can say that where the aim is to understand the growth of a particular branch of knowledge, the record of events belongs to science in its historical aspect; where the aim is to survey some stage in the life of men and to trace the growth of some particular social organisation, this belongs rather to history, regarded as a distinct field of knowledge.

History, therefore, in the fullest sense includes whatever record we can discover of events of all kinds in the past, showing by what stages the physical universe and the various forms of life have come to be what we see them to be to-day. We usually think of it, however, as limited to the record of man's social evolution and of the social organisations that he has created, and as touching upon changes in the physical environment only so far as these have affected or been affected by his social development. Whether we take it in the broader or narrower sense, we have two questions to consider: first, what is the nature of the evidence to which we have to trust; and secondly, what is the criterion of truth to be applied to such evidence as there may be.

All our knowledge of the past events that form the history of mankind depends, so soon as we look back beyond our own memories, on two things. These are the actual remains of things created by men in the past, and the records, oral and written, by which their doings are handed down from one generation to another. The former include the various artifacts left by primitive tribes, with

the remains of their dwellings and the requirements of various kinds stored in them; and so also throughout 'historical' times—times, that is, of which we have written records as well,—the still existing buildings, implements, articles of dress, works of art and so forth, which tell us how men lived in the past and what they cared about; and also such institutions as have left their mark on the world and still influence habits of thought and customs of modern life. All such things furnish the raw material of historical knowledge, from which we have to reconstruct what we can of past events and habits of mind. A greater wealth of material, though only for comparatively recent stages of human evolution, is given by traditions handed down by word of mouth or by writing, by inscriptions, and by records of passing events, from the first brief annals recorded to mark the passage of time down to the immense mass of written matter, public and private, with which, since the invention of printing and the more careful preservation of documents, the historian has now to deal.

This, as said above, is not in itself history, but the evidence on which history rests. It corresponds to the appearances of things observed by science, which have then to be sifted and tested, and from which, when something that we can regard as fact has thus been reached, conclusions have to be drawn. In other words, before there can be any trustworthy historical knowledge, there must be not only a thorough investigation of the evidence but some interpretation of the facts that it discloses. We must be assured of the degree of reliability in the witness who vouches for any fact, and must take into account the personal bias not only of the original witness but also of the writer who has accepted the evidence and who, moreover, cannot help, however unconsciously, to some extent re-shaping the fact in the telling. We have to make allowance for changes in the ideas and beliefs that underlie any statement, changes which give to words a different connotation and to facts a different meaning from those they once had; and we have no less to be on our guard against accepting as fact

what may have been, whether intentionally or not, distorted in the interests of propaganda.

The further back we go, the more we have to depend on tradition, in regard to which, for all these reasons, however hallowed it may have become by centuries of repetition and belief, complete certainty can seldom be reached for lack of sufficient independent evidence to test its truth. It is this that gives, for the early history of man, a special value to archaeological discovery, as tending either to confirm or to correct tradition; as, for instance, recent excavations in Mesopotamia have shown good grounds for accepting the tradition (one version of which is given in the Book of Genesis) of a great flood, the actuality of which many had doubted. In dealing with all evidence, from ancient tradition down to contemporary rumour, we must so far as is possible follow the methods of science and accept as certain nothing that cannot be tested. In the first place, we must be sure that we have given due weight to all the relevant facts; and if there is any dispute as to the facts or as to the interpretation of them, we must be careful to hear both sides of the question. Wherever possible, we must obtain independent confirmation of a stated fact, and must be chary of accepting any statement for which such confirmation is not to be found. Even if an event resting upon an unsupported statement is inherently probable, this may have been the very reason that gave rise to the statement, rather than knowledge of it as actual fact. Nor must we let the authority of any witness override our own judgment, unless that authority is so great—that of an intelligent eye-witness, for instance, whom we know to be unlikely to distort the evidence—as to outweigh any other grounds for judgment that there may be. In most cases we can only expect to attain to some degree, greater or smaller, of probability. Even if we can be sure of the actual facts as known to eye-witnesses, there is much in the interpretation of events that depends upon motives that are unseen and liable to be misjudged; and in tracing the sequence of events it is hardly possible to decide with certainty how

much was due to deliberate purpose and how much to inertia or to chance. The truth of history is therefore of a less assured kind than that of science. History, even when treated as a science, differs from an experimental science in one respect: the sequences of events that it studies cannot ever be exactly repeated or tested under selected conditions. It is therefore not so often by the discovery of new facts that a closer approximation to truth can be found as by fuller interpretation of the facts, such as is made possible by the advance of psychological knowledge. This can often throw new light on the motives of actions and the unexpected results that have so frequently frustrated the intentions of the actors, great as well as small, in the drama of events or on the way in which the events have been distorted in the process of recording them.

History was at one time regarded rather as a branch of literature than as a science, the object of the historian being to give a vivid picture of past events and one in which imagination could supplement tradition, more regard being paid to interest than to meticulous accuracy. In contrast to this (the Herodotus or Livy view of history) as it may be called) the aim of the scientific historian (Thucydides among classical writers will serve as an example) is to investigate with the utmost minuteness a single period, and to give only facts that are well attested. In the hands of the research school of historians to whom history means the study of contemporary documents and the accumulation of every available fact, this aim is apt to produce records of what Carlyle dubbed the 'Dry-as-dust' type, from which it is impossible for anyone but a professed student to extract any significance. A third view regards history neither as literature nor as science, but rather as a philosophic study. Croce,¹ for example, sees in it not a dead chronicle of unrelated facts but something that, of whatever period it treats, must be 'contemporary', in the sense that the historian must select and present the facts in accordance with his own philosophic belief. History, in

¹ Benedetto Croce, a contemporary Italian philosopher.

this view, is not a record of 'brute fact' but an individual perception of fact in relation to a chain of events in which the writer can trace some process of growth or decay.

Seeing that history is concerned with man's doings at this or that stage of social evolution, a large part of it is necessarily occupied with the doings of individual members of some social whole. Biography is thus history of a special kind. In history proper the main theme is the life of the community, and the individual is only brought into prominence so far as he directs this and influences the communal psychology; in biography the light is concentrated upon the individual and the historical background is of importance only so far as it offers the field for his activities and affects his psychological development. But in this side-study of history, as in the main field, it is truth of fact and of interpretation that is sought. If, in the quest of plausible interpretation, historical fact is either distorted or enlarged, if not altogether replaced by invention, the outcome may be the imaginative truth of a work of art, but not the truth of fact that is the basis of historical as of scientific knowledge.

It was pointed out above that, whereas organised knowledge was at first concerned mainly with external nature in order to obtain a greater mastery of the material needs of life, the knowledge of human nature and human institutions has now come to be of even greater importance as being concerned not merely with our surroundings but with the whole of our life, and with all our activities and interests. Of this knowledge a large part falls within the province of history. Knowledge of this kind is no less necessary than that furnished by the investigations of science; for it is only by knowing how the present position of things has arisen, and by profiting from the example of attempts, successful and unsuccessful, to deal with similar circumstances or similar tendencies in the past, that we can hope to approach the problems of to-day and to-morrow with sufficient understanding and to avoid the errors of which history may serve to warn us. Among the Greek leaders

before Troy, Nestor, who had lived through three generations of man, spoke with an acknowledged authority as the outcome of his greater experience, having always some illustration or lesson from the past with which to throw light on the question under discussion. To each of us history is able to give a memory longer than Nestor's, and to furnish examples, both of encouragement and warning, that we shall do well to heed.

For history is not only a record of events or of the growth of ideas, nor even an interpretation of them in terms of their relations with each other, but also an interpretation in terms of values. It is concerned with men's motives and purposes as well as with their actions; and is not, like science, a quest for impersonal truth but is enriched and vivified by the sympathies that arise from a common human experience. It sets forth what men at various stages of development have felt to be most worthy of their effort, and in challenging our judgment of their values compels us to become more conscious of our own. In this lies its greatest use; not merely in showing the results that have followed from this or that course of action in the past, but in weighing motives and tracing aims, and in judging the worth of the ideas that have found embodiment in action. History, if it is to have its highest value, must be not only a science but a work of art; no mere photographic record of the past, but one that by selection, grouping, concentration of interest, can educe from the confused web of events a pattern that shall reveal the values implicit in all experience.

CHAPTER V

TRUTH AS BELIEF AND IMAGINATION

§ I. THE BASIS OF BELIEF

The apprehension of experience that we call knowledge is based, as we have seen, on sense-perception and on reasoning about data thus obtained, whether at first hand or taken from the recorded experience of others. There is, however, another kind of apprehension of experience which gives, or seems to give, an equal certainty of assurance. This is not dependent on sense-perception, but rather on that mode of apprehension which we call *intuition*, in which feeling plays a larger part than cognition, though anything that is intuitively apprehended is usually so closely linked with cognitive elements that we often fail to distinguish it from knowledge properly so called. Being mainly a matter of feeling, intuition is in itself more akin to aesthetic experience than to the mental processes by which knowledge is built up; but the subject-matter of intuition can, of course, be treated in the same way as the data of sense-perception, and used as material for drawing inferences and building up systems of thought resembling the organised systems of knowledge to which we give the name of science. Whereas these latter, however, are based upon objective sense-data that can be verified by constant repetition, the former, being based on the largely subjective data of personal feeling, remain matters of *belief* rather than of knowledge.

In ordinary usage, 'belief' may have two different meanings that need to be distinguished. When we say that we believe such and such an event to have occurred or that we believe a statement to be true, all that we imply is that the degree of certainty, if not so great as to enable us to say that we know the event in question to have actually occurred or the statement to be in exact accord with the facts, yet is sufficient to justify us in acting on this assump-

tion. Thus we may believe that someone seen in the distance is a friend we want to speak to, and though the certainty is not complete, it is sufficient to make us run after him or call to him. Similarly, when a scientific hypothesis has, from other considerations, such a high degree of probability that for the time being its truth, pending verification, is assumed, it may be accepted as provisionally true although it is not yet to be treated as a piece of actual knowledge. So, too, we may believe that a certain historical event actually took place in the past, although full evidence may be lacking; or that events will follow a particular course in the future, even if there is no such degree of scientific certainty as in the case of an astronomical prediction.

All that, in such cases, is meant by the term belief is that there is a higher degree of probability, but one that, so far as certainty is concerned, falls short of actual knowledge. This, in the preceding chapter, was called 'opinion'; and this was said to be knowledge in the making, since in all cases when the probability can be practically tested, whether verified or disproved, it becomes knowledge. It is not in this meaning of 'opinion' that 'belief' is here to be understood. As contrasted with 'knowledge' the term is to be understood, not as expressing partial and not yet fully verified knowledge, but rather as an assurance of certainty differing from knowledge and arrived at in a different way. This assurance is derived not, as with knowledge and opinion, from the evidence of the senses and by reasoning about material thus obtained, but from intuition and imagination. That truth can be obtained by these means we commonly take for granted, and without requiring perceptual or evidential verification of the kind that we regard as necessary for scientific or historical knowledge. Thus we accept as self-evident truths that we are alive and distinct from anything about us; that we are actuated from within ourselves and have some freedom of choice; that other people feel as we do; that some things are good and others bad, and so on. From accepted 'truths' of this kind we can build up whole systems of belief which differ from

systems of organised knowledge only in the nature of the evidence on which they rest.

In one sense, indeed, all knowledge, even the most exact and most firmly based of the sciences, is ultimately a matter of belief. For behind the evidence of the senses and the use of the reasoning powers there are certain assumptions that must be accepted if there is to be any possibility of knowledge at all. Thus the reality of experience must be taken as the starting-point of all knowledge. We may question what it is that we experience, but that we do experience *something* we cannot question without denying the possibility of knowledge. And in general we assume much more than this. Thus the physical sciences start with the assumption that sense-impressions are due to external facts of some kind; and this, seeing that we can only experience the sense-impressions themselves, is purely a matter of belief. So also in accepting inferences as valid we are acting on belief, since in the case of inductive reasoning it cannot be shown that complete certainty can ever be reached. But though all knowledge thus ultimately rests upon belief,—upon matters of direct apprehension, that is, which we accept as self-evident,—we do not account anything as knowledge which does not come through evidence of the senses and use of the reasoning powers, things that can be repeated by any normally constituted and rational observer and verified in the manner above discussed. Any assurance of certainty that we may have which does not come through this channel we cannot regard as knowledge, but it remains throughout a matter of belief.

The difference between them lies in the fact that belief, as distinguished from knowledge and opinion, remains a purely subjective experience, incapable of submission to the test of objective observation which can be repeated at will. From one point of view belief is thus at a grave disadvantage. The truth of a piece of knowledge can be submitted to objective test and verified, or at least the degree of probability established, in a manner that will be accepted by all rational minds; while the truth of a belief is a purely

personal conviction which may or may not be shared by others but cannot be put to any test that will be accepted as conclusive by all. Even the fact that a man has died for his belief, while it will convince others of his sincerity, will not necessarily convince them of its truth. On the other hand, the fact that belief is the outcome of a direct apprehension of something that, to the one experiencing it, seems self-evident, instead of coming through the medium of sense-perception and inference, gives it a character of certainty seeming, to those who hold the belief, to have a validity superior to that of laboriously acquired knowledge. Poets—Blake and Keats will serve as examples—have long insisted on the superiority, as a means of discovering truth, of imagination over reason; and Bergson¹ is not the only philosopher who has placed the claims of intuition, for this purpose, above those of intellect. Since, as said above, knowledge itself rests upon assumptions that have to be accepted as self-evident, an apprehension of experience which is thus accepted may well seem to have an absolute assurance of truth. Thus the faith, whatever it may be, that is the core of any religion can well give a greater assurance of reality than any facts of observation or reasoning that may seem to invalidate it. To one who believes that there is some freedom of the human will, and that certain of his actions lie within his own choice, no amount of determinist argument, or even proof that in this or that case where we feel ourselves free we are in reality only following some necessity of our nature and circumstances, will shake his belief that there is yet some freedom of choice. Or again, if we share the faith that life and its purposes are not merely the outcome of blind chance, nor our values illusions with which we cheat ourselves into continuing a futile struggle, we shall not be shaken out of it by any demonstration of the insignificance of man's place in the universe, and of the hostility or indifference of nature to our desires.

¹ Henri Bergson, a contemporary French philosopher. His *L'Évolution Créatrice* was published in 1907.

But if belief is not dependent on the kind of evidence that we demand in the case of knowledge, this does not mean that it is entirely independent of tests such as are applied in verifying the facts of experience. We doubt, for instance, the sanity of a person who continues to hold a belief to be true which is continually being contradicted by normal experience. A belief which is found to be irreconcilable with this, or with the organised and tested knowledge that is the outcome of experience, must sooner or later be modified into some accord with it. Thus while we recognise more and more clearly the possibility, and indeed the frequency, of abnormal occurrences, especially where the relations of mind and body are concerned, we cannot now believe in the possibility of miracles, such as stopping the course of the sun or bringing a statue to life, which would imply breaches in the continuity of nature. A belief, if it is to be accepted by normal people, must be shown to pass the pragmatic test of leading, in practice, to foreseen results. And further, it must not be irreconcilable with the laws of thought or with natural feeling. The famous saying 'credo quia impossibile' will not serve to convince others of the truth of the belief in question any more than an argument in which there are demonstrable errors in reasoning. Belief in the efficacy, in times of crisis, of human sacrifice as a means of appeasing divine anger and averting disaster cannot survive the growth of humaner feeling; nor can we now believe that justice demands 'an eye for an eye', or that any human wrong-doing merits eternal punishment.

Not that our logic or our feeling is in itself a guarantee of truth; the real nature of the universe may have little relation to either. But as our beliefs are shaped by thought and feeling they are inevitably affected by any development of these, and we cannot continue to hold beliefs in which we become aware of any serious violation of them. Nor can we accept as true a belief which proves to be irreconcilable with others that we hold. Thus we cannot believe that the events of the universe proceed in fixed sequences of universal law, and also that they will be altered by some

overwhelming power in accordance with our requests. Not infrequently, indeed, we do hold beliefs that in reality are irreconcilable; but this is due to the power of dissociation,¹ by which the contradiction is kept from coming into consciousness. When once we are forced to see it, we have to admit that both of the contradictory elements cannot be true.

Of our beliefs, some (such as the truths above mentioned that we take to be self-evident) may be said to be innate. To these the term 'animal faith' has been applied; and aptly, for like animals and like children we act upon them unconsciously long before we become sufficiently aware of them to put them into words. Some are accepted from those about us by suggestion, or from books; some again are assumptions based upon experience, or else intuitions that may seem to be independent of it. They may form part of an organised system of belief, like religious or political faith, or stand alone, as, for instance, a belief in omens or premonitions may do. Whether they are as definite as this or of a more general character—such as the faith that effort, even if doomed to failure, is better than acquiescence in what is felt to be unworthy—our beliefs are of vital importance, for even when they do not come directly into consciousness they do much to determine and to intensify the motives of action. Whereas it is our knowledge that decides how we shall set about reaching the end proposed, it is belief that largely determines what end shall be pursued. And in one respect above all we need the assurance of belief to supplement our knowledge. Modern science, by revealing an immensity of universes far beyond our comprehension, tends to deprive man of any faith in an intelligible purpose and meaning in things, and of any purpose on his own part beyond that of material comfort. There is, therefore, beneath the growth of material well-being, a growing tendency to pessimism as to the meaning and value of life. This, being itself an attitude of belief, no reasoning can dispel. It can only be replaced by a faith that brings a stronger assurance of truth. Not, of course, that we can

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter xiii, § 2 (pp. 222-4).

set ourselves to believe anything that we may wish to believe or find comforting. Belief, as said above, has its own tests and conditions no less than knowledge; and no belief can satisfy us that cannot be reconciled with these. But we are too ready to assume that the truth of science is the whole of truth. There is much of human experience that does not come within its scope; and our deepest intuitions are no more subject to scientific proof or disproof than is our sense of beauty or any other direct apprehension of value.

§ 2. THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY

There are thus two fields of cognitive experience, the one concerned with ascertained facts and with all that can be inferred from these, the other concerned with beliefs as to the nature and significance of experience and the outcome, in thought and feeling and conduct, to which they give rise. Just as the one, based on observation and verified by experiment, is most fully organised in the systems of knowledge to which we give the general name of science, so also the other, based on the intuition of feeling rather than on sense-perception, finds its fullest organisation in the form that we call philosophy. They differ not only in the standpoint from which they seek to discover truth but also in their scope. Science is concerned with ascertaining facts of observation, and their various relations, in order to discover the sequences in which they take place and to utilise this knowledge for bringing them under our control. Philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned rather with the meaning of experience and seeks to discover underlying principles that will throw light on particular problems and help us to shape our attitude towards them.

In the earlier stages of reflection on experience it could hardly have been possible to draw a distinction between knowledge and belief. Experience showed certain facts: that stones were hard and could break bones; that water could be friendly and quench your thirst or hostile and drown you; that light sometimes gave place to darkness; and so

forth. But it was only a matter of belief that things would continue to behave in the same way, or could be changed by magic; whether, for instance, the sun in winter or in an eclipse was about to disappear for ever or could be induced, or even compelled, to return. It needed long and carefully recorded observation to substitute some certainty of knowledge for the possibilities of belief; and much testing by experiment before the facts of observation could be verified and the connection between them established. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that when man began to ponder over his experience and bring his ideas about it into some organised whole of thought, it was a philosophy (usually in some form of religious belief) that he first shaped for himself. In this way he acquired a body of beliefs that were mainly the outcome of feeling, in which the common-sense evidence of the senses was taken for granted, and any explanation of the meaning of events, so long as it satisfied his cravings and allayed his fears, was as valid as any other.

Philosophy—and with it science, which first took form as a branch of philosophical enquiry, and for long was designated 'natural philosophy'—found its starting-point in the teaching of religion as regards the creation and divine guidance of the universe, and endeavoured to fit all facts of observation and experience into a framework of unquestioned beliefs. It has been the task of philosophy, no less than of science, to emerge from this dependence on preconceived ideas and, starting from facts of experience—among which must be included the inner world of value as well as the external world of sense-experience—to construct a framework within which all these facts will find a place. In this process philosophy has come to occupy a more restricted and at the same time a more definite sphere of activity. Out of the region of belief and partial knowledge the various sciences have gradually been carved into so many separate holdings, as accurate observations were accumulated, facts and inferences tested, guesses verified or dismissed, and organised bodies of knowledge and belief

formed that could be relied upon in practice. Thus philosophy, which at one time embraced the whole range of organised thought that had grown from the common-sense apprehension of daily experience, has been gradually confined to the realms of thought that cannot be subjected to the methods of science or treated as scientific knowledge.

Philosophy, then, is the search for truth in a somewhat different field of experience from that investigated by science, and approached from a somewhat different standpoint. Its multifarious interests may be grouped in three main lines of enquiry. Along one of these it investigates the nature and the reality of experience, a line of enquiry to which the term 'metaphysics'¹ is usually applied. Along the second line it takes into consideration the meaning of experience, with which science is not directly concerned, and the different values that we find in experience of various kinds, with their influence on the conduct of life. It is thus closely connected with religion and with ethics and aesthetics. It constitutes, indeed, the cognitive aspect of religion; while ethics and aesthetics, so far as they are departments of scientific study, may be looked upon as having been carved out of philosophy on this side, just as the various actual sciences have been carved out of it on the other.

The third line of philosophical enquiry is in one sense even more fundamental than the other two, for it raises the prior question of the nature and possibility of knowledge itself, and investigates the means by which we can hope to attain any certainty either as to the reality of

¹ Just as the study of physical events and their properties and relations is called 'physics', so is this study called 'metaphysics' and the questions with which it deals 'metaphysical'. The use of the term comes from the writings of Aristotle, in which the discussion of questions of this kind was placed after that of physical matters, and so came to be referred to as the matters treated *after physics*, which is all that the term properly means. From this use, however, it has come to mean questions of a different character from those of physical science, and is commonly taken to mean *beyond* or *above physics* as though dealing with something either superior to, or not having the same reality as, events in the external world. To avoid any such connotation, the term 'ontology' is now more exactly used to express this branch of philosophy, to distinguish it from the other two branches which are respectively termed 'axiology' and 'epistemology'.

experience or as to its meaning. As no valid conclusions can be reached along either of these other lines without some assurance as to the validity of the means by which they are obtained, philosophy has tended to give more and more attention to this question, and has thus become more definitely psychological. To the question, "How is it we can know anything at all?" various answers have been given. Plato¹ held that, while all sense-experience is changeable and uncertain, concepts alone have a permanency and unchangeableness that show them to be real. Mathematical concepts, for example, such as that of a circle, are pure essences of which any actual figures that we can draw are only poor approximations and clumsy copies. Ideas, therefore, the pure 'Forms' of things, are the essential realities, which our minds, although hampered by the limitations of sense while they are confined in material bodies, can at least partially apprehend. This we do because, before this confinement within a body, we were free from its limitations and could apprehend the pure ideas, of which we still retain some dim remembrance. Experience is thus, he held, the reminiscence and recognition of the pure Forms when we come into contact with their earthly copies. Other thinkers, without accepting Plato's doctrine of ideal Forms, have also held that there are such things as innate ideas already present in the mind at birth and revealed in the course of experience.

This theory the Empiricist philosophers rejected, taking the common-sense view that knowledge is given directly by experience. To Locke,² for instance, the mind at birth was like a blank sheet of paper on which only actual experience could write anything. But it is not easy, on this theory, to see how, with no previous experience, the mind can begin to exercise the complex activity implied in perception, which is not simply a passive reception of sense-impressions

¹ Plato (428-348 B.C.), the best known of Greek philosophers, being the only one whose writings have come down to us entire. He was a pupil of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle.

² John Locke (1632-1704), an English philosopher of the empiricist school.

but a process in which such activities as selection, comparison, inference, expectation, are in varying degrees involved.¹

That the mind itself plays a large part in shaping the impressions that it receives can hardly be doubted. This *sine qua non* of knowledge was elaborated by Kant² in his theory of the 'categories', or fundamental conditions of thought, such as time, space, quantity, quality, causation, into which all that comes to us through our senses must be fitted before it can be used as material for experience and perceived at all. What 'things in themselves' may be—the reality of which our senses give us evidence—we cannot know, but only the ideas of them that are shaped by passing through the mental categories. Knowledge is thus made dependent on experience as moulded by the actual constitution of the mind.

Each of these theories makes a contribution to the problem. We do undoubtedly gain most of our knowledge from experience; but few would now deny that some knowledge is *a priori*, whether we regard it as 'reminiscence', in Plato's sense, or as inherited, like our bodily characteristics, from the experience of our ancestors, or as imposed upon us by the nature of our minds. That we can only perceive things in patterns in which certain relations of time, space, similarity and so forth are involved, is certain. But even so we are still at a loss to explain how perception takes place, and what is the nature of the connection between physical events and the mental process of knowing. To these questions science has no answer to give except on the physical side of the process; and philosophy can only suggest that the problem becomes a factitious one if we regard all events as having a twofold character, physical and mental, and knowing as the subjective aspect of objective existence.

Besides the question how knowledge is possible at all, there is also a further question as to the different modes of the mind's activity, and the extent to which reliance can

¹ See *The Will to Live*, chapter viii, § 1 (p. 119).

² Emmanuel Kant (1724–1804), one of the most famous of German philosophers.

be placed on any of them. Of the three fundamental modes of experience, doing, feeling and thought, philosophers, being pre-eminently thinkers, have usually been inclined to attach an exclusive importance to the third. The majority of philosophical systems have been based on reason; reasoning, that is, from certain data that have been taken to be self-evident has been recognised as the surest, if not the only, method of arriving at a coherent system of thought about the universe and the problems of experience. Reasoned argument, or 'dialectic', has been held, ever since the time of Socrates,¹ to be the proper vehicle of philosophy. While alike in this respect, the differences between philosophical systems have been due to the different data from which they have started. Since reason has usually found much to discredit in the myths and traditions that have grown up in all religions, a rationalist philosophy has come to mean one that is opposed to all spiritualist explanations of the facts of experience. But in this there is no inevitable necessity. A philosophy like that of the scholastics, which proceeds by rigid reasoning from first principles, can deduce from these, if its postulates be granted, the dogmas of Catholicism. The fact that the majority of systems of philosophy appeal to reason as the only assurance of belief is therefore no guarantee of agreement in any other respect.

Reason, in fact, is a powerful instrument for disclosing all that is involved in the assumptions, of whatever kind they may be, to which it is applied; but, except in emphasising the reasonableness of any conclusion thus reached, it can do little to give assurance of certainty to the initial premises from which it starts. The claims of different schools of philosophy as to the self-evident nature of their first principles are so contradictory as to afford no ground for accepting with confidence, outside the sphere of logic and mathematics, the results arrived at by reasoning from these

¹ Socrates (? 470-399 B.C.), the most striking figure, both for his character and his philosophy, in the development of Greek thought. He left nothing in writing; but his methods of teaching have been recorded in the dialogues of his pupil, Plato.

various premises. It is small wonder, therefore, if some thinkers have adopted a philosophy of scepticism, based on the insufficiency of reason to reveal any final truth. This is the position of these 'agnostics' who recognise the limited nature not only of our knowledge but of our power of obtaining it, and the consequent impossibility, as they feel, of solving metaphysical problems.

Other philosophers would dethrone reason in favour of intuition as the most reliable means of discovering truth. Intuitions of some kind, ranging from the common-sense that takes all its perceptions for granted as giving direct contact with reality, up to the vision of the mystic, which to him seems to give this contact in a manner and to a degree impossible to anything that comes through the senses, have always been the chief basis for beliefs for the majority of mankind. Philosophers also, from Plato to Bergson, have insisted that feeling has its place, as well as reason, in the discovery of truth, and that intuition, in which feeling is one with cognition, can make us aware of a reality that cannot be reached either through the senses or by pure intellect.

Yet others hold that truth is not to be discovered either by reason or by intuition, but only by actual results. Some assert that there are no pre-existent truths from which we can deduce the rest, but that our beliefs are only established by the general experience of mankind and must continually be modified as this is enlarged. The position of those who hold that only whatever is found in practice to work is to be counted true, is called pragmatism. Those who wish to emphasise the fact that our knowledge of such truth is confined to human experience and concerned only with whatever affects mankind, give to their position the name of humanism.

A more recent development of this attitude towards truth is that sometimes spoken of as 'instrumentalism'. Professor Dewey,¹ its chief exponent, points out that the quest for some stable certainty in the constant flux of events has

¹ See *The Quest for Certainty* by J. Dewey. Allen & Unwin.

led to an unfortunate separation of *knowing*, as seeming to give such stability, from *doing* which is necessarily concerned with change. Since all action implies an attitude based on probabilities, theory, in which doubts and contingencies need not arise, has always been unduly exalted by philosophers over practice. Science, however, with its dependence on experimentation, is now restoring the balance and supports a 'functional' view of knowledge. Those who think along these lines find hope for the reconciliation of the results obtained by science with our beliefs concerning human purposes and values by means of an 'experimental empiricism', in which directed doing is recognised as determining what there is to be apprehended. Such an attitude towards knowledge involves giving up the quest for absolute certainty. Mind is not, in this view, regarded as the spectator of external objects, but as a participant in the evolution of natural and social events. The objects of the process of knowing are the consequences of doing; and the presence of mind is expressed in changes that are directed, its function being not primarily to know, but to guide action.

It will be evident that such a view of the nature and function of knowledge as a means of approach, through action as well as through feeling and thought, to a truth that is not complete takes into account, as the older philosophic systems did not, the fact of psychological evolution. It exemplifies the modern trend of thought no longer to regard the universe as a static whole to be contemplated by mind, whether by means of science or philosophy, but rather as a concatenation of continually changing events, in which all is relative; and to regard mind not as a mere spectator but rather as an agent seeking to order events in accord not only with its logical necessities but also with its values. There is, of course, even within the framework of such a general conception, room for considerable differences of opinion and belief, and little likelihood of the emergence of any one philosophic system that will command general acceptance; but it is along some such lines that the exploration of the problems of philosophy seems mainly to be tending.

Although it is possible to distinguish philosophical systems by the relative importance that they attach to reason, intuition or practical experience as the most reliable means of arriving at truth and the guarantee of its certainty, no system, on whichever of the three it places most reliance, can entirely dispense with the other two. Both rationalist and pragmatist, whether they admit it or not, depend in the last resort on an intuitive apprehension of the reality of the facts or the validity of the principles which they take for their starting-point. And so, too, though sceptic and intuitionist may distrust the sufficiency of reason and set narrow limits to its scope, they must both make use of it within these limits to establish their own conclusions and build any system of thought out of them. And all alike must take into account the facts of experience, for no system of thought could win acceptance for long which proved to be in flagrant contradiction to the common experience of mankind. To the enquirer who looks to philosophy rather for some guidance in forming his outlook upon life than for metaphysical subtlety, that philosophy would most readily command his assent which gave due weight to each of the three sources of conviction. It must be in harmony, that is, at once with his own deepest intuitions and with the facts of actual experience; and these, together with any conclusions that can be drawn from them, must be submitted to the judgment of the intellect and must be able to pass whatever critical tests reason can apply. Only in this way is it the outcome of the whole mind in all its modes of experience, each of which we cannot but believe to have a validity of its own that must not be ignored.

§ 3. THE SEARCH FOR REALITY

Philosophy began with the first generalisations of experience and was chiefly concerned with the objects of man's desires and fears, and with the explanations that he gave himself of their nature and origin. In this respect it resembled the myths that play so large a part in the history of early religion. To find the causes of things is the aim both of

philosophy and of science; but while it is the search for immediate causes and laws of interaction that has become the special task of science, the philosopher searches for ultimate causes and for principles that lie beyond the scope of the scientist. Only philosophers can devote themselves to this search and to the elaboration of systems of belief; but though all cannot do this, each of us must have some philosophy, however far from explicit and coherent it may be, as the basis of his conduct of life. Even if he has no guiding principles but drifts along at the mercy of circumstances, this still implies a negative outlook on life, a philosophy of indifference. In most cases, our outlook is vague and changeable until in time we settle down into a routine of habit and prejudice; the principles on which we act are often contradictory, and most of us are content to leave them unformulated or to accept—in name, at least—those of some particular creed. But whether we have thought them out or not, we tend, according to our mental make-up, to some kinds of belief rather than to others: either, for example, to a materialistic or to an idealistic outlook, or to a habit of mind that resents change or one that desires it. Philosophy, in fact, is not something that is merely the concern of a few but, like science, affects us all.

The starting-point is to be found in the accepted beliefs of common-sense, the habit of mind that is called empiricism, taking things as they come and judging by the results, though with a constant readiness to jump to conclusions on the slightest of evidence. Historically, as said above, philosophy has largely been science in the making; its earliest forms were the assumptions and guesses from which tested and verified knowledge slowly grew. As more and more sciences have been detached from the general body of philosophic enquiry, it has been argued that philosophy must finally disappear and be absorbed in science, or else itself become a mere branch of science—‘epistemology’—that deals with the nature of *knowing*. To regard it, however, as merely an inchoate science with this narrow scope is to misunderstand the proper function of philosophy.

This is not, like that of science, to seek to know the structure and working of the universe, but rather to seek to understand its meaning in terms of rationality or of value. Instead, therefore, of being narrowed by the growth of science its range has been extended by this growth, for it seeks to obtain a 'synoptic' view (as Plato called it) with which to embrace all knowledge and the basic problems of life as a whole. The philosopher, in short, is not one who knows more facts about nature and man than ordinary people, but one who cares more for the significance and value of the facts. While philosophy, therefore, has been the forerunner of science, to prepare the way for exact knowledge, science in its turn is the handmaid of philosophy. On the one hand, it provides material more reliable than that of unsystematised experience, and, on the other, it forges an instrument of logical thought and scientific method by which to test the conclusions developed from our beliefs, and so to give assurance to the aims and lines of conduct in which our values are embodied.

To most people philosophy stands for metaphysical speculations, remote alike from the interest and understanding of the ordinary man and seeming to have little practical application. The old jibe against the metaphysician as "a blind man in a dark room searching for a black cat which isn't there" finds only too much warrant in the history of philosophy. It has been suggested¹ that philosophical enquiry—the application of intelligence to belief—arose from the need that came to be felt of reconciling the traditional acceptance of social obligations and the beliefs by which they were supported with the positive knowledge arising from the practice of crafts and the increasing familiarity thus brought about with observed facts and sequences implying universal causation;—the need, in short, of reconciling religion and its traditional beliefs with the systematic knowledge that had its origin in practical experience. Owing to the prestige of tradition, the natural tendency was for the thinker, even while criticising the forms taken by

¹ By Prof. J. Dewey in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*.

traditional beliefs and correcting their absurdities, to wish to preserve their spirit and to make plain the essential rationality and universality of the underlying principles on which the traditional system could be shown to be based. He was thus led to make an exaggerated parade of rationality in the method and of universality in the outlook of philosophy, in order to give certainty and sanction to beliefs which could not, like the practical knowledge of the craftsman, be readily submitted to experimental test. This, at any rate, may well be one reason, besides the natural tendency of thinkers to exaggerate the importance of abstract thought, for the bias of philosophy towards metaphysical speculations.

These speculations have mostly busied themselves with two questions: the first, as to the unity or diversity of substance of which the universe, beneath the endless multiplicity of appearances, may be held to be composed; and the second as to the ultimate nature of reality. Of the first, with the monist, dualist and pluralist theories that have been advanced, something was said in an earlier chapter,¹ when it was suggested that the problem takes on a new aspect when considered in the light of emergent evolution in which a reconciliation of the opposing views is possible. The second question has divided philosophers, whatever their other differences, into two great opposing schools: the realists, who stand by the common-sense view (however far from the common-sense presentation their elaborated systems may be) of the real existence of the external world independently of our knowledge of it; and the idealists, who point out that whatever may exist is only known to us through the medium of our minds and as part of our mental experience, and for us, therefore, so far as our apprehension of it goes or can go, exists in our thought and may have no other than a purely mental existence.

Idealism—to speak of this first—has developed along two main lines. The one may be called subjective idealism, in which reality is denied to external things and found

¹ See Chapter I, § 1.

only in the minds of the person perceiving them; for since, it argues, our perceptions, whatever they may seem to make us aware of, are events taking place in the mind, these events are the only things of which we can be fully certain. Things only exist for us, in fact, when they are perceived by us. This position, carried to its logical conclusion, leads to *solipsism*. According to this, since for each of us nothing can be known except what he perceives, we cannot know of the existence of any reality apart from the perceiver—apart, that is, from oneself; not even another person can be assumed to exist except as an idea formed in one's own mind. We have in this reasoning, however difficult it may be to disprove, an admirable example of the fatuity to which formal logic, as said above,¹ can lead us. The other line is that of objective idealism. To this view, although things can only be known to exist by some mind which perceives them, yet the existence is admitted of a universe apart from the mind of a particular observer, including much that may be quite unknown to any individual human mind. This implies a universal mind—the only true reality—of which the universe is the outcome. Some philosophers speak of this underlying reality as the mind of God, in which the universe is a developing thought or act of will. Others are content to lay down the proposition that the ultimate reality is mental in nature. This mental reality is present in all physical processes; and its presence in ourselves is our only guarantee of our own existence or that of anything else.

To either kind of idealism the plain man thinks it a sufficient answer, as did Dr. Johnson, to kick a stone. Prospero, he feels, was merely using a poetic metaphor in saying that we are "such stuff as dreams are made on"; nor can he believe that the great globe itself is only an insubstantial pageant. Many philosophers too, and most men of science before the present century, have believed that whatever else may be real, matter certainly is. Many have attempted to show that it is the only reality, and that

¹ See p. 89.

the activities of some material substance will account for everything in the universe. Even when, as to the scientific thinker of to-day, matter tends to dissolve into energy and 'solid' objects are thought of as 'events' that are no longer material in the old sense of the term, it is no less possible to believe that these have a real existence apart from any mind that perceives them; and that mind, indeed, may be itself the product of events of a certain kind.

There have been many schools of realists, from those that have upheld the crudest materialism down to those whose view of reality is largely determined by the modern tendencies of science. This view—neo-realism as it is called—does not look for any one principle to which all else can be reduced, but regards existence as a whole of events linked together in different ways. In one kind of linkage, that of causal relationship, they constitute the world of external nature; in another kind, that of memory-continuity, they constitute mind, the process of knowing being only the play of events upon each other in this particular relationship. But though mind may thus be one aspect of reality, or at least of a part of it, the neo-realists are usually careful to insist that existence in no way depends on its presence, and that the universe has existed in a form in which mind did not show itself and will continue to exist in some form after the activities of life and mind have ceased to be possible. Reality, in this view, is unaffected by human knowledge and human wishes, and we must accept the position that it may be both illogical in essence and indifferent to our values.

If called upon to choose between the two rival schools of thought, of those who hold that 'hard' facts exist independently of us whether we can ever understand them and can make them fit in with our values or not, and of those who hold on the contrary that facts are so 'soft' that they are shaped by our minds and take their form and meaning from our needs, the votary of common-sense is apt to feel that there is some truth—together with much that he cannot accept—in both. Reality, he feels, must be objective

—something to be known, not a dream constructed by the mind out of nothing. But equally, it must also, he feels, be subjective, in the sense that it must include our experiences, our intuitions, our reason, and our values, and must be capable of being apprehended by our minds. Being so apprehended, it must inevitably take shape and colour from the medium through which it comes; and so our apprehension of reality can never be final and absolute, but must inevitably be reshaped continually as the mind that apprehends it grows. But if the meaning of things eludes him as yet, he feels that the universe has a meaning, and one that must ultimately be intelligible to us, otherwise all philosophy alike is equally futile.

Besides such sharp lines of cleavage between philosophical systems as those of unity or diversity of substance and of the mental or non-mental nature of reality, there is yet another, dating from the time of the early Greek thinkers, some of whom held existence to be a static condition of 'being', while others thought of it as a perpetual 'becoming'. Those whose main object was to discover an underlying unity beneath all varieties of experience, adopted the first view, holding an unchanging permanence to be a necessary condition of the perfection that they postulated; and this, in the idea of an originally divinely-created universe, the work of an all-powerful and all-perfect creator, has had the support of religion and so remained the more orthodox view. In the other view, based on experience rather than speculation, a perpetual flux was the essential characteristic of the universe; and in modern philosophy this view has been powerfully reinforced by acceptance of the doctrine of evolution.

The older schools of philosophy tended to look at the universe, as it were, from the outside, regarding it either as an antecedent and independently existing whole that can be perceived by mind, or as a logical whole, systematised and made intelligible by mind if not existing solely as a product of thought. The newer schools of evolutionary thought, on the other hand, look at it from within, and see

it as a constantly changing and interacting whole, either shaping itself into new forms by some law of its own development or shaped and directed to a continually greater extent by mind that is emerging in the course of evolution. The older schools, whether realist or idealist, were concerned with the relation they could discover between the actual existent universe and the idea of it present in our minds. The newer, accepting evolution as a principle at work in the future no less than in the past, are more concerned with the relation to be established between the actual world in which we live and the ideal world that is shaping itself in our minds as a means of taking what part we may in directing the further course of evolution. To such a view philosophy is no mere contemplation of a static and given universe, around us or within our minds, but rather the search for whatever possible good may be brought about by our efforts.

For philosophy, if it is to have its full value, corresponding to and even greater than that of science, is not to be confined to metaphysical problems, and has for its deepest concern not the nature of existence or of knowledge, but rather the significance of experience. It is the attempt to understand the meaning of what is given to us directly by intuition and feeling as well as of what we forge into knowledge. Philosophy, therefore, is not to be reduced to the rôle of assistant to science, "clarifying the fundamental ideas of science, and synthesising the different sciences in a single comprehensive view of that fragment of the world that science has succeeded in exploring. It does not know what lies beyond."¹ It is quite true that of this 'beyond' we have no sensory experience, and cannot apply to it any physical or mathematical test; but we may reasonably refuse to admit that there are no processes at work in the universe except those that can be expressed in mathematical formulas, and may reasonably believe that the values apprehended by feeling are in every way as real as the relations apprehended by intellect, and that both alike must be taken into account

¹ Bertrand Russell: *Sceptical Essays*, p. 79.

in our conception of the whole. Philosophy, in fact, has much in common with art and with religion as well as with science. In the truth which is the object of its search, feeling and doing, and not merely knowing, have a part.

There have not often been times when there has been so little certainty upon fundamental questions of thought and belief and conduct as the present. Owing to the transformation of thought by the methods and discoveries of science the old security of authority and tradition, alike in the fields of knowledge, of religion and of social obligations, is gone. We have to face a situation as novel as the revolution in thought brought about by the Copernican theory in astronomy when the earth was displaced from its accepted position as the centre of the universe. The old interpretation of human nature has crumbled away, and a new has yet to be found. Philosophy has now, as it has always had, "the problem of adjusting the dry, thin and meagre scientific standpoint with the obstinately persisting body of warm and abounding imaginative beliefs."¹ Never was there more need of the guidance of philosophy than now, in face of the new conditions brought about by the discoveries of science, the destructive agencies at our command, the growth of production and luxury, and the decay of the former sanctions of conduct. For we can no longer think of human life as directed, without responsibility on our part, by the will of some higher power, but must recognise that the shaping of the future largely rests with ourselves.

Not that philosophy, any more than science or religion, can be fashioned once for all. It must continually take new form, consonant with the knowledge and the values of the age. Some beliefs we must have; these beliefs, their source and meaning, the conditions under which they can be held and the consequences that follow from them, philosophy seeks to appraise. "Thoughtful valuation", as Professor Dewey calls it,² is its true function; criticism, that is,

¹ Quoted by J. Ratner in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 511.

² *Ibid.*: p. 532.

“not for its own sake but for the sake of instituting and perpetuating more enduring and extensive values.” Thus the outcome of our philosophy should be beliefs, founded in experience and confirmed by critical thought, that will furnish principles for guidance in all that we do.

§ 4. TRUTH OF IMAGINATION

The ideal of science is the purely impersonal presentation of fact, stripped of all personal elements in experience; experience reduced, as it were, to a diagram in which all will recognise certain relations, with nothing else to blur or distort them. Art, on the other hand, is the expression of a purely personal experience, embodying in movement, sound, colour (whatever the medium may be) the individual reaction of the artist freed for the time from preoccupation with causes and results, and calling forth in the spectator an individual reaction of his own. This is what is meant by saying that the goal of science is truth and that of art the something (whatever it may be) that is called ‘beauty’. But between the two extremes there are intermediate positions, through which the truth of science merges into a truth of art. One of these we have been considering as philosophy, into which comes the element of belief, and its goal is therefore a truth of feeling as well as intellectual truth. Nearer still to art, and indeed merging fully into it, is the imaginative treatment of experience which still deals with fact and belief but as material for imaginative reconstruction. It may be said to have both truth and beauty for its goal, but the truth is not the truth of science but of imagination.

This truth of imagination in the presentation and interpretation of experience necessarily comes, in greater or less degree, into the reconstruction of past events by the historian and biographer. Imagination is needed not merely to bring back what is past and make it live again before our eyes but still more to seek for the unseen motives of recorded actions and to reveal what, as we must believe, was in the minds of the actors on the occasions described. If this

method of revivifying the past has as much in common with fiction as with history, it may still be a means of presenting truth. And even in pure fiction, where there is no question of historical fact, there can be none the less a truth of imagination which presents human relations in every variety of circumstances and interprets imagined actions in the light of what we know of human nature. Was it not Macaulay who said that fiction bears the same relation to the facts of an individual life as algebra does to arithmetic? In portraying a generalised experience it may be a more potent instrument for revealing truth than an actual instance, less easy to see in relation to its environment, could provide. Thus, for example, Browning's "Lost Leader", if taken as representing a particular poet, is in many respects inaccurate and unfair; but is entirely true as an imaginative presentment of the change, seen in so many instances, from the keen enthusiasms and revolutionary ardour of a poet's youth to the gradually congealing respectability and orthodoxy of his later years.

Imaginative literature in general, and most of all if it takes the form of poetry, we usually think of as belonging to the realms of art, and turn to it, as most of us turn to music, for recreation and for an emotional satisfaction associated with the sense of beauty rather than as a help to the discovery of fresh knowledge or a means of strengthening our hold upon truth.

There is, indeed, one aspect in which art of any kind may be regarded as an escape from reality—a means of 'wish-fulfilment', in the language of the psycho-analysts, by which our fancies of what we would like to be and do can be fulfilled in imagination when the hard facts of our incapacity or our circumstances will not allow of their realisation in any other way. There can be little doubt that this is a motive, though perhaps an unconscious one, that may prompt poet or novelist, or an artist in any medium, to self-expression, and may lead us to find in their art the same kind of enjoyment that we find in day-dreams. But to regard this as a complete explanation of the origin and purpose of art,

as one school of psychology would have us do,¹ seems as one-sided and misleading as the similar assertions that philosophy is only a rationalisation of what we want to believe, and religion merely a means of inducing us to make the sacrifice of our instinctive needs which is required in the interests of society; assertions in which there is also a partial truth.

But while there may be at times, in art, as in philosophy and religion, some element of compensation for the loss of instinctive satisfactions, this is by no means the whole of what they are. All great imaginative literature, whether poetry or drama or the psychological analysis that is the chief contribution of the modern novel, has thus, like science and philosophy, its part in the quest for truth. In literature of this kind the purpose is not to present scientific or historical or philosophical truth for its own sake. But if "the proper study of mankind is man"—and who would not agree that, whatever other study may have its special attraction for us, it is knowledge of man's nature, our own included, and of man's relations with his fellows that is most necessary of all?—imaginative literature should be more helpful to this end than any more specialised form of knowledge. It deals with the very stuff of experience in the form in which it comes to us, not in some portion isolated from the rest and thereby falsified, or in abstractions that lack the movement and reality of life; and yet not confused and unintelligible, as in ordinary experience, but simplified and revealed by the light of imagination. In such literature truth is not sacrificed to mere wish-fulfilment or to the evoking of an emotional thrill. By imagination, truth and beauty are fused into a whole of vision that adds the warmth of feeling to the colder certainties of knowledge, showing us experience as it comes to us in life itself, though, without the help of art, we cannot usually apprehend it so fully.

Looked at thus, as a means not only of refreshment and delight but of enlarging and clarifying our individual experience, imaginative literature shows us human beings, both

¹ See, for example, Professor Freud's *Civilisation and its Discontents*.

those in some way exceptionally gifted and ordinary people like ourselves, in all their various experiences of life; whether in circumstances such as ourselves we have constantly to meet, or in some exceptional crisis that calls out their fullest powers and reveals in human nature possibilities that, but for such occasions, we should hardly suspect. It is equally helpful to see how others deal with problems such as we have to face, and to see ourselves in imagination in conditions of which, for the very reason that we are not so likely to meet with them, it is well to have some imaginative experience. Not only are we the better able, thanks to this added experience, to face whatever comes to us, but also by imaginative experience, as by play, impulses are released and utilised that might otherwise suffer repression or find an undesirable outlet. Just as a poet in the act of creation discharges an emotional complex which, if undischarged, can fester and work as a poison,¹ he can also bring about, in some degree, a similar liberation for the reader. And further, to see the sufferings of others, deserved or undeserved, and their struggles in the coil of retribution or of circumstance, is not only to be stirred emotionally—to be purged, as Aristotle said, by pity and terror—but to know more of the possibilities of experience and what man is capable of doing and bearing. Anything that thus adds to our knowledge of humanity, and helps us to realise its dependence upon external circumstances and its power of rising superior to them, cannot but increase our sympathy and make us more ready to understand and pardon; and at the same time it cannot but arouse in us determination to alter the conditions that inevitably tend to drag human nature down, and to make clearer what action is necessary for this end.

But if imaginative literature is thus to enlarge our experi-

¹ Thus Ibsen, in a letter to P. Hansen, wrote: "From time to time the little animal" (a scorpion that he kept in a glass upon his desk) "was ill. Then I used to give it a piece of soft fruit, upon which it fell furiously and emptied its poison into it—after which it was well again. Does not something of the same kind happen with us poets?"

ence as well as to strengthen will and purify feeling, it is essential that it should be true. Not that the facts portrayed need be true in the sense of historical or scientific truth, but the presentation must be true to human nature, in whatever environment, realistic or imaginary, it may be set. Novelist, poet or dramatist may introduce supernatural happenings or weave a fairy-tale; he may make imaginary reconstructions of the past or visions of the future, Utopias, moral or scientific, a world that is possible or an unreal dreamland. What matters, from our present point of view, is the reaction of human character to the imagined setting. If no such reaction is possible, but there are only impossible figures in incredible situations, while such literature may have a value as beauty and a use as recreation, it has none as truth. Truth of imagination is truth to human nature; and if there is this, it does not matter how remote from ordinary experience is the setting in which it is shown, so long as it can be imagined as possible. Truth of this kind, however fantastic its dress, serves not only for recreation and delight but to add to our store of experience, and so has a value which does not lie only in the feeling it evokes.

Imaginative truth, however, like philosophy, is something more than knowledge; and this something more gives it an added value as compared with historical or scientific truth, in spite of all the material conquests achieved by science and the enlargement it has given to thought. The difference is that conveyed by the distinction between 'wisdom' and 'knowledge'. Although knowledge has the wider range and greater practical power, wisdom is still the greater in that it is the outcome of the whole of experience, of feeling as well as knowing, and both of them arising from and issuing in action. All the activities of the mind, all its pursuits and interests, have a value of their own considered separately; but their true function and highest values are to be found in the contribution that they make to life regarded as a whole. Neither contemplation nor intensity of emotional experiences nor activity in itself constitutes the sum and

purpose of living. That is the richest life which combines them most fully; and its outcome is a wisdom that wells up from the deeper levels of experience where thought and feeling and will are not yet separated and weakened by the impoverishment and distortion that isolation brings.

CHAPTER VI

THE SENSE OF BEAUTY

§ I. WHAT IS BEAUTY?

Just as there has been little agreement among philosophers as to what can be accepted as the ultimate truths of existence, so also when they have turned to the consideration of beauty they have found themselves just as little able to agree upon its nature or upon the conditions on which its presence or absence depends. Theories of beauty and treatises on aesthetics are plentiful. Like Omar Khayyám, we have

heard great argument
About it and about, but evermore
Came out by the same door wherein (we) went.

And if we turn for help to the artists, while they can show it to us and bid us feel it as they do themselves, they cannot tell us what it is or why we feel it. All that is agreed is that there is a particular kind of experience—a mode of feeling which is termed 'aesthetic'¹ to distinguish it from mere sensation on the one side and from specific emotions such as anger and fear on the other—in which we enjoy the sense-perception or imaginative contemplation of whatever appears to us to be beautiful; and this enjoyment can find expression in some form of artistic creativity. Such aesthetic experience, it is agreed, when once we have been strongly affected by it, is one of our highest values. Beyond this, however, and the fact that all share the experience in some degree, though some have far more aesthetic sensitivity than others, there is so little agreement that the plain man is inclined to dismiss the matter as a question merely of differing tastes, personal preferences for which no reason

¹ The unfortunate associations of the term 'aesthetic' with late-Victorian decadence and the ridicule heaped on it, must not lead us to suppose that it implies something 'precious', limited to a few peculiarly gifted individuals. There are, it is true, great differences between individuals in the development of the aesthetic sense, but the apprehension of beauty, on some level, is shared by all, and was no less marked in primitive man.

can be given and about which there can be no useful discussion. But if we think of the part that this experience has played in human evolution (to say nothing of animal evolution in which it may also have played a part) and how intensely it has been felt both by primitive and civilised man, we shall not so lightly dismiss the study of its meaning and development.

We may approach the subject in different ways, according as we dwell most on beauty in its passive aspect, as enjoyment found in its apprehension by sense or by imagination, or in its active aspect as creation of beauty in works of art. Or we may set aside both these aspects of passive enjoyment and creativity, and by critical consideration of its nature and the conditions under which it is present treat it only as subject for the formulation of aesthetic theory. It is, of course, possible to entertain all three mental attitudes, in varying degrees, at the same time. Thus a painter may be at once, or at least in close succession, enjoying the aesthetic contemplation of some scene or object, creating on his canvas a work of art and exercising his critical judgment as to proportions and tones and the technical handling of his materials. But though in experience of this kind, as of others, thought, feeling and action do not occur in complete isolation, it is usually helpful, in order to understand them, to consider them separately. In this chapter, therefore, we shall treat beauty in its passive aspect as a mode of feeling; and in the next, in its active aspect, as the expression of aesthetic feeling in the arts. For this purpose some consideration of the nature of beauty and of the conditions on which it depends will be necessary. But it is no part of the purpose of this book to formulate an aesthetic theory, any more than a system of philosophy or ethics; so the discussion will only be carried as far as may be needed to throw light on these two aspects of beauty and the terms applied to them.

We will begin, then, with enjoyment of beauty, whether in sense-perception or in imagination in whatever form it may come to us,—the apprehension of beauty, that is,

through the aesthetic sense. Here at once the question arises: does the beauty that is apprehended belong to the object, whatever it may be, that seems to us to be beautiful? Is it, that is to say, an inherent characteristic of certain objects, like their shape or weight; to be apprehended, like these, by some appropriate sense-process and accepted as something that exists independently of our individual contact with it? This would probably seem to most people, considering it for the first time, to be a true account of the matter. They would be inclined to say that certain things, flowers and faces, for instance, birds, butterflies, jewels and certain materials, shapes, colours and sounds, in themselves possess the quality of beauty, while others do not. Perhaps on reflection they might also add relations between things—certain proportions, and the like.

This assumption that beauty is inherent in certain objects, or at least in certain forms and relations, is accepted by some writers on aesthetics. Some, for instance, speak of an object, or the representation of it, as being beautiful only if it possesses 'significant form'. This, however, does not tell us much about the nature of beauty, for it seems to mean no more than that one kind of 'form'—the relations, that is, between its parts or between this and other forms—is more 'significant' than another, in that it affects the aesthetic sense more powerfully. And even this, we find, is not the case at all times, or with all observers. Nor are there any objective criteria for the measurement of beauty (as there are for such things as size and weight) to which we can submit differences of feeling in order to secure agreement. The music by which the soul of one is caught up to heaven to another may be no more than the screeching of cats on a roof. The presence of beauty is known only by the feeling aroused in those who perceive it.

Beauty, then, is not something wholly external, an impersonal fact that can be appraised by methods of science, but a certain quality of experience, of which the external fact is the occasion. Some thinkers have gone to the other extreme in supposing that beauty is a purely subjective

experience, projected into an object in the same way that we can project our own feelings into animals and trees, or even into inanimate things, and imagine them to be actuated by human motives. The fact that a lover or a mother can see extreme beauty in a face that to others seems plain enough gives colour to this view. But even so the feeling is not unconnected with the object, but is in some measure aroused by it. To most, therefore, the theory of projection is no more satisfactory an account of beauty than the other, except that it emphasises the part that psychological considerations must have in it.

A truer account of beauty would seem to lie between the two extremes. On the one hand, it implies some external event, apprehended directly by sense, or else something called up in thought, whether already existent or brought into existence at the bidding of creative imagination. And, on the other hand, it implies a particular mode of apprehending experience. Only from the union of the two is beauty born. Whether or not it has, as some philosophers and poets have believed, an independent and absolute existence, to us it is known only as a particular kind of feeling with a strongly pleasurable tone. However difficult it may be to define, the feeling is as easily recognised, when experienced, as any of the specific emotions associated with instinctive tendencies. It might, therefore, seem that the feeling of beauty should be classified amongst the instinctive emotional reactions to contacts with the external world were it not for a consideration that shows a marked difference between them.

Beauty, it has just been said, is a mode of experience; and all experience arises out of some correlation between the inner self and the external world, being the inner counterpart of the behaviour with which an organism reacts to any situation in which it finds itself. All instinctive behaviour has for its object the maintenance and extension of the life of the individual and of the race to which it belongs; and the specific emotional reactions that have arisen in connection with such behaviour serve to further this object. But

when we turn to the feeling of beauty, we find that it does not seem to serve this purpose. It does not, as they do, heighten and give a specific character to the conations needed for the maintenance of life and mastery of the environment. The apprehension of beauty, in fact, in spite of the urgency and universality of the feeling, does not seem to serve self-interest, or to arise from any biological necessity. It is, so to speak, an overplus of feeling, beyond the satisfaction of the necessities of life, even if in origin it is connected with the sense-impressions through which (by the contact with the environment and the mastery of it that they make possible) the satisfaction of these necessities is obtained.

The experience that we call beauty is thus in a special degree a gift of nature, an added enjoyment over and above the enjoyment of utility in experience. By the sense of beauty we are enabled to obtain enjoyment from objects whether they have otherwise any utility for us or not; and just as the sense of sight extends our knowledge and mastery of our surroundings beyond the direct contacts of touch, so also we can draw enjoyment not only from sense-perception of objects themselves but also from imagination of them. In this there is no question of biological necessity. It is rather, as just said, a gift of nature that we have capacity to feel, and feel intensely, a value for which there is no apparent purpose in the nature of life other than its spiritual enrichment. In the sense of beauty even more than in the apprehension of truth and moral good, with their more evident connexion with biological and social needs, we seem to be compelled to think of evolution as working not merely to biological but to spiritual ends.

§ 2. THE AESTHETIC SENSE

Beauty, then, is a fortunate experience arising when some external object or event is 'aesthetically' apprehended in sense or imagination. There must be, on the one hand, something which is capable of arousing the sense of beauty, and on the other the particular mode of feeling that is

capable of apprehending it as beautiful. Both these factors of beauty need some further consideration.

In the first place, if our sense of beauty is to be aroused there must usually be appeal to both sensuous and emotional, and even to intellectual, elements in us. A sequence of meaningless syllables may seem to be beautiful simply by their sensuous appeal as pleasing sounds. They will certainly seem more so if their arrangement and cadence are such as to arouse an emotional response in us, like the various syllables so uttered as to form a gay or plaintive cadence; and most of all if they are not without meaning, but have all the manifold associations of words to arouse the imagination of the hearer. There can be little doubt, however, that the first appeal to the aesthetic sense is made by the sense-impressions that we receive. Certain sounds, scents, forms, colours, textures, and so forth, seem to us to have a high degree of beauty in themselves. In our own case it may not be easy to separate the sensuous appeal from the associations that have gathered round the objects in question; but we see how children are thrilled by certain sense-impressions even on the first occasions on which they experience them. Still more does pattern of any kind, as shown in order, symmetry, rhythm, proportion, contrast and harmony, make a strong appeal to the aesthetic sense. This is the case not only in works of art on which a formal pattern has been impressed by ourselves, but also in natural objects; indeed if pattern of some kind is not obviously present, the mind seeks to impose it as an aid to perception, as for instance in the patterns that we see in the stars.

Even in inanimate objects we feel this appeal of beauty; in the splendours of colour in the sky, for instance, the sound of the wind or of moving water, the forms of mountain peaks, reflections in water, and the like. But still more of the beauty that we find in nature is associated with life; for here, as there is something in living things that touches our sympathies more closely, the emotional appeal is stronger. Not only is there in these the beauty of form (if form may be taken to include all that makes up pattern of any kind)

in leaf and flower and fruit, in shell and plumage and fur, but also that which is most expressive of the life within, grace of movement, joy of song, play of features, and all forms of expression in which man reveals himself most fully. With this fuller emotional appeal comes also the further beauty given by greater depth of meaning; in recognition, for example, of adaptation and efficiency, in beast and bird and insect or in piece of construction, such as a building or shipping or machinery, which is recognised as serving most effectively the needs and purposes of life.

But while everywhere around us there is limitless wealth of material for beauty, it is only when transformed into aesthetic experience that beauty is born. It is not enough to see and hear; that is for the utilities and needs of life. There must be the 'seeing eye' and the 'hearing ear' if we are to have enjoyment of this gift of nature. Aesthetic sensitivity, the apprehension of beauty, comes to us as an emotional overplus, superadded to the normal feeling of ordinary experience. Thus beyond the mere satisfaction of a need, whatever it may be, there can also be a heightened satisfaction in some peculiar fitness in the means by which the satisfaction is obtained—the flavour of the food, for instance, or the handiness of the implement, or some rhythm of movement and sound, perhaps, to aid and lighten a task. In heightened satisfactions such as these we may trace the beginnings of the sense of beauty.

But if it is in some such overplus of feeling that the sense of beauty has its origin, it is not always present, but only when circumstances allow. So long as any particular need is urgent and all available energy is required for procuring its satisfaction, there is no room for this added feeling. To a starving man the flavour of the offered food is immaterial. One who is engaged in a struggle for life has no thought for the shape and balance of whatever instrument he grasps with which to save himself. It is only when the sense of urgency is remote, and the promise of accomplishment can be held certain, that a heightened enjoyment is possible; only then does beauty also, in addition to

utility, attach to the means whereby the accomplishment is to be, or has been, reached. For this reason children, whose needs are mostly provided for by others, often have a stronger sense of beauty than those who are preoccupied with the practical requirements of life. There is often something of this childlike attitude, with its dependence on others and its subordination of practical needs, retained through life by those endowed with most aesthetic sensibility. Thus a Turner, putting to sea in a storm, tied to the mast, in order to store his mind with shapes and splendours to be transferred to canvas, has something in common with the child who claps his hands and shouts with delight at flames in which others see only danger and destruction. All aesthetic enjoyment, indeed, demands some such disinterested acceptance of things as they are. Could we, for instance, find so much beauty in tragedy without a childlike acceptance of fate in face of which we can do nothing, and are therefore free to rejoice in whatever greatness of soul it reveals?

As soon, then, as we are assured of the satisfaction of our primary needs, and have some leisure to enjoy this satisfaction, the sense of beauty begins to find play. Under such circumstances we choose the more appetising food, and material for clothing that is pleasant to touch and sight as well as being supple and giving warmth; and when shelter is no longer an urgent need, ornament becomes of the first importance. Still more is this the case in connection with our secondary needs, the things that will help us to obtain the satisfactions on which life depends. The making of an implement of any kind implies some leisure to spend upon it before it is required for use; this means leisure also to enjoy any peculiar fitness it can have, or any expression of our heightened pleasure that we can give to it. In all that contributes to our satisfactions we find a quality which, though in part contributed by them, in part is also the projection into them of our heightened enjoyment. Thus it comes about that others may see little or no beauty in what to us, like a shapeless rag-doll to a child, may seem

to have it in high degree. If a heightened feeling of the worth of existence, an added touch of joy in life, is thus experienced, the aesthetic sense is awakened and there is present, however far it may be from full consciousness, some awareness of beauty.

This heightened enjoyment and sense of the worth of life that comes to us in the apprehension of beauty is closely connected with the fact that the beauty which we find in living things is itself an outcome of their enjoyment of life. For it is the very exuberance of vitality that gives to health an added perfection, bloom to fruit, richer colouring and sheen to hair and skin and plumage, beauty of form to limbs, pose and grace to movement. Even more striking is the beauty that accompanies the uprush of life in reproduction, when the plant breaks into loveliness of flower, and animals put on their richest splendour for a wedding garment. And this is the time that brings also the greatest heightening of feeling, so that life is then all beauty and emotion. Recognition of the splendour in which abundant life decks itself has been a main factor in the development of the sense of beauty. It makes little difference whether we say that the apprehension of the beauty brings the sense of fuller life, or that it is this feeling which we call the aesthetic sense.

If this be admitted, we can the more readily understand how beauty comes to be found in other things also besides those that we normally consider pleasant. Sweetness is not the only quality of taste that gives us satisfaction; we find this also in a salty flavour and even at times in sharpness, easily as both may become unpleasant. So, too, a prettiness that is merely soft and sugary, however attractive at first, soon wearies us. Beauty needs contrast, vigour, the sense of abounding life rather than what is merely soothing and caressing. Just as the whip of wind and rain and the keen bite of frost may make for health more than ease and pleasant surroundings, so, too, may beauty be linked with struggle and danger. There is a terrible beauty; and there is tragic beauty when we see life, however bruised and

battered, however much the sport of circumstance, yet unsubdued and rising triumphant over defeat and death. Beauty, in short, need not come to us as a sense of pleasure merely, but it comes always as a sense of revelation.

For the apprehension of beauty such as this it is evident that a development of the aesthetic sense must have taken place far beyond the heightened enjoyment of sense-perception in which it began. As psychological evolution has advanced, the primary sensitivity underlying the various kinds of sensation has been further differentiated into emotional and cognitive processes of various kinds. The 'emotional overplus', at first entirely sensuous in origin, comes to attach also to any emotional or intellectual satisfaction; and thus the sense of beauty is enlarged and enriched for us by emotional overtones derived from other than sensuous experience. We know, for instance, how it can be heightened by a strong emotion such as the awe we feel in presence of some overwhelming manifestation of nature, a thunderstorm, perhaps, or Niagara, or the starry sky. Most potent of all emotions in this respect is love; for this not only, as said above, makes living things adorn themselves in special forms of beauty, but also heightens the sense of beauty to which the added splendours of scent and sound, form and colour, with this emotional enrichment, make appeal. Nor is it only during the mating period that this takes place. Beauty has its roots also in the feeling of sympathy with all that seems akin to us; not only with our own kind but with those animals whose feelings seem most nearly to resemble our own. With some who are most sensitive to beauty its roots seem to lie deeper still, in the sense of one-ness with all living and even with inanimate things, for which the term 'empathy' has been suggested. Through the emotional enrichment of the aesthetic sense by the wide extension of the affections and loyalties in all the relations of social life, we come to see beauty also in conduct, in acts of love, devotion, self-sacrifice and wherever such qualities as courage and patience and wisdom are manifested. To the beauty-loving Greeks 'beautiful' and

'good' were almost interchangeable terms; and even in our own speech this is common enough to show how much the sense of beauty has been extended and deepened by human intercourse.

We must remember also that every enlargement of the sense of beauty has brought with it added sensitivity to ugliness. We cannot become aware of any good without also becoming aware of a corresponding bad, by contrast to which the good is more clearly recognised. If once we have experienced a good, then all defect of that good is so far bad, and so, still more, is all that is opposed to it and threatens to destroy it. In so far, then, as we come to appreciate beauty, we become sensitive to the lack of it and to all that militates against it. If the sense of beauty is largely a heightened joy in life and sense of its worth, ugliness is a sense of life stunted and diminished; we find objects and actions ugly which degrade life and make it meaner or are the outcome of life so degraded. For this reason deformity and disease usually offend the aesthetic sense, and all that reveals or suggests decay. So also living things that are shapeless or colourless, as being sluggish or shunning the light; parasites and things that merely crawl or creep; all, in fact, whose form and habit is so far removed from what we have come to consider normal that they stir no sympathy in us or baffle imagination of what life for them can be. So, too, in human life, all that we see to be merely dull and stupid and inane, and all that is cruel and callous, is recognised as ugly,—all, that is, which lacks the vigour and joy of life or which is destructive of its higher values. The more sensitive we grow to the actual or possible beauty of life, the more sensitive also do we become to failure and degeneracy and all the ugliness of blind or wilful folly. Nor need we regret that it is so. Our sensitivity to ugliness is at once a warning and a spur. Without this sensitivity we should be content merely to enjoy beauty when we could find it and should allow conditions that make for the growth of ugliness. And since the less of beauty there is to contemplate the less we are ourselves capable of creating,

ugliness would soon come, through this insensitivity, to take the place of beauty—as indeed we so often see it doing in any organisation of our surroundings which serves merely to satisfy our material needs.

§ 3. GROWTH OF THE AESTHETIC SENSE

Beauty, we have seen, is experienced as an emotional thrill—of which most often sense-impressions of some kind are the occasion, but which may also be the outcome of imaginative experience and even of pure thought—bringing a heightened sense of living and of the worth of life. We have spoken of it as a gift of nature, something that we have, so to speak, no right to expect; for beauty is beyond the powers of sensation and perception that enable us to carry on the commerce of life, and beyond the emotions that normally arise from this commerce and reinforce the responses by which its interests are safeguarded. Beyond all this, and with no such biological value, we have, when the experiencing mind is tuned, as it were, to a particular pitch of feeling, a new heightening of experience. This is the sense of beauty, nature's gift to her most favoured children, bestowed more lavishly on some than on others. When the mind is tuned to this pitch of feeling that we call the aesthetic sense, there is little in experience that cannot present itself as beauty; without the mind so tuned, as for long stretches we often remain, life seems drab and beauty something remote from ordinary experience. This dependence of beauty on the moment's feeling leads some of those who value it most to regard it as a revelation of another world. Others would rather ascribe it to a fortunate state of mind, whether momentary or lasting, in which, as with intellectual apprehension in moments of deepest insight, this emotional apprehension is at its keenest.

The apprehension of beauty in its simplest form was developed, it has been suggested above, in association with the satisfaction of the primary needs when there was leisure, so to speak, to savour the enjoyment apart from the insistence of self-interest. Such delight in flavours and scents

and caressing textures, bright colours and pleasing sounds leads directly to delight in all objects and situations, whether in nature or created by man for his pleasure, that give occasion for aesthetic experience. And with the growth of feeling and imagination and insight such experience is vastly extended. We find a new delight that is no longer dependent merely on the senses; an apprehension of spiritual beauty that enriches and extends the beauty of the external world and the things of beauty created by man's effort.

But though beauty can thus be found in many kinds of experience it is most often awakened in us through sense-impressions, and through them, in the majority of cases, most strongly felt. To whatever apprehension of spiritual beauty we may attain, it is through sensuous beauty that we have been led to it. And in this development all the senses have had their part. We are accustomed to think of beauty as appealing specially to eye or ear; nor is it surprising that the sense of beauty is now most often aroused through these, since they are the organs of our most highly-developed senses which have contributed most to our higher mental development. But though now so largely associated with them, beauty is not the outcome of these senses only, and to it all have contributed.

Taste is the first and most direct form of enjoyment and mode of discrimination, as we see in the baby's instinct to put into its mouth everything it can grasp. For this reason—although we now regard it as the lowest rung of the ladder up which we have climbed to a fuller apprehension of beauty—it is not unfitting that *taste* should have been adopted as the generic name for aesthetic appreciation; even if the term, while remaining suitable enough in its application to the arts and graces of life, is too thin and meagre to denote the full experience of beauty in all its forms. Smell, the sense of such importance to animals as a means of cognition, is much less highly developed in man, who has learnt to rely far more on other senses. But though it may not now play a large part in the whole field of aesthetic appreciation, it has undoubtedly helped to develop

the sense of beauty in us, and still has a subtle heightening effect in association with beauty of other kinds. We know, for instance, how much it contributes to the aesthetic appeal of flowers and fruit; and the use made of it in religious ritual and in personal adornment is a survival from a time when it played a larger part in human life and when its importance was more fully recognised. Touch has also, without doubt, had much to do with the development of our appreciation of beauty; not merely in discriminating differences of texture and surface, but still more when associated with muscular sensation in giving us a sense of form and in the apprehension of such things as solidity of masses, suppleness and tractability of curves, the gain of symmetry for balance, or adaptation of the tool to the hand. The muscular sense, again, experienced in movements which bring in the element of time, has been an important factor, developing not only the sense of rhythm but also the ease and grace that come from balance and poise. There is less need to insist on the contribution made by hearing and sight, this being in both cases so evident. Rhythm, harmony, tone, colour, pattern—most of the terms in which we describe and analyse things of beauty are drawn from these senses.

While sense-experience, however, has thus provided the soil in which the sense of beauty has grown, and direct experience of this kind remains by far the largest and most frequent occasion for its exercise, the development of the aesthetic sense is largely due to the revival of aesthetic experience in memory and imagination. For beauty, as was said above, is an emotional enjoyment over and above the satisfaction of the immediate need; and for this leisure in some form is necessary. So long as primitive man was engaged in the quest of food or in struggle against foes, there was no room for anything beyond the instinctive feeling of the moment. Only in intervals of leisure, in imaginative reconstruction of the past experience, was there time to savour the feeling. "Emotion remembered in tranquillity" is the clue not to poetry alone but to the

greater part of expression in the arts. For not only does reflection reveal an added wealth of meaning in experience, but it allows the imagination to dwell upon much that was transient or hardly realised at the time. We often find, for instance, that we only come to appreciate the beauty of our surroundings when we have left them and look back upon them.

Through such remembered beauty, seen by "that inward eye which is the bliss of solitude", we are led on to the imagined beauty which shapes itself alike out of past experience and that to which we look forward. It is this imagined beauty which gives form to the arts. Whatever the outlet in which our emotional states tend to find expression,—gladness in some cheerful noise, perhaps, or jauntiness of carriage; sorrow in wailing or a drooping posture,—imagination seizes upon and shapes it to some more conscious form of beauty. Thus playing round some past crisis, and heightening it with the glow of success, imagination decked it out in dance and song and story; or turning to the future, and seeking to make success more certain, busied itself with some greater perfection of tool or weapon, and with magic rite or with representation, in clay, perhaps, or in colour on the cave wall, of the animal to be overcome. In this way art was born. For effort so expended, whatever its ultimate purpose, has enjoyment for its immediate aim. Dance and song and painting, even the utilitarian aim of shaping weapon or tool into the form that is handiest and best adapted for its purpose, is not a mere matter of utility, but has an emotional meaning also and is to satisfy the sense of beauty. Wherever there is leisure for enjoyment, ornament makes as much claim on effort as use. The pot, however crude, must have its bands of colour or indented pattern. The weapon handle must be carved into the shape of some familiar figure. The necessary toil must have its ritual to make it not only endurable but a real enjoyment.

Of such expression of the sense of beauty in craftsmanship and in the arts more will be said in the following chapter. Here it is only in place as furnishing one of the chief means

of which the aesthetic sense has been developed and the enjoyment of beauty deepened. For even those who have no creative skill themselves find their appreciation of beauty continually enlarged by contact with things of beauty produced by the artistic skill of others. It is, indeed, the greatest service of art that it enlarges our vision, making sense and emotion and understanding more receptive to the amazing beauty that is around us everywhere, if only we are not sense-bound and indifferent to it. It is the gift of literature in particular to open our eyes to much of the beauty in human life that would else go unrealised. To be made aware of some fineness of feeling and some special grace in its expression or in the way in which some act, however simple, is done or, it may be, some suffering borne, or to be made to realise the touch of personal distinction given to common life where love and sincerity are present; this is to enter into a new world of beauty and a heightened apprehension of life and its values.

Nor is this true only of the particular fields of activity that are usually intended when we speak of the arts. Skill, ease, grace, are qualities of intellectual activity as well as of bodily movement or of technical performance, and in that kind of activity also there is an aesthetic satisfaction. Even abstract thought has its beauty of form and fitness. Ideas and theories, though they may have little sensuous or emotional content, may yet surprise us with a sense of beauty. But the intellectual element in beauty is not merely one of abstract form or pattern. When the poet said "beauty is truth, truth beauty", he was giving expression to what is not only a philosophical intuition but a fact of common experience. In all but the simplest and most sensuous apprehension of beauty there is an intellectual as well as an emotional element. The more fully the meaning of the experience is grasped, the fuller (as was pointed out in connection with value in general) will be the appreciation of beauty also. It is mistaken to suppose that in the contemplation of beauty judgment has no part; judgment, whether intuitive or consciously brought to bear, is a

necessary factor in appreciation. A merely critical attitude towards beauty is apt, it is true, to lose sight of what it seeks to judge. The commentator, for instance, who delves for the secret of beauty in the poet's assonances and alliterations, arrangement of words or connection of ideas, his allusions or reminiscences of others' felicities, may easily bury beauty deep beneath a superstructure of merely confusing knowledge and unhelpful judgments. On the other hand, feeling without judgment is only too likely to be ill-founded, sentimental, ineffective. This is the pitfall gaping for an untrained taste—the gushing sensibility that welcomes emotion for its own sake regardless of its quality or outcome, and is so impressed by florid ornament, however commonplace, as to be unable to see the faults of proportion and lack of thought that it conceals. Where feeling and intellect are fused, we get beauty at its highest. This is, indeed, the distinguishing mark alike of the truest criticism and of the finest works of art.

In these ways aesthetic sensibility is enlarged and strengthened, bringing, in the fuller apprehension of beauty, a heightening of experience through which we enter into a more abundant life. Thus, even if it does not seem to have so obvious a 'survival value' (as biologists call it), beauty comes to hold as high a place amongst the supreme values as truth and goodness. Indeed, just because it is thus wholly dissociated from self-interest, beauty may seem to be of even higher spiritual value than these. Or may we not rather say that our apprehension of truth and of moral good is incomplete until it is the beauty of truth and the beauty of holiness that we value rather than the service that they render us in the conduct of life; and that in beauty, thus comprehensive, alike through the aesthetic sense and through its expression in creative effort, we seem to come nearest to the divine.

CHAPTER VII

BEAUTY AS EXPRESSION

§ I. CRAFTSMANSHIP

In the last chapter we have been considering beauty in its passive aspect as the apprehension, in sense or in imagination, of a particular kind of experience. Of this mode of apprehension—the aesthetic sense, as it is termed—and of its development some account has been attempted. We have now to turn to the consideration of beauty in its active aspect; the expression, that is, of the aesthetic sense in some outward form as the outcome of creative effort. We have already seen how much of that which appeals to the sense of beauty is in itself expression of superabundant vitality; such unconscious creation of beauty is the normal accompaniment of vigorous and healthy life. In addition to this, however, as the sense of beauty grows, it tends to find particular expression in some form of activity undertaken for its own satisfaction; to such activity, when consciously undertaken, we give the name of art. Beauty, then, as expression of the creative activity of life, and in particular as expression of the aesthetic sense in art, is the subject to be treated in the present chapter.

If we confine ourselves for the present to the consideration of art in the sense of an orderly arrangement of material or activity, there would seem to be two main ways in which it has been developed, according as the ordering has been mainly for delight or for use. The former is closely connected with the play instinct.¹ That also affords an outlet for energy which is not at the time required to provide for the necessities of life. Such outlet usually takes the form not merely of aimless movement but of mimicry of activities ordinarily called forth in the serious business of life and its needs, but in play practised only in fun, for the pleasure

¹ See *The Will to Live*, pp. 111, 112.

that they afford in themselves. The pleasure experienced in play thus has much in common with the delight—free, as we have seen, from any consideration of self-interest—that we experience as beauty. It is not, therefore, surprising that at such times the aesthetic sense is easily roused to activity, and play tends to take a form that will also bring aesthetic satisfaction. Thus we find the play impulse readily taking some form of dance and song or of dramatic representation; in this way it leads to the various 'expressive' arts, as they may be called, which include, besides those just mentioned, all representation of scenes and events in words or graphic form or in action, with all that may be termed ritual, and the expression of emotional states through the medium of sound. Of these arts more will be said in the following section.

The other line of development of art is the making of things required to satisfy our needs, and the bestowal of care to make them as perfectly suited to their purpose as possible. For this also, as said above, some leisure is necessary, which gives time to savour the pleasure derived from the sense of special fitness in the thing that is being made; and this pleasure, again, finds expression in emphasising the sense of fitness by beauty of shape or by added ornament. Hence comes all beauty of craftsmanship which is the expression of the craftsman's delight in his work. It shows itself first in the 'constructive' or 'decorative' arts; then also in the others, in so far as technical skill is required in all of them, and there is scope in these also for the craftsman's delight in his craft. An important factor, then, in the development of art is to be found in the use of tools.

Even amongst animals such use begins in the quest for means to satisfy the primary needs of obtaining food, safety and shelter. It is no small part of the primacy of the apes that their hands enable them to use sticks as aids in getting food and for other purposes, a habit that man has turned to such fruitful use. Most of all is he a tool-using animal. This is due first to the correlation of hand and eye gained during the stage of life in the trees; then, still more, when

he took to life on the ground, to the freeing of his hands by the upright position and balance in movement that did not need their help, and the effect that this had in the development of his brain.¹ Man has become lord of the earth by having hands with which to grasp tools and a brain with which to learn how to use them.

With the first unshaped tools, out of stones and branches, bones and antlers, he could fashion weapons for striking down his quarry and defending himself against attack. Soon he learnt to make himself utensils, clothes, a place of shelter, and better tools with which the better to make these and many other things besides. A lump of flint, flaked to form a cutting edge, wedged into a cleft stick and tightly fastened there with sinew, was an axe of equal value for killing and for working wood. Stones of different sizes worked to various shapes served for hammer, scraper, drill, and for arrow, spear or knife. With these tools bone could be shaped for harpoon or hook or needle. And in all this work not only were hand and eye being trained to a continually greater nicety and skill, but he was learning the secrets of balance and symmetry, and proportion, how handiness and efficiency depended upon form, and how the forms that proved best fitted for their purpose also gave a pleasure in themselves, a sense of beauty added to the pleasure of good workmanship. It was said above that the crude physical needs once satisfied, the first claim on effort is enjoyment. The craftsman's search for suitability of form led first to enjoyment of form for its own sake, and then, as leisure allowed, to enjoyment of added decoration. Thus also out of the needs of life, by shaping tools with which to win their satisfaction, art was developed.

In this way the properties and fittest uses of various materials were learnt: wood and stone first; then bone and horn, sinew and fibre; and for other uses, skins and hair, reed and osier and clay. Fresh implements and utensils were fashioned as there was more leisure and more skill for making and using them. Baskets and jars, for carrying and storing;

¹ *The Will to Live*, pp. 108-10.

wheels for spinning, making possible the weaving of cloth to supplement the use of skins or plaited grass; hoes for breaking up the ground for cultivation, and then rude ploughs; personal ornaments for delight, and musical instruments. In all such things the lessons of the forms required for handiness and efficiency were repeated and intensified, together with a new care for economy of material, so that things in constant use might not be too heavy for ease of handling and for comfort. And all such things gave scope for fancy in decoration, pattern that could be made in weaving or impressed on clay or added by colour, so as to give to the eye a more complex delight. So, too, by making instruments of various kinds it was possible to get a wider range of sound and differences of tone to extend the possibilities of beauty in music. In personal adornment the scope was even greater, when cloth of various materials and colours could be used as well as the various skins of beasts; when richness of ornament was added by strings of teeth and claws of beasts (selected, no doubt, for purposes of magic, to give the strength of the vanquished animal, no less than as signs of the prowess of the vanquisher) or by coloured stones and beads; and most of all when gold and other metals could be added, for their own beauty and as setting for precious stones. From the use of fire for warmth and protection came the discovery first of the hardening of clay by baking, and then, by some happy accident, of getting metal from the ore and softening it for working. Not only could the old stone implements be replaced by more efficient ones of metal, but things more elaborate in pattern and more delicate in workmanship could now be made, offering a new challenge to the skill of the craftsman, and enlarging the sense of beauty in his work.

We cannot doubt that primitive man's first consciousness of beauty was associated with the objects that were thus made for his use and decorated for his greater enjoyment, and with the rhythmic movements and sounds in which he found delight, long before he thought of beauty in connection with anything in nature. From such beginnings the

appeal of beauty grew with each extension of man's skill and of the field in which it was employed. Certain animals, for instance, which were always the object of his keenest interest, first as quarry to be hunted for food, and later as his domesticated servants, to provide him with most of the necessities of life, also made strong appeal to his dawning sense of beauty. This we see from cave-paintings such as those of France and Spain. Although the purpose of these paintings was in all probability some kind of magic to ensure success in the hunt, can anyone who sees them doubt that the painters took the keenest pleasure in their work, and were in some degree conscious of the beauty of form and colour and movement of the animals they depicted? Even the hunted quarry was a friend who let himself eventually be killed and eaten, much more the domesticated beast who shared one's home and, alive and dead, provided for one's needs; and it is the things we love that become our standard of beauty and enable us to find in others something of what, in them, has been so great a source of pleasure. So it was, too, with the fruits and seed-bearing plants on which man also depended for his food. With agriculture came new interests and new skill; and the plant that he tended came, for this very reason, to have a beauty in his eyes. It is not surprising that the first pleasure in landscape, as graphic art and literature abundantly show, was aroused by ordered field and garden, and the stream that gave life to these as to himself. They were an oasis in the midst of wild nature, with the same beauty for early man that the gardens and orchards of Damascus have for the Arab of the desert.

With each advance in man's power and knowledge came new needs evoking new skill to meet them, and a widening of interest in the world as far as it was mastered, which meant also a widening appreciation of its beauty as well as of that which he created for himself. Thus the need of transport brought the evolution of the boat, with oar and sail, and of sledge and wheeled cart; and forms found necessary for efficiency in use became new types of beauty.

The wheel especially has played a large part in man's imagination as well as in his practical life; one form of it, the potter's wheel, has enabled him to shape forms that owe as much to an ideal of beauty as to their use, and that offer an admirable surface for decoration, on which much of the early history of art was written. But most of all, perhaps, was due to building, the greatest of the crafts. Whatever the material that the particular environment suggested for the purpose, reeds, daub and wattle, timber, stone or brick, with branches, thatch or tiles for roofing, the need of stability taught the adjustment of mass, proportion, upright and horizontal lines; right angles for walls, with lower or higher pitch for gable and roof according to the weather to be kept off and the weight to be borne; and finally arch and dome for bridging spaces larger than could be spanned by stone slabs and more securely than could be accomplished by timber. In these discoveries man learnt the abstract laws of beauty, the lines that best gave the impression of stability and of grace; and in door and window, column and cornice, wall and pediment, there were endless opportunities for the added ornament that expressed his delight in the beauty of his work, making it worthy of the god or godlike king for whose honouring it was raised. So architecture, calling to its service painting and sculpture, and pressing all materials into its use, became the greatest of the early arts that began as crafts for the making of needed objects, and then in the delight of creation gave wings to soar beyond mere need and to seek beauty for its own sake as well as for the sake of magnificence and pride.

In the ritual of every art tradition is at first all-powerful; it is only by slow degrees that emancipation is won. In all there is the same sequence of development, parallel to that which is frequently seen in the life-history of the craftsman and artist himself. This sequence in recurrent cycles is clearly shown in the case of architecture. First there is the archaic stage, while the material is still intractable, and the craftsman does what it imposes on him rather than what he set out to do; but yet is satisfied with his work because he has

done all that he knows to be possible. Then comes the stage when mastery is gradually won, but there is still simplicity of aim and execution, as he does not trust himself beyond a certain range of accomplishment. But with the full mastery of material and technical ability, design and workmanship become ornate, displaying to the full the craftsman's skill; then fanciful or even fantastic, seeking to impress by originality and daring in the effort to escape from the routine of tradition, or in the mistaken idea that beauty comes from wealth of ornament and florid execution. When this stage is reached, that particular line of advance is ended. A new start must be made with new material, or with new principles of construction, and new aims.¹ With this last stage we are, at the present time, familiar not only in architecture, with the possibilities offered by steel and concrete and glass as new materials to explore, but also in painting and poetry and music. Even if we cannot but deplore the end of a great tradition of beauty achieved, we can yet welcome the ferment of striving and confusion of aims from which some new order will emerge.

Architecture has been instanced as a craft that has grown into an art. The distinction is one that to us seems natural and inevitable in days when the workman no longer designs his work, and the artist frequently does not himself carry out what he creates. The complete disruption of the two is the outcome of an industrial system in which the personal touch of the craftsman is usually replaced by a machine, with the loss, to him, of his joy in his work, and, to the designer, of intimate knowledge of his material and its possibilities. One result has been to set the constructive

¹ It is noteworthy that at each stage of advance a new material is used at first to imitate the old, until its own properties and possibilities are discovered. In Egypt columns of stone were carved to imitate the bundles of reeds that they replaced. In Greece it was from tree-trunks, with a slab of wood laid on them for the beams to rest on, that the Doric columniation was evolved, with spaces between the columns of a size that marble blocks, replacing the beams, could span. So also in our own time the tendency has been to put into steel buildings a sham façade suggesting that they are built of stone. It is only as architects are learning to design in the new materials they employ that a new style of architecture is emerging.

(or 'useful') arts on a lower level than the expressive (or 'fine') arts, as though the latter alone were worth the artist's attention. But the distinction between craftsmanship and art is older than the industrial revolution. The Greeks, with their exaltation of theory above practice, as being ideal and universal in contrast with the flux and perishability of material things, held craftsmanship in low esteem; and their example has affected our estimate of the rank of the worker as compared with that of the designer, so that we are accustomed, at least subconsciously, to regard art as something ideal and workmanship as mechanical. The result is disastrous, if the making of things is thus degraded into a lifeless and monotonous routine; and no less if it leads to art being regarded as something only for the few,—for them a form of refined self-indulgence, and for the rest at most an amusement. To think this is to lose touch with the spiritual value of beauty, the delight in life which finds expression in the creation of beauty in all we do, with the heightening thereby of joy in the doing, and the refreshment and enlargement of the spirit by the beauty to be found in all experience.

§ 2. THE ARTS

We have taken architecture as an example of what was at first merely a craft growing into an art. The distinction implied in the terms marks a difference not so much in the nature of the work undertaken as in the spirit in which it is carried out and the purpose that it serves. A certain kind of work has to be expended upon any material in order to make it into a serviceable object; the carrying out of this work is the craft in question, and its main end the utility of the object for the particular service for which it is intended. An art, on the other hand, however much work it may involve, has its main end within itself, in the expression of the feeling of the artist. Whatever other purpose it may serve, the product is not a work of art if it was not done largely for the sake of the doing and to give embodiment to the feeling that prompted and accompanied

it, and if it does not in some degree awaken a similar feeling in others, in those at least who are sufficiently receptive to apprehend it.

For the sake of sharpness of contrast, then, we may say that a craft has its end outside itself, in some particular utility of its product, while that of an art is within itself, in the feeling that it expresses and conveys. But in practice they are seldom so sharply separated; more often each contains something of the other. The greater the skill of the craftsman and the pride and pleasure that he finds in his work, the more of his feeling will he put into it. This may show itself merely in elaboration rather than expressiveness; but whatever of the latter quality there is in the work, it will become in that degree a work of art as well. This is where the product of a handicraft has an advantage over a machine-made article, however well turned out. In the former there can be an individual touch, a sense of personality and of interest in the work that gives to each object an individuality of its own; in the machine product, however good the design and accurate the construction, this other element is lacking—until, perhaps, much handling may give it the personal impress of the user rather than of the maker. And on the other hand, an art can seldom be practised for its own sake alone. Much of the beauty created by art is, no doubt, spontaneous as the song of a bird, expressive of the moment's feeling and with no further purpose. But just as most crafts have in them wide possibilities of art, so also most of the arts involve craftsmanship and rest upon uses for which their products are wanted. Beauty, indeed, resembles pleasure in that it is not so readily found when it is sought for its own sake as when something else is the first aim in view. One reason why it is now so often lost is because it is regarded as the sole object of art instead of the natural outcome of all fine feeling and good workmanship.

But though they thus have much in common, the distinction between art and mere craftsmanship is a real one. Skill alone does not make the doing of a thing into an art.

There is, indeed, a danger on the part of the highly-skilled craftsman of aiming at perfection of finish rather than at the expression of his individual apprehension of beauty. A workman may by practice acquire astonishing skill in turning out some object; but if it is done mechanically (whether by machine or by hand) without personal interest or pleasure in each one that is produced, any beauty of form or construction will be lifeless. It may be a clever imitation of art, but it cannot be a real work of art if the sense of self-expression and delight in the act of creation is wanting. Where this sense is conveyed, even if it was unconscious on the part of the workman, something of art is present, although unintended. There may be art by accident, as at times in the movements of children or in the talk of simple persons who are unaware of the beauty they create. But though any such self-expression may give rise to what in reality is art, it is of the kind that we then call 'artless', implying that it is not conscious; whereas only to conscious self-expression can the term art in its full meaning be applied.

Though skill alone does not make art, whenever skill is used not merely to turn out a piece of work but to do it as well as it can be done, because of the pride the doer takes in it, there art to some extent comes in. Thus journalism, for instance, is a craft which may also be an art. We are apt to think that the distinction between prose and poetry is that of the presence or absence of metrical form; but it lies deeper in the purpose and manner of what is said. Prose is the language of statement and enquiry, and its purpose to convey and elicit meaning; much of didactic and narrative verse is merely prose cut up into metrical lengths. Poetry, on the other hand, the language of emotion and of creative imagination, has for its purpose to give expression to feeling and to embody beauty. Such language, no matter if the medium is verse or not, gives the effect of poetry and has something of its form; for all impassioned and imaginative speech tends to find rhythmical expression and takes on something of the beauty of art.

Art, then, is the expression of personal feeling in the reproduction or imaginative shaping of experience. If this be so, it is not something apart from daily existence, a side-issue of life, confined to a few specially artistic natures, but includes most of what we do. It can be present in our daily talk as well as in the poet's outpourings. It can add grace to the simplest action and beauty to the commonest relations of human intercourse. Not that art is to be regarded as ornament stuck on to what, without it, would be merely plain and serviceable; often it is rather a discovery of beauty in simple things no less than in those on which elaboration has been lavished. The great artist is one who reveals fresh beauty where before it has been unnoticed, in some play of light or harmony of tones, or it may be in the very factories and machinery that had seemed to destroy it, and in the lives from which it had seemed to be banished. Art may, it is true, be degraded into a useless addition to practical life or an amusement for an idle hour. But in itself it is as much an outcome of the urge of life as any other activity expressive of the will to live; an overflow of energy that finds its outlet in beauty as naturally as the life within the sea-shell shapes its exquisite beauty of form and patterned colour, or the bird's vitality breaks into beauty of plumage and song. In man, in addition to the external beauty that—with him as with other living things—is the outcome of vigorous and healthy functioning of the bodily life, it is his mental life above all that finds varied expression in the practice of the different arts.

The first activities to be undertaken for the mere delight they gave were undoubtedly, in the infancy of the race, as still with every baby, those involving movement and sound. First there is the delight in mere repetition—the basis of rhythm—and then in the variation within a repeated pattern which heightens the pleasure and transforms mechanical repetition into an art. Sound and movement, both being modes of bodily activity, are easy of correlation; hence the close development of song and dance. The ritual dance may be looked upon as the basic art; song first, and

later a musical accompaniment, being subsidiary to give the time and preserve the rhythm. Together they make the most natural outlet for emotions either of joy or sorrow, from the unstudied cries and gestures of the individual up to the elaborate ceremonial in which social excitement is worked up to its highest pitch of enthusiasm, in war-fever or triumph, festivity or mourning. Thus it became instinctive to resort to music and rhythmic movement at all the most strongly-felt moments of social life; and especially in the ritual of great occasions, such as the ceremonial of religion and the honours paid to earthly rulers. Whatever the occasion and whatever the ostensible purpose of the ritual, the urge to self-expression finds in it an outlet. It is characteristic of human nature to make of any event—a funeral as much as a wedding—a holiday from the routine of ordinary life, and to deck it out in some pomp of attendant circumstance as an occasion to satisfy the need of beauty. Thus from their beginnings as the fitting expression of common emotions on great occasions, singing and dancing become, so to speak, detached arts available for use at any time, either separately or linked with other modes of expression in more complex forms of art.

Another such mode of expression was story-telling. This belongs to a somewhat higher stage of mental development than the song-and-dance stage of emotional cries and mimicry of gesture to record some triumphant exploit or tragic occurrence; but when there had been sufficient development of language, it was an equally natural mode of expression of remembered events and the feelings they aroused. Hunter and fighter loved to recall the past achievement of victory or escape heightened by the thrill of danger; and the whole circle of hearers could share the emotional vicissitudes of success and failure, fear and daring, of unforgotten deeds related by the old who had witnessed them or heard of them from their own elders. Thus grew up the great traditional stories of gods and heroes and an established art of telling them, as they took shape in ballad and epic; the teller adding some turn of expression or

incident until the tradition was so firmly established that it must not be varied, or till the form was fixed in writing.

From such recital of "old, unhappy, far-off things" arose the art, first oral, then written, which since it is handed down to us in writing, we call literature; language, that is, expressive, first, mainly of action and of emotion associated with it, and later increasingly of thought as well. In literature, song came before story, poetry before prose. Not only was the first utterance emotional and rhythmic but, before writing became easy, remembrance of the traditional tale, in the traditional words, was easier if the language had a recurrent rhythm, or was helped by music. So, besides purely lyric song, war-chant and dirge, love-song and drinking song, we have ballad and epic. Out of these, with the addition of mimicry of action and gesture, grew the poetic (or 'heroic') drama, in which legend and tradition were embodied; and from this again, later, the drama of contemporary life in ordinary speech. So, too, from the same root of the story told to the circle round the fire came, in days when writing was no longer a kind of magic known only to the few, the prose tale, branching into romance and history. And with the development of prose-writing grew the whole literature of thought about life,—philosophy, criticism and essay; thought-forms that are also forms of art so long as delight in the experience that is expressed and in the mode of expression has no less weight with writer and reader than desire for knowledge.

Writing, with its need of implements, is already midway to the second group of arts which are in origin and essence handicrafts, and depend for a great part of their effect on the manual skill as well as on the artistic feeling of the craftsman. Writing is not fully one of these, as any beauty of manual skill is only an accessory of the literary art; it can be dispensed with altogether by the listener, and forgotten even by the reader when generalised as print. But in painting and sculpture the actual handling of his material by the artist is a vital element in the effect produced. Sculpture has two sources. One is the modelling of solid

objects in clay which is the delight of all children as expressive of their interest in animals and other features of their surroundings; an interest similar to that which shows so largely in the remains of primitive man. The other is the chipping of stone, wood, bone or ivory, into some likeness of living things so far as the conditions imposed by the material in question will allow. Limitations at first imposed by technical difficulties are apt to become traditional and are accepted as canons of art until some more skilful and daring craftsman breaks through them. With the advance of technique conventional form can be replaced by a greater realism, until, following the sequence above mentioned, the cycle ends in mastery so complete as to be mere imitation of nature, and greater expressiveness is sought in some new kind of convention.

In painting, limited as it is to two dimensions, the conventional tradition is still more marked and is further intensified by the influence of the decorative patterns with which it began in the smearing of face and body with coloured earths, and the decoration of jars on which it was soon discovered that colour could be fixed by firing. The amazing advance that was made at least by some races of early man, and the vigour and truth with which some of the animals he knew best could be portrayed, are revealed by the cave paintings already mentioned. Early pottery and frescoes show how inevitably the forms they studied most were conventionalised for the sake of pattern and represented by a traditional system of line and colour. Representation in the flat, without perspective or light and shade, was necessarily confined to a few outstanding figures, their surroundings merely suggested by conventional symbols. It was only at a late stage of development of the art that interest in environment assumed equal importance, and natural scenes came to be represented, first as background to the human interest, and finally for their own sake. With this extension painting ceased to be merely a mode of decorating objects and bare surfaces, and became, for good or ill, an independent art, as we know it to-day,

divorced from the other crafts to which it was originally subservient, and following in its development the same cycle as we have seen in the case of other arts.

There is one obvious difference between the graphic arts, together with those of sculpture and architecture which also make appeal to the eye, and those, such as dancing and the drama, literature and music, that appeal to the sense of movement and to the ear. The former are concerned mainly with spatial relations which can be simultaneously apprehended, whereas in the latter the time element is the more important, both in the form of rhythm and in the fact that the pattern involved can only be recognised as a matter of succession and development. As rhythmic movement, on which our apprehension of time is based, is a central characteristic of life from its first beginnings, it is not surprising that this should furnish a more powerful means of expressing and arousing emotion than any visual contemplation can give rise to. No other art can produce such a frenzy of emotional excitement as some forms of dance-ritual, such as those of the dancing dervishes and of many primitive tribes, inspired and intensified by their musical accompaniment. Such manifestations as these we may be inclined to dismiss as savage survivals, unsuited to a more civilised stage of development; but at any stage music remains a powerful stimulus and the fullest expression of emotional experience.

It began, as said above, in song, as a social rather than, at first, an individual means of expression, whether of triumph or grief. But since any concerted activity, if it is to maintain a rhythmic recurrence and harmony in variety, requires a leader, song also, like the dance, becomes an individual thing. As with the dance, it needs some support to mark the rhythm and enrich the melody,—some kind of drum for the one need, and some variation of note of pipe or string for the other. What was at first merely accessory then became of interest for its own sake, whether to recall song and dance at times when the solitary performer, the lonely shepherd, for example, could not share them with

his fellows, or to suggest them to others or, finally, to take their place with a satisfaction complete in itself. Thus, as with painting, from being a subsidiary accompaniment of other arts, instrumental music has become an art in its own right. Of all the arts this is the furthest withdrawn from the external world of action and cognitional experience. For this reason it has been the latest to develop in its pure form,—as the expression, that is, of emotional experience apart from the usual manifestation of such experience in action and in spoken words; in the same way that pure mathematics is a development of thought apart from immediate reference to external objects, although it was in the study of their numerical and spatial relations that it began.

Whereas sight has been, at least for mankind, the most important of the senses for the investigation and understanding of the external world, and so has played the largest part in the development of intelligence, our development on the emotional side owes more to sound, as providing the chief means for communication of feeling. For this reason, even if an art that appeals to the eye may give to some a keener aesthetic delight, whether in the contemplation of beauty as revealed in actual objects or in abstract form, music may be said to be, in one sense, the most perfect of the arts, in that it gives the most direct expression to the whole range of feeling, and with least admixture and distraction of extraneous circumstance. The graphic arts are by their nature mainly representational; however abstract the idea to be conveyed, they must employ images drawn from material forms. Poetry comes nearest to music both in its medium of sound and as expression of every shade of emotion; but owing to the fact that words are fixed symbols of definite objects and happenings and relations, it is necessarily more closely bound to the external facts of experience. Music also, of course, since its medium, sound, is part of the material world, can be representational and even imitative; but this is not its true function. On the other hand, it can lose itself in a formalism of pattern addressed rather

to the intellect than to feeling. In art, as in life, feeling is enriched and enlarged by intellectual growth. Human emotion—love and fear will serve as examples—though it may be no stronger, is infinitely fuller in content, we must believe, than that of other living things. But wherever, in the arts, an intellectual interest, whether insistence on accuracy of representation or on the constructive framework, or taking the form of a purely abstract treatment, becomes predominant, it is science rather than art which is in question. This may be the case with music, and it may become little more than an exercise in mathematics, the science to which it is most closely allied. But though, like other arts, music may fail of its true purpose in either of these ways, just as it may fail in the unreality or tawdriness of the feeling that it expresses, at its highest it gives expression to a fullness of thought-enriched feeling, and lifts experience to a spiritual height, greater than other arts can attain.

§ 3. FORM IN ART

Art seeks to give expression to an emotional experience. When the aesthetic sensibility of the artist is aroused in presence of some object or situation, actual or imagined, it finds expression in the creation, in whatever medium he employs, of a work of art; and by this the aesthetic sensibility of others can in turn be aroused. In order to do this the artist must so arrange and modify its unorganised material as to give form and meaning to what would otherwise make little direct appeal to the aesthetic sense. In the act of artistic creation, that is, the experience itself together with the means through which it is to be reproduced, must pass through the mind of the artist and emerge in the form impressed upon it in the process.

The particular form that an artist gives to his work is decided partly by his personal reaction to what he experiences as beauty, and the selection and arrangement which his imagination exercises on the material that is offered him, and partly by the conditions under which he works.

Among these conditions, apart from the limitations imposed upon him by the medium that he employs and by his skill in using it, are the conventions of the art; traditional rules, that is, which have become established at the particular epoch and in the community to which he belongs. To the establishment of such conventions many things contribute. Some are due to the actual nature of the material that is used. In architecture, for instance, they will be different according as this is wood or stone, brick or ferro-concrete. So, too, in sculpture they will not be the same with bronze as with marble or clay. Patterns in weaving, again, have conventions dictated by the material and by the nature of the craft. Others are imposed by the conditions under which an art is exercised. The conventions to be observed in a drama that can only be enacted in the open air will be different from those of a small theatre with curtained stage and artificial lighting. In music, again, they will differ according to the instruments used and the range of sound that can be produced. And one of the conditions, as said above, is the stage of craftsmanship to which, at any particular epoch, the artist has attained. There is not a little in the art of various times that corresponds to a child's highly-conventionalised drawing of a human figure which, being all he can then do, completely satisfies his sense of artistic fitness. Such is the strength of custom, especially where an art is associated with religious observance, or handed down in a special guild of craftsmen, that conventions, originally due to limitations of these kinds, come to have a traditional significance and to be looked upon as themselves types, or at least necessary conditions, of beauty that must not be tampered with. Hence the establishment, in all the arts, of conventional forms and traditional patterns, from which, both in the planning of a whole, such as a Greek temple or drama, and in its various parts, for long periods of time no great deviation is held to be permissible.

But though this will account for much that is conventional in the form that is given to a work of art, it is by no means the whole of the matter. The formal element in art is not

merely due to tradition; nor is it an involuntary limitation from which the artist is always striving to free himself. It is, indeed, the very essence and distinctive feature of art. The artist does not seek merely to reproduce actual experience. For one thing, to do so in all its fullness and complexity would be beyond any means that he could employ; and for another, even if he had the power, he would not wish to use it, since such a reproduction would be no more apprehensible than the actual experience until this has been, so to speak, fused in the artist's imagination and recast in a simpler and more intelligible form. That is what art does for us: it selects from experience what it feels to be significant, and modifies this in such a way as to make it into a recognisable pattern that can be enjoyed because now, for the first time, the experience can be grasped as an intelligible unity.

Art, therefore, is always in some degree a process of abstraction, a conceptual rather than merely a perceptual apprehension of experience, "submitting", as Bacon said, "the shows of things to the desires of the mind". Among these "desires of the mind", if there is to be any aesthetic satisfaction, are a sense of proportion, coherence and intelligible relations, to give some kind of unity and order in the welter of experience. Aesthetic satisfaction arises when the mind recognises some part of experience as thus having a formal organisation that makes it stand out as an ordered whole. In creating a work of art the artist gives to his material the unity of formal organisation which his imagination has grasped, so that in recognising this a similar aesthetic satisfaction can be enjoyed by others. And in doing this he can find help in the limitations imposed by his material and his tools. As Emerson put it, "like a skater, he must go partly where he will, and partly where his skates carry him." It is the utilisation of this necessity that gives to an art, as to skating, its ease and beauty. Each art has its own technique, and consequently its own conventions to which the worker in this technique must submit. The process of simplification thus forced upon him is itself an element

that makes for unity in the whole; and accepted conventions enable his intention to be more readily recognised and approved.

It is, then, by picking out what is most significant and suppressing unnecessary and distracting detail that art can enable us to feel the aesthetic value of experience. To do this is to impose upon the experience some form—or, if we prefer to put it so, to allow the form which is apprehended by the artist to detach itself from all that tends to conceal it. But there are still two courses open to him. He can attempt to reproduce the experience that he has himself thus apprehended as a whole, either objectively, by as exact a representation as he can give, or more subjectively, conveying by means of some kind of symbolism the emotion that he feels and wishes to evoke. Art tends, therefore, to be either representational or symbolic. While this is equally true of the arts that involve movement and speech as well as those that use form and colour, it is in the graphic arts that the difference is most easily seen.

If the artist is chiefly interested in the external world and the behaviour of living things his art is more likely to be representational; and less so if he is chiefly concerned with feelings and ideas, whether personal or traditional. But while the line followed is thus largely a matter of personal disposition, it also depends upon the influence of his surroundings, his time, and the tradition into which he is born. Delight in organic form and movement is more likely to arise when external nature is kindly and life easy than when it is hard and cruel. Thus throughout the temperate zone art tends to be more naturalistic; while in lands where great cold or heat, jungle or desert, make hardship and danger ever present, it tends to seek escape from nature in an ideal world of abstraction or of fantasy, and to express itself in elaboration of intricate pattern and rich colouring, or of fantastic and violent form.¹ Symbolic

¹ Some such difference in the conditions of life and the consequent purpose of artistic activity seems to underlie the different lines of development, so marked as a whole though frequently modified by cross currents,

art is strongly emotional; whereas in representational art an intellectual curiosity, akin to that of science, is evident both in the desire to show all that can be perceived in the object represented, and also in technical interest in methods of expression and the use of the medium employed. This attitude of mind easily leads to an extreme realism that is sought for its own sake, to which ugliness has no less interest than what is usually accounted beauty. In this respect it has done good service to art, by enlarging its sphere and revealing beauty where this was not seen before; but it is always in danger of falling into mere imitation, and thereby ceasing to perform the true function of art. Realism whose object is exact verisimilitude, as in a waxwork figure, overreaches itself and only gives a sense of deception instead of reality. Nature is not simply mirrored in art, but rather is enriched by the imagination of the artist.¹ Far more is gained than is lost through the very simplification which enables us to pierce through the distracting multiplicity of life to the spirit within.

The other line of development turns away from realism and makes its appeal to the emotions through a traditional symbolism, which links the particular experience with something that all have felt, and shows it as a typical instance or at most as a variation of a familiar pattern. This mode of treatment, while in itself more consonant with the function of art in that it recasts experience in a form that gives it a richer emotional content and meaning, has also a danger into which, in one of two ways, it is apt to fall. For the appeal to be effective the symbolism must be of a kind to be readily grasped, intuitively, at least, if not consciously, and the pattern one that is accepted as familiar. Such art, followed by Western and Oriental art. Chinese art shows both tendencies; but even when it is naturalistic it seeks rather to express rhythm of movement and poetic sensibility than the more intellectual interest of the West.

¹ Thus photography which reproduces nature mechanically is not in itself an art. It comes within the range of art, however, when there is such selection and arrangement of the material, in the subject chosen, the point of view, the lighting, and so forth, and such imaginative treatment, both in these respects and in the definition of the various parts, as reveal a personal vision and emotional response.

therefore, tends to follow traditional lines. But in so doing it is apt either to get fixed in a formalism from which life and meaning have been lost by excessive abstraction or constant repetition; or else, in the effort to avoid this fixation, it tends to take refuge in a violence of symbolism and capricious treatment of form in which accepted conventions are replaced by individual mannerisms and aesthetic values are subordinated to the quest for originality.

This dilemma constantly awaits the artist, being, indeed, inherent in the very nature of art. Since the purpose of art is not merely to record but rather to give some satisfying interpretation of experience, it seeks to present particular objects or situations and the emotions to which they give rise not as isolated bits of experience unrelated to the rest of existence but as embodiments of a universal experience which they enable us in part to realise. A flower or a certain succession of notes may thus become the key to all beauty, and each human experience an epitome of humanity. This sense of universality seems to be implicit in the aesthetic apprehension of experience and in any art through which this apprehension is expressed. When given back in the form of a work of art, however personal and particular the experience may be, it takes on a generalised and conceptual character which gives to it a wealth of allusive ideas and associated feelings, all the greater if the form in which it is presented is one already known and enriched by traditional observance.

But if to disclose the universal in the particular is thus a main function of art, it is no less true that it is only through some particular instance that the sense of universality can be expressed. A work of art is an individual creation, a particular experience apprehended in a particular manner. There is, therefore, always the question on which of the two elements, the universal or the individual, the emphasis shall be laid. Is the form to be generalised, abstract, symmetrically patterned, with the beauty of something removed from the chances and imperfections of common life? Or shall it be strongly individual, responsive

to all the irregularities of life, and seeking beauty in vividness of impression rather than in a traditional perfection? It is plain that in the two cases the form given to the experience as expressed in art will be very different, hardly more comparable than a stained-glass window and a scene upon the film. Which form he will adopt depends on the personal bias of the artist and on the extent to which he is influenced, whether in acceptance or in revolt, by the dominant convention of the age.

These two contrasted tendencies¹ are those that in Western art are usually termed 'classical' and 'romantic'. This use of 'classical' is due to the fact that insistence on the universal element in art is so clearly to be seen in Greek literature and sculpture at the time when they reached their finest manifestations. But though specially characteristic of the Greek genius, this tendency is not confined to a particular race or period; it is a natural development in art, though more strongly marked in some races and at particular epochs in their development. It stands for such qualities as restraint, proportion, common-sense, insistence on all that is common in the lot of humanity, treated with frankness but without exaggeration. The 'romantic' tendency, on the other hand, insists on the unique character of all personal experience, and seeks to escape from the bounds of the ordinary and commonplace by an unchecked freedom of imagination and emotional expression, seeking the loveliness which cannot be enshrined in any pattern and escapes all rules. The difference between the two is clearly shown by comparison of 'classical' poetic drama, such as that of Racine, governed by strict conventions of speech and action and restricted within narrow limits of time and place and unity of tone, with the freer Elizabethan drama in which such restrictions

¹ They are not the same, it should be noted, as those above contrasted as symbolic and representational art. Thus, to revert to the illustration just given, while the treatment of a stained window tends to be symbolic and abstract in form and colour, it may be realistic and representational; and, on the other hand, while this latter may seem to be the obvious treatment for the subject of a film, such subjects can be treated in a highly symbolic manner.

are disregarded and violent contrasts of tone are intentionally sought. It cannot be maintained that the one is good art and the other bad. Both make a profound appeal to aesthetic sensibility, but in quite different ways that are more operative at one time than at another. While the romantic tendency is always present, it is most likely to assert itself when some particular artistic tradition has been long observed and its pattern repeated to the point of weariness and consequent loss of aesthetic appeal. But while it is thus the natural expression of a youthful ardour that will not be confined within an outworn tradition but wishes to explore new possibilities and create new forms for itself, it may easily, in the quest for originality and freedom, forget the essential quality of form in art, and so become merely the cult of some novel mannerism, or the pursuit of expressiveness by means of exaggeration and distortion.

Either tendency, indeed, if pushed to its extreme, becomes equally barren. To stand aloof from the world of ordinary experience, to lose sympathy with the common feelings of humanity and to abandon all restraint of form is to make of art "a tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing". And at the opposite side of the strait path that leads to beauty lies in wait the Charybdis of mere abstraction and unreality, if the artist loses his hold of individual life with its intensity of personal experience. In actual practice art is usually strongly influenced by one tendency or the other; but a balanced combination of the two is not impossible.¹ To some this may seem nothing but a poor compromise, an attempt to make the best of two worlds that cannot be reconciled. Such would either sacrifice everything to a poetic idealism or would be content with nothing short of a slice of real life, regardless of form so long as it gave the impress of actuality. So, too, some architects are for treating a building in some traditional style, regardless of its purpose

¹ Drama, for example, such as the later plays of Ibsen, can have all the austerity of form and economy of material of the classical pattern while presenting new problems in the setting and language of contemporary life.

and mode of construction: while others are for taking these alone into account, without care for abstract form or unity of design. Those, however, are the truer artists who, while following the dictates of purpose and material, and seeing that form and construction are in close relation to one another, can create a beauty that depends not on traditional form or ornament but rather on proportion and sincerity, verified by imaginative vision and made living by personal feeling.

Aesthetic appreciation, it was suggested above, arises from a sense of heightened life. This, where art is concerned, may be considered as a sense of fuller integration of the personality finding its sustenance and expression in some external harmony of rhythm and proportion, revealed, perhaps, in time and tone relations in music or in space and colour relations in visual art. Such a sense is often largely subconscious, and its cause and nature little understood. In most cases it needs some recognisable pattern in the associations and meanings that are evoked to bring it into consciousness before the underlying relation can be realised. For this reason the first approach to aesthetic appreciation is most likely to come through vivid presentation of what is already familiar; hence the appeal in popular art of naturalism, and the 'telling of a story'. Any new departure that does not accord with a familiar tradition is sure to arouse resentment and dislike until it has become sufficiently familiar to take its place in the tradition. The artist, on the other hand, being more sensitive to the purely aesthetic elements in what moves him, and less dependent on familiar associations, is likely for this very reason to turn away from naturalism and from modes of expression that have become traditional and academic, and to lay emphasis on deeper relations than those that have now become obvious and hackneyed. In this way the work of a great artist may at first be largely unintelligible to his contemporaries and may have to open men's eyes to see new relations before its greatness can be recognised.

Our conception of the place of art in life is narrow in

proportion as our sense of beauty is undeveloped. If this is associated mainly with prettiness and sentimentality we are apt to think of art as something that, like the higher mathematics or theology, is the possession of a few and beyond the apprehension of all but its specially gifted votaries. To break down this indifference and enlarge our conception both of art and beauty is the greatest thing that art can do for us. The artist to whom we owe most is one who reveals to us new heights and depths of feeling and enlarges our vision of the meaning and value of experience; who shows us new beauty, unrecognised before, whether, as in tragedy, in sorrow and suffering, or in what, without this vision, we had regarded as ugliness or at least as the dull commonplace of life. This all true art can do; and this it does in some degree for all. However primitive in form and simple in feeling, it can still move us deeply; and however profound in conception and elaborate in technique, it can enrich the feeling even of those who have little understanding of its technicalities. True enjoyment of *Hamlet* or Westminster Abbey or of great music is not confined to those who know most about the details of their construction, still less to those who set up to be 'aesthetic', but can be felt by the ignorant as well as by the cultured.

In spite of this, however, it is only now and again, at some great period of history when there comes a new uprush of spiritual life, as in Athens or Florence at their crowning moment, or in such an age as built the cathedrals, that art is felt by the man in the street to be important. For the most part, we are content to satisfy our emotional needs in trivial ways, and to seek beauty only in the gratification of the senses. We do not sufficiently realise that beauty in some form is just as necessary for spiritual health as sunlight for the health of the body. And it is not enough, in order to satisfy this need, to have our eyes opened to contemplation of the beauty round us, much as art can do for us in this way: we need no less to have some share in the joy of its creation. So far as the practice of the 'fine

arts' is concerned we can, most of us, do but little; but in one art at least—and that the greatest of them all, the art of living—we all take part and can be not merely craftsmen but, in some degree, creative artists.

§ 4. THE ART OF LIFE

For it is not in 'the arts' alone, whether 'fine' or 'useful', that beauty is the outcome of creative activity. There is a wider meaning of art, which is not to be confined to those specialised forms of creative expression of the aesthetic sense. If this were all that art includes, we should be right in supposing, as most of us are apt to do, that art could play a comparatively small part in our lives. For though there are few who cannot—or could not if we were wise enough to shape the routine of life so as to allow of it—know something of the delight in doing work that has beauty as well as utility for its aim, and few who cannot share in such universal arts as dance and song, there are not many who can become creative artists in the narrower sense of the term. There may be those who have the innate power but, for lack of opportunity or lack of training, are unable to give it expression. Many a country churchyard may contain the grave, as the poet thought, of "some mute inglorious Milton"; though where the urge is strong, in ploughman or shepherd-boy¹ as well as in those more fortunately placed, it can sometimes find its way over difficulties and obstacles. But not all even of those in whom the aesthetic sense is keenly developed feel the creative impulse; or if they do, they have not the special gift of artistic expression or power of acquiring the necessary technical skill. There are many in whom the love of beauty finds its expression in good taste or, it may be, in good manners, rather than in one of the creative activities to which the term 'the fine arts' is usually confined.

But while the number of those whose sense of beauty finds creative expression in the arts is limited to such as

¹ E.g. Robert Burns, the poet, and Giotto, the painter.

have at once exceptional gifts and opportunities for developing them, there is a sense in which expression in art is open to all. It is so, at least, if by art we mean the spirit, akin to what we have called craftsmanship, in which any activity is carried out in a manner not merely to promote some self-interest but to satisfy the aesthetic sense as well. The desire to make a good job of anything that we do, the pleasure that we find in using whatever skill we have so that the thing done may be at once as good as we can make it and expressive of our delight in the doing, constitute art in this wider sense. There is, indeed, a common use of the term in which art means no more than technique, involving special knowledge and training, as when we speak of the art of medicine or of advertisement or of waiting at table, or whatever it may be. If this is all that is intended, and if efficiency is the sole purpose that is aimed at, it is not art in the sense in which the word is here being used. This implies an activity that is not merely efficient in reaching the end proposed but also gives some degree of aesthetic pleasure by the skill that is employed in the process and by the manner of its employment.

If art be understood in this way, then we can rightly speak of art in connection with any kind of activity. Thus there can be an art of pocket-picking which could give the same aesthetic pleasure as any other kind of legerdemain, however much we might reprobate the use of it. But if the aesthetic sense is itself enriched by the emotional and intellectual content of experience, the pleasure given by any recognition of art will necessarily be fuller or poorer according to the kind of activity in which the art is exercised. There is more beauty to be found in *King Lear* than in the ordinary plays that most theatres produce, although they may be presented with equal skill, because of the greater fullness of content and the deeper emotions that are revealed. Judged by this standard, the highest art is the art of life; and the greatest service, as was said above, that the arts can do us is so to purify and deepen our sense of the beauty, actual and possible, of life that we may come to appreciate

at its full value this art in others and ourselves become truer artists in it.

For, whether we will or not, we are inevitably artists, in all we do creating beauty or ugliness. There is one portrait whose features we all paint, one figure that we all mould, not in clay or bronze but in living form. One story we all write, not in prose or verse but in what we are and what we do. Like Donne's "coy mistress" whose

pure and eloquent blood
Spoke in her cheeks, and so distinctly wrought
That you might almost say 'her body thought',

we cannot help expressing our thought and feeling in all our actions as much as in our words, and often more fully. Just as the merest jotting by a master of line and colour will be instinct with beauty, so in the greater art of life is every movement expressive; however simple and unstudied, it can be a thing of beauty in some grace and ease of manner, in the gladness and vigour of life, the fullness of feeling and perception that it reveals. We see this especially in those who, on the one hand, are least self-conscious or sophisticated, and least troubled by doubts and afterthoughts; in children who have never been encouraged to show off, when they are alone or pursuing their own concerns; in the plain dealing and simple courtesy of many of those who work with their hands and are proud of their work; in all in whom the natural expression of good feeling has not been overlaid by conventions or repressed by bad treatment or untoward circumstances; or on the other hand, in those in whom good breeding has made a fine courtesy of manner a second nature, or at least a traditional obligation of birth and position that could not be departed from without loss of self-respect.

Such natural or inbred art is in the main unconscious, with a beauty like that of the movements of animals or the growth of a plant. If conscious, it may still be fine, with the conscious artistry of the dancer rejoicing in her skill or of the virtuoso playing with the difficulties of his art. But

in conscious artistry there is always the danger of pushing art so far that it becomes artificial; either self-conscious, that is, and with some falsity of artistic pose, or conventional and unfelt. Indeed, like much of the experience out of which great art is made, it is best when least realised, at the moment, as subject for art, but merely felt and lived as the moment's need demands. In the other arts it may happen that such experience, reshaped in imagination, is then aesthetically apprehended and expresses itself in some work of art; but in the art of life the truest artist is he whose experience instinctively finds expression in forms of beauty, and who is at the time concerned only with the feeling that he is expressing in his acts rather than with how they look, to others or to himself, which would at once bring in an element of artificiality.

To playwrights and play-lovers life has always presented itself as a drama, in which we have our parts to play. To some, as to Swift, it is "a tragedy wherein we sit as spectators awhile, and then act our own part in it".¹ To others it is a farce, to be applauded or hissed when the final curtain falls. But if there is a sense in which we are all actors and life itself "a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage", it is so from the point of view of the spectators, whether human or celestial, rather than of the actors. To those who are taking part it is no make-believe, with parts that we assume and can drop at will. And yet, as just said, there is a sense in which this is true. Each of us has some 'character', some part to play in the whole, thrust upon him by his heredity and circumstances, with little choice of his own, and has to conform to the general movement and setting of the scene. It is for us, therefore, to play our part, whether outstanding or humble, with such spirit as we can, not merely pushed about the stage but with fitting movement and gesture, accepting what comes gaily and with dignity as the scene demands. But if life is finer for something of the actor's art, as many have shown at their

¹ Quoted by Havelock Ellis in *The Dance of Life* (Constable, 1923), a book in which the subject here under discussion is admirably treated.

final exit on deathbed or scaffold, it is so only if the actor is so much one with his part that it is felt and not assumed. Anything histrionic, mere empty acting, is fatal to the true art of life.

If life is to be an art, there must be, as with all art, both freedom and control. Art is expression, and if the artist is not free to express the beauty present to his imagination, all that he produces will be mechanical and lifeless. To the extent that we are fettered by external circumstances, and still more by our own fears and inhibitions, such art as we achieve will be marred, halting, feeble. But art, on the other hand, is not merely expression of experience just as it comes, imitation of nature, reproduction of the confusion of life, letting loose a flood of uncontrolled feeling. It gives form to experience, guiding its immediate embodiment in outward act or reshaping it in imagination. Without some sense of form, analysable into proportion, harmony, and other factors of beauty that have been touched upon before, there can be no art. The freedom, therefore, that art needs does not mean absence of all restraint; and though the restraint must be self-imposed by the artist rather than imposed upon him, yet he often finds in the limits laid down by the materials he has to use and the conditions under which he has to work, helps rather than hindrances, or at least challenges to call out his finest skill. No small part of the fineness that, at its best, we admire in the art of life is due to our recognition of the difficulty of much of the material, not of our own choosing, that life presents to each of us to master and work into some harmonious pattern.

If this is to be done, there must be some skill on the part of the craftsman who has to shape the material presented to him and to make it the medium for self-expression; and there must also be, in order to give to the pattern a beauty and distinction of its own, a self that is worth expressing. For all of us some material is provided, to shape as best we may; but most of us are but poor craftsmen and make but a botch of it instead of a thing of beauty. To be a good

workman, and much more to be a true artist, we must have natural aptitudes, not deficient sensitivity or fingers that are all thumbs; and we must have training, good models to copy and material that is not too difficult on which to practise. This is the purpose of education, to discover aptitudes, to give them abundant opportunity to strengthen themselves, and to give them also incentive and inspiration in objects of beauty as well as of utility on which to use them. And though no training can wholly change the self, of which all that we do will be the expression, yet it can do much to ensure which characteristics of the self shall find fullest development and in which directions it shall seek to express itself. "Produce great persons," said Whitman, "the rest follows." The saying is preeminently true of the art which, more than any of the specific arts, is the expression of the whole personality; and though no education can "produce great persons" at will, it can do much to encourage the sound feeling and sound thinking without which there can be little either of beauty or greatness.

And, in addition, it can foster the love of beauty. In order to preserve the heritage of beauty which is ours in a landscape whose unsurpassed loveliness is in part a gift of nature and in part the work of an instinctive art in days when men lived closer to nature, and in order to create new beauty for those who come after us, we need a people who feel beauty and love it; with eyes opened to see and ears to hear, and with hands trained to fine craftsmanship, so that each will not only feel but express the beauty that he feels in creative activity in every aspect of life. When we discover that enjoyment does not depend upon possession, that imagination is the source of the truest wealth, that it brings a greater pleasure to create than to consume the work of others, and that no small part of happiness lies in finding outlet for our creative impulses, we are learning to see in life the greatest of the arts,

CHAPTER VIII

MORAL GOOD IN ITS SOCIAL ASPECT

§ I. MORAL VALUES

In its widest sense 'good' is applicable to any kind of experience in which we find some value, whether it is one of sensation or of practical utility or of spiritual apprehension. But when we speak of a good action, and still more when we call a person good, we usually have in mind a particular kind of value, more precisely defined as moral good. This addition, whether expressed or implied, limits the term to matters of conduct; to activities, that is, at a certain level of human development, at which the criterion of value is no longer merely good or bad in the ordinary sense—pleasant, that is, or unpleasant, satisfying or failing to satisfy some need—but something more than we call 'right' or 'wrong'. Where this kind of value is present we can speak of moral good, and of the moral sense that apprehends it.

Few would deny that there is in most people a sense by which they are enabled, in greater or less degree, to distinguish between right and wrong. In some individuals, it is true, it seems to be wholly or almost wholly wanting; such we recognise to be completely, or at least to a great extent, a-moral. But though there are such, we do not often meet with them. The great majority of people have some moral code, and consider some things right and others wrong, even if their code is not the one commonly accepted at the time and if, in consequence, much of what they think right may seem to others to be immoral. The moral sense, in fact, is as variously developed in different people as the sense of beauty; we differ in our ideas of right and wrong just as we differ in our tastes, though laws and accepted conventions tend, by imposing a common code, to lessen the apparent differences. But much as they may differ, just as most people have some sense of beauty, however

little developed, so also they have some moral sense by which to distinguish moral good.

What is it, then, that gives this value to conduct, making it morally good or bad? Whereas in the other kinds of experience the good or bad that is felt lies in the apprehension of what *is*, the right or wrong that is felt in moral experience lies in the apprehension of what *ought to be*. Whenever we are conscious of an 'ought', a moral value is present. This implies three things. In the first place, while all values can be apprehended only by sentient beings, moral good is, further, only to be apprehended in connection with the experience of such beings. Other values are experienced in our contacts with the physical world as well as in our own activities and relations with one another. Truth and beauty, for instance, have a meaning applied to other than human actions and motives; but this is not the case with moral good. In the goings-on of the physical universe there is nothing to which the term moral can properly be applied. When Wordsworth speaks of duty as preserving the stars from wrong, he is speaking either as a poet who loves to personify nature and read into it human feelings and motives, or as a philosopher who sees in the ordered sequence of physical events, subject everywhere to what we call the laws of nature, not merely an analogy but a foreshadowing of the moral imperative. But unless we think, as children and poets do, of inanimate objects as in some way sentient, the ideas of duty and wrong have no meaning as applied to them except in the way of metaphor.

And in the second place, this limitation applies also to the greater part of organic nature, for moral good can only be present when there is not merely some degree of sentience but also some possibility of choice. In whatever way we regard plants as being sentient, even if we suppose them to feel, in some degree, what happens to them, we can hardly think that they are able to choose what they will do, but regard their activity as necessitated by external forces and by their own organic impulses; and in such activity there is nothing moral. And so, too, with the

greater part of the animal world. Even among the higher animals, in so far as they are activated by instinct and have no conscious choice in their responses to their surroundings and to their inward urges, we cannot properly assign a moral character to their actions. How far amongst the most intelligent the level of conscious choice has been reached, it is impossible to say. It is certainly difficult to convince oneself that in the most highly organised animal communities there is no glimmering sense of right and wrong action; or that in a mother's action, when she is ready to endanger, and even sacrifice, her life for the safety of her young, there is no element of conscious choice. In the case of a few of the animals long associated with mankind a sense of wrong—in a dog, for example, that has disobeyed an order—or a personal devotion amounting to self-sacrifice, appears so plainly that we can speak of some of their actions as reaching a moral level.

It is just in this dependence upon an act of choice that moral good differs most from such values as truth and beauty. These last are in no way dependent on the possession—whether this be real or we merely take it for granted—of free-will. The truth of things is independent of our will; it is given, and we can only discover it. Truthfulness is a moral activity, because that is a matter of human intention; but the actual truth is not. The only relation of moral good to truth is in our attitude towards it, the care that we take to discover and to adhere to it and the refusal to take it for granted without first subjecting it to such tests as we can make. So, too, with beauty; this also is not a matter of choice or dependent upon our will, except so far as we seek to discover and to preserve it, or—as we cannot do to the same extent with truth—to create it for ourselves. In this last respect, as outcome of creative effort, moral good is more akin to beauty than to truth; but whereas beauty is also to be found in things that are wholly independent of human effort, moral good arises only in connection with such effort and in the choices and motives from which it springs. In so far as we merely *contemplate*

moral good—in the intellectual treatment of an ethical problem, for example, or the admiration of an act of heroism—it is not, properly speaking, moral activity that is involved, but only the apprehension of a special form of truth or beauty. In moral activity there is, besides the apprehension, a choice between possible courses to be followed, and the creation, in intention if not in act, of some good that otherwise would not have existed.

Moral values thus come into actual existence only through the medium of sentient beings possessed, or acting as if they are possessed, of some degree of free-will. Even if, as Plato held, these values exist independently of us in some ideal form, it is only through our choices and activities that they can be realised in life, as known to us. While events and situations can have an apprehended value of other kinds, they can be recognised as morally good only if they are brought about in the pursuit of some end, however narrow and momentary or however great and far-reaching this end may be. Moral value, in short, though we may believe it to be an essential part of the nature of reality, only comes into actual existence in the intention of living things and through their activity. It belongs, that is, not so much to a state of things already existent as to one that has still to be attained and is continually being created by our choices and our efforts.

But there is still a third factor that is needed to bring about the full difference between good or bad and right or wrong. For an action to be moral it must be in accordance with some admitted claim. Thus if I lend something on the understanding that it shall be repaid at a certain time, there is a claim admitted on both sides; to repay it at the time appointed is therefore right, to fail to do so wrong. But if the one to whom I have lent it has, through helplessness or some other reason, a claim on my forbearance, it may be wrong to insist on the repayment. Wherever a claim of any kind is admitted, a question of right and wrong enters into the resulting situation, an 'ought' which, as said above, is the distinctive characteristic of moral good.

Where there is no such claim, the question of moral good does not arise, whatever other values may be involved. The fact that one of two or more possible courses is chosen does not of itself make the activity moral. Thus if I go for a walk no moral value is involved in the choice of which way I shall go unless I have a message to deliver or someone to see or there is some other claim, of whatever kind it may be.

In saying that the claim must be admitted, we need not suppose that it must be stated in words or even fully present in consciousness, so long as it is felt. We all tacitly recognise claims upon us of the same kind as those we make on others and the benefits we receive from them. The very fact of our living in a community establishes claims upon us in return for the protection and help of a thousand kinds that the common life affords. Nor is it necessary for the claim to be admitted by all; it is the admission by the one who is to act upon it that gives the action its moral character. Our country, for example, has a claim upon our service, and most of all when it is in danger; but some may feel, where war is concerned, that other considerations have a still stronger claim upon them, and that refusal to fight, no matter what the consequences to themselves, is for them the only right course. Where, as here, there are conflicting claims, and the question is not between right and wrong but rather which of two rights makes the higher claim or which of two wrongs is the lesser, there can be much difference of feeling; in any such case each has to make his choice according as his understanding of the situation and his moral sense directs.

All experience, then, has a moral value when there is admission, overt or implied, of some claim; and this is equally the case whether the claim is recognised as imposed upon us by others or by something in ourselves. To the great majority of people, children for instance, and those who are still in a childish stage of development, the claims that they recognise as involving an 'ought' are mainly if not entirely social obligations, embodied in laws or traditions

that are enforced by some authority, or in conduct that is customary and supported by public opinion. For many people claims of this kind determine their choice of the course to be pursued, and it is only in connection with such claims that their moral sense is aroused. But to all who have a developed moral sense this is not enough. The claims of others, whether individuals or the community and those who wield its authority, are not the only or the most insistent claims that they feel. Though our duty to our neighbours is the main part of morality,¹ the deepest and most difficult moral problems are concerned rather with other claims: with what, in one kind of language, we call our duty to God, or in another, what we owe to ourselves. The fact that the most insistent and the most puzzling moral problems are of this personal kind, to be dealt with by appeal to conscience rather than to any legal code or social custom, has led most philosophers and moral teachers to regard the moral sense as the expression and activity of a personal conscience: of something, that is, innate in us which gives us a direct apprehension of right and wrong that is gradually extended, as our experience widens, to our dealings with others.

That something which can develop into a moral sense, as well as something which can develop into a sense of beauty or a logical sense, is innate in us few would deny. It is a part of the potentialities that are our normal inheritance. But this is not to say that each of us is born with a conscience just as he is born with nerves or a palate, and that he can distinguish right and wrong as readily or as certainly as he can distinguish hot and cold or sweet and sour. Our personal conscience—the sense of what is right

¹ It is well to make a distinction between 'morality' and 'moral good,' keeping the former term to denote the standard of conduct that is accepted as right at any given place and time, whether this standard be embodied in a formal code or in customary observances and in public opinion, or is that of any particular individual as determined, in part at least, by his own conscience. Morality will thus always fall short of the claims of the ideal moral good; in the same way that what at any time is held to be true or beautiful must always fall short of the ultimate ideals of truth and beauty.

and wrong for ourselves, independently of what seems right and wrong to others and what they think right and wrong for us—is a slow and late growth. Historically, it must rather be regarded as a development of the social conscience—our loyalty to the group of which we are a part and our recognition of the claims that it makes on us. Both in the case of the individual and in the evolution of mankind there can be little doubt that this is the order of development.

The essence of a claim lies in the restriction and modification of impulsive action by other feelings and considerations; and it is through social relations, whether in the family or the group, that such claims first arise. Whenever individuals live and act together, the activity of each is necessarily modified by that of others; some kind of give and take and some degree of authority and submission are inevitable. This is not due to conscious agreement. There is no "social contract" in psychological any more than in political evolution. Conformity to social needs is at first instinctive, brought about by the powers of sympathy and suggestion that underlie the group-instinct; and as long as it is purely instinctive it is not a moral activity. At first the social demands, whether embodied in personal authority or in custom or tradition, are blindly obeyed, in submission to superior strength or to an overmastering force of suggestion. Like the child's dependence on its parents, the individual's dependence on the group has long been so complete that its claims could not be disregarded on pain of death. Obedience was the price of survival; hence the tremendous compulsive force of group-feeling and the loyalties to which it has given rise. In fears of penalties attaching to disobedience, and in affections and loyalties called forth by social experience, and most of all, perhaps, in a sense of disloyalty when any of the greater claims of the group were disregarded, are to be found the beginnings of conscience. In the growth of such feelings and in the growing recognition of the claims that they imply, when these are not merely felt but accepted, we can trace the growth of the moral sense. When once the 'ought' of social conduct has

thus been established, and, like other aspects of conduct, is bound up with the self-respect of the one who feels the claim, it comes to him no longer as a matter of external compulsion but as a need of his own, an inner claim that carries a higher authority. Of the moral sense in this personal aspect more will be said in the following chapter. At present we are concerned with its social development and the forms of moral good to which in this aspect it has given rise.

§ 2. SOCIAL VALUES

Although, like other emergents in evolution, spiritual values only appear at a certain level of psychological development as something that was not existent before, they are based upon the fundamental compulsions of life. Shaped by these compulsions, certain instinctive tendencies are common to living beings in whose behaviour we seem to see mind at work in ways not too remote from those of which we are aware in ourselves. These instinctive tendencies fall into three groups, as being concerned either with self-maintenance, with reproduction, or with life together in a community; and it does not seem merely fanciful to regard the three kinds of spiritual good that we count as our highest values as directly connected with this threefold grouping of the deepest of our instincts. Thus the love of truth seems to be in direct connection with the first group of instincts; with that one in particular, curiosity, which impels us to learn all we can about our surroundings in order the better to deal with the situations in which we find ourselves. The love of beauty is no less closely connected with the reproductive instincts to which so much of the actual beauty of living things is due, and which have to do with creativity in all its forms. And if it be allowed that the 'ought' of moral activity is the outcome of social experience, the connection between moral good and the group-instinct is no less evident.

While moral values thus spring from roots that go far back into primitive instincts, they also presuppose values

of a lower order without which the higher values could not come into being. The love of truth demands some intellectual equipment for its development, and the love of beauty not only some degree of aesthetic sensibility but also means through which it can find expression; so also does the moral sense need the help of certain qualities of character and conditions of activity if it is to be creative of the finer moral values. There must be sensitivity to the needs of others, showing itself in keenness and range of sympathy. This and the loyalties to which it gives rise are the finer part of the social conscience in which the 'ought' of the moral sense takes the place of the 'must' of compulsion and of fear. There must also be readiness of active response: some strength of character, that is, instead of the inertia that lets us drift at the mercy of circumstances without making the choices on which moral activity depends or without carrying them, even when made, into the efforts which give to activity its moral value. And for this there must be sufficient freedom to make choice possible, and sufficient imagination and power of foresight to make the choice a true one—the outcome at once of judgment of the situation and discrimination of its values—instead of merely following the impulse that at the moment is uppermost. A slave is not morally responsible for actions done under compulsion; nor do we hold a child morally responsible for actions the results of which his scanty experience could not enable him to know. Moral activity, in short, while ultimately dependent on the sense of moral good, also requires some degree of perception and judgment in order to provide material in which the feeling may find suitable practical expression.

Given these conditions in greater or less degree, moral values become possible. The earliest to show themselves, as was said above, are social values, themselves of lower or higher order, representing claims made by the group upon the individual, or by the individual upon his fellows whether severally or as a whole. The first and lowest of such claims is that of obedience. As long as this is merely a matter of

compulsion, whether of instinct or custom or of superior strength, it has no more than a conditional value however necessary it may be to the maintenance of existence alike for the group and the individual members. It is only when the need is recognised not merely as a 'must' but rather as an 'ought'—when loyalty, that is, takes a larger place in consciousness than compulsion or fear—that obedience becomes a moral value; for then it leads on to such social values as trustworthiness, fair-dealing and truthfulness, the foundation virtues on which any communal life that is worth having, not merely herd together by brute force or by custom, is based. Trustworthiness in all its forms is essentially a social virtue, a claim made upon the individual in the first place by the group; but from the sense of responsibility and loyalty thus engendered comes no little of the self-respect that plays so large a part in the development of the personal conscience.

Of all the social values the largest place is held by justice. On this many of the higher values depend, and in its various applications it touches most of the relations of human beings with one another, both in the claims of the community upon its individual members, in theirs upon the community, and in the claims of individuals upon each other. But though it thus comes into most human relations, it is not in itself the highest of values; being rather of a negative character, to prevent injurious or unfair treatment, than concerned with the positive side of moral activity which is moral good in its highest aspect. It is, however, this negative character which gives to the sense of justice its strength and universality of claim. We see it in the form of a strong resentment of injustice, at a comparatively early stage of the child's moral development. Beginning with the feeling of personal hardship at being excluded from anything that others are enjoying, it is at first purely self-regarding. But the feeling soon extends by sympathy to other members of the group, and a sense of injustice arises, even when oneself is not affected, if they are shut out from the enjoyment or treated with undue or capricious severity. All social

organisation being largely a matter of custom, it is any departure from recognised custom that first rouses this sense of injustice. Before this sense of wrong, which is a matter of personal apprehension whether experienced directly in one's own case or by sympathy with the experience of others, can give rise to a conception of justice, considerable intellectual development is needed. The idea of equality and impartial treatment for all—the principle which underlies a fully-developed sense of justice—is the product of reflection rather than of feeling.

It is necessarily the negative aspect of justice that is to be seen in its practical embodiment in any system of law or government. Restriction of anti-social impulses is the first need in enforcing the rights of the community or of individuals. All law inevitably takes the form of 'thou shalt not'; and government has little to do with the 'thou shalt' of positive morality beyond making it possible by removal of hindrances occasioned by injustice. So, too, the actual exercise of justice can seldom deal with more than external acts, and cannot weigh all the interplay of motive on which the moral character of the act depends. For these reasons, while a system of organised justice is essential in a community of any size in order to minimise actual injustice, whether deliberate or unintentional, the value of all such negative justice lies mainly in being a means to something more.

On its positive side—giving to each his due—it has a higher value. What justice in this aspect means, and what in the fullest sense is due to each of us, raises far-reaching ethical questions with which philosophers, from Socrates onwards, have grappled, and which religious teachers have answered in various ways. If social morality be considered not in the light of philosophy or religion but as a practical activity subject to the conditions of a given time and given environment, our due may be regarded as mainly a matter of custom and agreement. At its lowest, it is whatever the law, tradition and public opinion of the time enjoin, for these cannot suddenly be altered or disregarded without

encroachment upon the acknowledged dues of others. This at least, and nothing less than this, is the due of each. It will inevitably be less than what is held to be just by the finer spirits of the time. From these justice as a positive ideal will make further claims, in the endeavour to bring the standard by which customary dues are measured into closer accord with an ideal justice of equality of treatment and conditions that may give to each an equal freedom of opportunity to make the most of life. But even so, however far such positive justice can be carried, it would still be a cold thing and of little living force if it is not enriched and vivified by the kindlier feelings that have their root not in any abstract ideal but in human fellowship.

For whereas justice is concerned only with recognised claims, and so long as these are not violated has no further concern with the individual, kindness goes far beyond the actual claim and gives all it can, whether claimed or not. In this way justice, great as is its social value, on the personal side is a lower value than love both in the nature and in the extent of its demand. For this reason moral and religious teachers, insisting on the supremacy of love as a moral value, have urged that it could dispense with the need for justice, as it would of its own accord satisfy all the claims of justice and go on to add the much more of its own. If love could be all-wise as well as all-embracing it would undoubtedly absorb into itself the narrower claims of justice and of other virtues; but failing this, there is still need for the lower value of justice to impose its claims. Feeling alone, without the help of rule and standard, is not always just. It can err by excess as well as by defect, and in pouring its abundance upon those nearest may be blind to the needs of others or of the whole. A community of friends is without doubt a finer thing than a community based solely upon justice, if such a thing could be. But since friendship is necessarily restricted in its range, and sympathy dependent upon some degree of personal contact, such a community can at best be but a small one; and even so, there will almost certainly be need of rules of some

kind to ensure that each, whatever more he may receive, shall not come short of his due in any particular. Both justice and love are therefore needed, that the one may not be lacking in sympathy nor the other too partial in its incidence.

Happily, we do not have to choose between them. A single moral value cannot exist in isolation; if we allow it to do so by practising one virtue to the exclusion of others, it loses the greater part of its value and becomes a kind of monster, a cancer absorbing energies whose free play is needed for healthy life. Moral values are like the colours in nature; life is shot through and through with them, and its beauty lies not in the dominance or invariability of one but in their changing combinations. Although we feel some to be intrinsically higher than others, this does not mean that the lower can be dispensed with. Just as the performance of the more complex kinds of vital activity depends upon the satisfaction of certain fundamental bodily needs, so also are the higher spiritual values dependent upon and conditioned by others that are basic in character. Of these basic social values justice remains the most indispensable.

Whether it be obedience or loyalty, trustworthiness or justice, or any other value arising from life in a community, moral activity presents itself as the satisfaction of a claim that is made upon us by others. It means, therefore, in the first instance, some restraint of the free play of impulse and direction of response into other channels. Even if, with the growth of the moral sense, such restraint and redirection may often become a matter of voluntary effort that brings its own satisfaction, the effort was necessarily, in the earlier stages of moral growth, and at times must still remain, difficult and painful; for the impulses to be restrained have usually the full force of primary instincts compared with which social claims, and still more the sense of an 'ought' that is due to our better selves, seem at first weak and remote. Thus morality—all conduct, that is, of which we admit the claim as superior to that of impulse—inevitably presents itself to us as a restraint, debarring us from doing

something that we should like to do. To some this first impression never changes. The 'ought' of moral activity appears to such only as a spoil-sport, with its perpetual "thou shalt not". If it brings positive demands, these must necessarily be, they suppose, to do something hard and unpleasant to ourselves or to insist on something hard and unpleasant to others.

This conception of morality as a negative thing, preventing the satisfaction of natural desires and substituting unwelcome duty for spontaneous impulse, incomplete and distorted though it be, is natural enough; for all that makes up the positive aspect of morality—the urge of social activity, the sympathy and affection, the trust and loyalty which give to the sense of 'ought' a warmth of emotional colouring very different from fear or submission to necessity or calculation of self-interest—requires far less conscious effort, being either largely instinctive or else unquestioned custom. We take health for granted and only notice any interruption of its normal course; so also we take ordinary social conduct for granted and only notice it when it interferes with our other impulses. This morality must frequently do, checking impulses that are both natural and insistent but, judged by social standards and in reference to social requirements, may, in that particular instance, be selfish and harmful. Reason as well as feeling may convince us that the subordination of such impulses to the claims of social welfare is worth attainment; but still it is hardly to be wondered at if, alike from remembrance of the painfulness in the past and from the need of similar effort on each fresh occasion, we think of morality mainly as an irksome duty. We are apt to regard it as a matter chiefly of self-sacrifice, and to overlook its positive aspect—the creation, through social activity, of moral good, with the profound satisfaction that such creative activity brings.

It is here, in this positive aspect of morality, that its highest values are to be found. While justice, even in its negative form—the prevention of injustice—is indispensable, it is so as a condition, like the primary values of life, for the

growth of the higher. The practical importance of the foundation values is seen if we consider how little of life, physical, social or spiritual, without these could be carried on. But though fundamental they are not, therefore, the highest. Only when moral good, even if still social in its outward expression, no longer comes as an external claim but rather as an inner compulsion with an even deeper sanction, does moral activity lead to the fullest and finest life, and reach its highest value.

§ 3. MORALITY IN RELATION TO SEX

Moral action of any kind implies recognition of some claim. We are first conscious of such claims in the form of loyalty to the community and the obedience that is owing to whatever demands and restrictions the community believe to be necessary or at least conducive to its welfare. But we soon find that claims are made on us not only by duty but also by sympathy. In addition to all such ties as are established by the division of labour and the subordination to authority which this entails, with responsibility on the one side and loyalty on the other, there are also ties of personal affection and fellow-feeling. Societies are held together by these personal ties as well as by the ties of duty.

Of all the ties arising from personal affection rather than from the loyalty inured in us by social dependence, by far the strongest are those that are most directly connected with the compulsion of sex. Sense of blood-relationship is the deepest of the various feelings and interests that underlie the life of a community; while sexual attraction, at least for the great majority of human beings, is the most intense form of personal experience that they undergo, and the one that has the most disturbing influence on their conduct. It is not surprising, therefore, that sex and its modes of expression should always have been a matter of urgent social concern, surrounded with deep-rooted customs and stringent taboos among all races of mankind. Any survey, however brief, of moral values, social and personal,

must include some discussion of sex-relations as a factor of immense importance in both lines of development.

We are probably apt to assign too large a place in the life of primitive man to the family. When the sex-urge was still, as with animals, a seasonal matter, mating (whether for a shorter or longer period) and the care of children were only an incident in the ceaseless need to provide an adequate food supply. Whether this was furnished by hunting or by the care of domesticated animals or, later, by agriculture, the organisation of whatever kind of group could best, in each case, meet the requirements of those particular conditions was in reality the outcome of economic need rather than of family ties. But even if the food-bond had more to do with the formation of primitive communities than the blood-bond, it was the latter, whether real or assumed, of which primitive man was most conscious and to which he attached most importance. The unity of the tribe was felt to be one of common descent rather than of common interest.

The question of blood-relationship being thus important, became still more so when further enhanced by the inheritance of property. For this reason as well as from the violence of the passions to which sex-attraction gives rise, the community has always found it necessary to regulate the sex-life of its members. It would seem at first sight a natural supposition that the first restraints originated in the taboos imposed by the jealousy of the dominant male in the 'patriarchal' family group or tribe. There is some evidence, however, of a previous 'matriarchal' stage, in which kinship was recognised only through the mother, possibly from a time when the father's part in procreation was little understood, as seems still to be the case in some extremely primitive peoples. If so, it may well have been in this stage, through the enforcement of the mother's authority over the young, that the most universal and deepest-seated taboos—those against murder and incest—were established. However this may be, sex-taboos are amongst the oldest and strongest in human experience and have had much to do with the development of conscience.

The need of some regulation of the sex-impulse was all the greater when a more settled life was made possible by the practice of agriculture. A compulsion which originally, with man as with other animals in their wild state, had been seasonal, in dependence upon climate and food-supply, now through assurance of food and shelter lost, with man as with domesticated animals, its seasonal character,¹ and so became a more constant source of disturbance and even of possible social disruption. Much indulgence might unfit for the demands of war or other duties; and nothing was more prone to start feuds and lead to bloodshed than sexual jealousy. So strong an instinct was bound to run counter at times to social loyalties and the needs of the community; it could only be made compatible with a settled society if under strict control. It is not surprising, therefore, that sex has always been held to be a dangerous element in life, and one which must be hedged round with restraints of many kinds. To primitive man, moreover, there was much about it that was not understood, and being mysterious it was consequently something to be feared. The oncoming of sexual maturity must be made, he felt, the occasion for protective ritual. Still more at the time of birth must there be a ritual for purification, as protection both for the child and for the community. In such rites as baptism and confirmation, as well as in the marriage rite, we have survivals of the elaborate ceremonial practised by primitive peoples for these ends.

One of the sex-taboos of longest standing is that which forbids mating within the nearest ties of blood-relationship. Whether it originated as was suggested above or merely in a natural tendency to find greater sexual attraction in what is not familiar or easy of attainment, it was certainly

¹ In the recurrent sexual orgies of primitive civilisations, extending even into a more civilised stage of development and consecrated as religious rites, we can see perhaps a partly conscious attempt to canalise sex-indulgence on the old seasonal lines, as well as rationalisation of periodic indulgence as sympathetic magic to promote fertility and help the creative forces in vegetation and in animals to attain their full efficiency.

intensified by the observance of totems¹ so common amongst primitive peoples. Those who shared the same totem (from which, in some cases at least, they supposed themselves to be descended) were held to be of one flesh with it and with one another; it was, therefore, strictly forbidden either to eat their common flesh or to mate with one who shared it. Whatever the initial reason for the taboo, it has been enforced ever since the earliest stages of social development; later it was rationalised as necessary for maintaining a sound stock by preventing excessive inbreeding.

In this matter of racial soundness two opposite tendencies have long been at work. The one—that called exogamy, the tendency, that is, to seek a mate outside the circle of close kinship in order not to offend against the taboo—was no doubt strengthened by considerations of power or wealth that an external alliance might bring. The converse tendency—that of endogamy, not mating, that is, outside the ties of remoter kinship as defined by real or presumed descent or by community of religion and social custom—also had obvious common-sense grounds for its observance; such as, for instance, are emphasised in the Biblical stories telling how Abraham and Isaac sent to the distant family home for wives for their sons to prevent their marrying those who would introduce alien habits and rites.² In a

¹ A 'totem' is the representation of some object, usually an animal, sometimes attached to an individual as his distinctive badge, more often belonging to a whole clan or tribe, either as representing a mythical ancestor or as the symbol of some power recognised as specially available for the group to which the symbol is attached; or possibly what was, at one period in the existence of the community, a main source of food, which therefore came to be so venerated that it became, in later times, too sacred to be eaten. Such totems are found widely distributed among primitive tribes at the present day, whether of North American Indians, Africans or Australians. And there is evidence of their having been in equally common use in the past in primitive stages of society as a bond of union between members of a particular group, whether as a sign of common descent or as a substitute for this. They still survive in family crests and in the emblems of modern nations; and they have been directly adopted, in accordance with their primitive use, in the Scout organisation.

² The tendency is seen, pushed to its extreme, in the practice of the Pharaohs, and passed on from them to the Ptolemies, of mating brother and sister

different form we see the same feeling in the repulsion, so strong in some races as to seem almost instinctive, from unions with those of another colour. In these opposed tendencies the biologist can see examples of the complementary principles of variation and continuity that run through the whole of life.

The institution of marriage as a contract recognised by the community and implying obligations on the part of all concerned, has an economic basis. Unions were made lasting for the sake of mutual advantage. Whether obtained by capture or by purchase, a wife was valuable to primitive man not only as the mother of children who would become valuable helpers but also for the work that she could do; in return for this she gained some measure of protection and a settled life. At some stages of tribal life the possession of wives and children was one way, just as slavery was another, of amassing wealth by increasing the number of dependent workers. Polygamy has, therefore, been a common practice in the history of different races, recognised as customary and right, and long tolerated—even after it had come to be questioned—as not incompatible with the needs of the community. But various reasons, economic, legal and moral, have brought about a change of habit and of feeling. Even in times and countries where it has been allowed by custom and supported by religion, the practice has been dependent on the possession of wealth and has had little hold upon the poorer members of society. Hired labour has done away with its economic value; while affection, prestige, and need for fixity of inheritance all tend to exalt the status of a single wife. Family life, which forms the larger part of the total sex-experience, is easily poisoned by the jealousies and rivalries for which polygamy gives so much occasion. Moreover the gradual sublimation of the sex-urge into the sentiment of love has brought a growing desire for a partnership in which mind and spirit also should

as joint occupants of the throne of Egypt, on the theory that the blood-royal must not lose its purity of descent by union with any of less 'divine' origin.

find satisfaction, and a growing conception of marriage as comradeship rather than merely as a means of gratification or possession. Such changes in conditions and in feeling have tended to establish an ideal of monogamy as the highest form of the marriage-relationship. This, amongst Western nations, has received the sanction of religion, and has taken a prominent place in their moral code as the ideal form of sex-union, both in its material and in its spiritual aspect.

There can be little doubt that monogamy has hitherto proved in practice the most satisfactory way of promoting the two aims that must underlie all moral advance, the welfare of the community and the spiritual development of the individual. With the latter the community has no direct concern. Except so far as any personal action may affect others adversely, sex-relationships only come under its control in matters of legal status and inheritance, and for ensuring the welfare and proper upbringing of its future citizens. In these respects a permanent monogamic union has evident advantages over polygamy on the one hand and over any system of temporary unions on the other. It would seem, therefore, that whatever experiments may be made in the way of recognised companionate and trial unions, marriage must remain as a social institution; but with sufficient relaxation of rigidity to ensure that, in cases of incompatible temperament or unendurable conditions, it need not become a prison.

Even if it be accepted, however, that, alike in the interests of the community and of the individual, the ideal form of marriage as an institution is some kind of monogamic union such as will allow of a measure of parental care as well as of lasting comradeship, and that this would best satisfy the psychological needs of personal development, this is not the only aspect of morality in its relation to sex. Marriage does not cover the whole of sex-life. Whatever form it takes, there will still be the question as to the right or wrong of other satisfactions of the sex-impulse, and the extent to which individual freedom in a matter of such intense per-

sonal moment is to be rendered possible. In this question is involved another: whether whatever freedom may be thought possible for one sex should also be held to be right for both. Hitherto there has usually been a considerable difference in the codes enjoined upon the two, greater freedom being allowed to the dominant sex. This had, until recently, so long been the male sex that most people took it for granted that it must always have been so, as though by natural right of greater strength and greater intelligence. Even if, as seems probable, there was a matriarchal stage of society in which there was a practical equality of the sexes, if not some predominance on the part of women, in most communities known to us this had later been replaced (owing, probably, to the prevalence of warfare and the disadvantage of the child-bearing woman in this and other strenuous pursuits) by male predominance. One result of this change was the establishment of a code of morality conforming to the wishes of the dominant sex, and requiring a greater degree of modesty and chastity from the other. This we are apt to rationalise as due to differences, physiological and psychological, between the sexes, in accordance with which greater freedom in the exercise of the sex-function must be given to the man than to the woman. Hence the differences in the application to the two sexes of the moral code, as upheld by public opinion, as well as in the legal position of the two in regard to divorce, the possession of the children, the holding of property and other matters connected with marriage as an institution regulated by the state. In all these matters our own times have seen the advent of a great change brought about by the growing demand for sex-equality. As part of this change, the ideas and customs on which not only the marriage laws but also the traditional morality of the sexes are based are now undergoing challenge, and are fast crumbling under the impact of new ideas and conditions of life. Thus the possessive idea of marriage is giving place to the idea of an alliance on equal terms to be worked out in accordance with individual needs, physiological, economic and spiritual,

rather than dictated by social tradition; and in the new relationship of the sexes is implicit a reassessment of moral values and a reshaping of the code in which they are embodied.

Whatever form this reshaping may take, now and in the course of further development, there will always be, where moral values are concerned, a twofold aspect, personal and social. In the one aspect moral conduct is answerable only to the dictates of the individual conscience, or to the guidance of whatever intuitions may take its place. In the other the accepted code of any age is a resultant of different conditions and points of view; so that, however far it may be in advance of the practice of the majority, it must inevitably lag behind the thought and feeling of the finest minds. For this reason it is desirable that such a code should neither be rigid nor all-embracing. In an age which sets a high value on individual development it will seek to regulate personal relations only so far as they affect the common well-being, and in particular the welfare of children; ensuring to these, as far as possible, sound inheritance and healthy upbringing, up to an age at which, with physical and mental maturity, responsibility must fall upon the individual. These considerations apart, sexual relations are a personal matter in which, as with all the most intimate moral questions, individual judgment and feeling must decide. We must recognise that, in the vast majority of cases, sexual satisfaction is as desirable and as necessary for psychological as for physiological well-being. It is a liberation of creative energy, an inspiration and incentive to fuller activity, and the completest self-realisation through the transcendence of self. A sane morality, therefore, will not be content with a negative attitude of prohibition, whether based on social conventions or on religious traditions; it will rather seek to replace such an attitude by a positive one of acceptance and utilisation for spiritual ends.

That difficulties and problems arising from the urgencies of sex will ever completely disappear is not to be expected; but we may hope that they will be recognised as matters

affecting personal development rather than merely as breaches of social taboos. In any age in which ideas and conduct have to be reshaped, any break with custom and traditional codes which have ceased to satisfy and no longer command assent, is likely at the time to seem merely an abandonment of all restraint. Thus the present demand for sex-equality to some may seem to be only a claim for unbridled licence. The fearful have always so regarded any change in the accepted code. But there is a core of soundness in human nature in the bulk, a sanity of feeling and thought that can be trusted, when faced with a new situation, to discover such restraints as may be necessary to meet its new needs. And two things are certain: the one, that in sex-experience as in other spheres of conduct, frankness and freedom will do more than concealments and repressions to bring about a true morality based on knowledge and self-control; and the other that a code which considers the interests of one sex alone cannot satisfy human needs. It is the surest hope for the emergence of something more in accord with our present stage of moral development that the attitude, legal and moral, taken towards sex-problems must now be equally acceptable to both sexes and the outcome of their common consideration and agreement.

§ 4. MORALITY AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION

If morality is the outcome of social life, it is plain, on the one hand, that it must, in any particular age and country, be largely shaped by the social organisation and institutions of the time, and, on the other, that these in their turn will be gradually modified by the growth of the moral sense. To attempt even a sketch of this interaction in the different stages of social development is not possible here; but there are certain factors of such marked influence in the historical development of mankind that they must at least be briefly touched upon. These are warfare, slavery, and the amassing of property.

At the present time not only the actual horrors of war but also the wastefulness of its methods and its inability

—beyond clearing away some obstacle to peaceful progress—to provide a real and lasting settlement of international differences have been impressed upon us by so much painful experience that it may seem absurd, if not cynical, to speak of war as a factor of moral development. Reflection, however, will soon show that there is some ground for so calling it. Struggle of all kinds, with living foes and rivals as well as with the forces of nature, has been one of the chief means of human evolution. In the dangers and obstacles with which man has always been surrounded we see one of the conditions of his mental and spiritual growth. The need to surmount obstacles and escape dangers has heightened his powers of body and mind and has been the stimulus to countless inventions; further, by necessitating common action, it has strengthened the social ties and provided a social discipline that has ingrained moral habits and developed the social sense. And amongst his earliest teachers, together with stress of weather and flood and fire with beasts of prey and all that disputed his right to live, we must include also warfare between rival groups and between hostile tribes and races; for the dreams of a golden age of universal peace in some remote past have little solid foundation, at least as soon as any kind of civilised life had begun.

In the earlier stone ages, when man roamed in scattered groups in search of food and gathered in caves, there is no reason to think there was any organised warfare beyond occasional fighting with marauders in defence of the lair and any stores that had been collected there. In the pastoral stage, however, fighting must have been an inevitable part of a nomad existence; either in driving off rival groups that wished to occupy the same pasturage, or in repelling raiders or making up losses by raiding the herds of others, as we see among the desert tribes to-day. And when agriculture had enabled a growing population to settle in one spot and to make more rapid advance in civilised arts, there were two reasons for the growth of warfare as a normal concern of government. In the first place, such a settled civilisation meant a greater accumulation of food-stores and

of other goods. Thus it would be a continual temptation to the nomads round its borders to raid it and carry away its gathered wealth; so that some organised defence by means of outposts and counter-attacks was essential. And secondly, the need of security would naturally lead to the extension of the community by the inclusion of neighbouring settlements and the conquest of the surrounding territory; for this the need of raw materials for industry and a supply of man-power to perform the harder kinds of labour would be a further incentive. The earliest records of civilised communities, such as those of Egypt and Mesopotamia, clearly show both these causes at work. It is plain, indeed, that war was an almost inevitable accompaniment of the growth of a settled civilisation.

That the part played by war in moral training has been a great one need not surprise us if we consider how it demands the most complete devotion and self-sacrifice, and at the same time provides an environment, physical and psychological, in which these demands are most readily complied with, since the need for them is clear to all members of the community; an environment in which the subordination of personal impulses to duty is greatest, and the need of comradeship brought most keenly into consciousness. War, in fact, intensifies all the conditions that call the group-instinct into play; it draws closer the ties of sympathy that give an emotional tone to moral obligation, and makes this obligation more obvious and more insistent. It is not surprising, therefore, if many even to-day look upon war not merely as a necessary evil but even as a moral agency.

But if it has in all ages provided a strong stimulus to the growth of the moral sense, the growth thus stimulated has been narrow and accompanied by conditions that have prevented growth of a larger kind. In the first place, the feeling of social obligation fostered by war is confined to the community to which one feels oneself to belong. The moral code of the community, therefore, necessarily involves hatred of those outside it, and a sense of triumphant right-

doing in inflicting on them all that we are determined at all costs to repel from ourselves. War thus gives the strongest incentive to a narrow morality that is based on hatred as well as on sympathy. Moreover, the organisation of a community for war involves other narrowing factors. It implies, on the one hand, military discipline and, on the other, the dominance of a military caste. Such a community tends to be a military hierarchy arranged in successive grades of authority, each dependent on its superior but absolute as regards inferior grades, and supported by the work of the non-military classes which are regarded as its inferiors. Even if this state of things was not originally established by conquest, reducing the previous population of the country to the position of serfs living and working at the disposal of their new masters, in a community organised for war all other classes are subordinated to the soldier and his needs; not only the workers but women also are an inferior caste whose main function is to contribute to the welfare of the fighting-man and to keep up his numbers.

Thus through the distortion that it brings into human relations, the intensification of tendencies to extremes of dominance and subjection, the exaltation of one kind of activity as noble and the degradation of others of greater social worth, and the enthronement of brute-force as the arbiter in social concerns, the influence of war—apart from the wastefulness and inhumanity that are inseparable from its actual methods—has been to stunt moral growth and to establish false values. Even if in the past it has been a means of developing social consciousness and calling out valuable qualities of character, its evils have now, under changed conditions, been increased and intensified out of all proportion to any good that it can bring.

And does it follow that, if war is relegated to its place among the modes of thought and conduct which we have outgrown, the qualities that are the outcome of struggle must be sacrificed? Struggle of some kind there must always be if life is not to degenerate through inactivity. But of this we need not fear any lack in the contest with

starvation and poverty, with diseases that we have to learn to exterminate or to avoid, with accidental evils—the destruction wrought by storms, for example—that foresight can avert or skill can minimise, and with every kind of obstacle, in ourselves and in conditions of our own creation, to the full life that we desire to lead. While in the past such struggle has been mainly a matter of individual effort and sacrifice, it comes more and more to require communal effort and devotion similar to that demanded in time of war. Struggle of this kind will call for all the self-discipline, all the devotion, all the cooperation and unselfishness of which we are capable. And it will not require resort to actions hitherto deemed permissible or even meritorious when practised on a vast scale, though in the narrower circle of our personal relations they have long outraged our moral sense, and do so more and more when applied not only to our immediate neighbours but to others whom we begin to recognise as fellow-members of a larger community.

Of the many evils that have had their origin in warfare one of the greatest is slavery. At the outset it was no doubt an act of mercy to spare the life of a captured prisoner and allow him to pay for his life by toiling for his master. In such cases generosity on the one side and gratitude on the other may have done much to humanise the relationship and to bring into existence a new kind of loyalty. But it was soon evident that raiding and conquest provided an easy way of obtaining labour which, being easily replaced, needed little consideration; with the result that, in place of a human relationship, slaves came for the most part to be regarded as mere chattels, of less importance than animals or other possessions. Whether the slave were illtreated or not, the acceptance of slavery as a normal part of social life has had a deep and lasting effect upon the moral code. This effect has been of two kinds. On the one hand it has tended to undermine the true basis of social morality in establishing a false ideal of fullness of life for the few at the cost of conditions that deny it to the many.

And on the other it has helped to develop a 'master-morality' and 'slave-morality' in both of which, whatever their good elements, the bad have been predominant.

Social life rests upon cooperative labour for the satisfaction of its needs, and therefore morality is closely connected with the economic aspect of social organisation. In this as in its other aspects subordination of self-regarding impulses to the common need is essential, and in simple forms of society is freely given for this purpose. Common work is a great moral agent, with the same obvious need behind it as in war. But when the enslavement of the conquered, and later the power of money, provided an easy means of living on the work of others, the old moral order was upset and unsocial elements came in. Members of the ruling class were able to indulge their impulses without regard for the needs of others; while for a large mass of the community the only morality was held to consist in obedience to the will of their masters, as a matter of compulsion, without the bond of common feeling that gives to obedience, willingly rendered, a moral value. A relationship between employer and employed that is humanised by kindly feeling and loyal devotion is only possible where there is personal contact. Where slavery is employed on a great scale for purposes of production, as in the empires of the ancient world or in the wage-slavery of modern industrial organisation, such personal relationship is rare and, in the main, impossible. Instead, therefore, of a social bond of cooperation for a common purpose—the essential condition of any true social morality—there is nothing but self-interest, and usually a bitter sense of opposing interests and mutual distrust; a soil in which only partial and, for the most part, anti-social loyalties can flourish.

This relationship, with its ideal of irresponsible authority on the one side and slavish submission on the other, has done as much to distort the conception of morality as to degrade it in practice. To this is largely owing the antithesis, so dear to moralists, of pleasure and duty, as though duty must always be opposed to our natural desires. Morality.

in this conception, is something hostile to all that is pleasant, with the corollary that pleasure is something only to be found when the fetters of morality are broken. Such a conception of morality is the reflection of a social organisation based on slavery.

The evils attendant on slavery are apt to arise not only when human beings are treated as having no more rights than other possessions, but also, in some form, when there is accumulation of property in private hands. In primitive forms of society, apart from the few personal belongings, such as clothes or weapons, that are indispensable for the life of the individual or, like ornaments, an extension of his personality, all else that is needed, utensils, implements, food-store and so on, formed a hoard to be guarded against seizure by others but free for the common use. As needs became more varied and the means of satisfying them more complex, more things came to be regarded as personal belongings of the individual or of the family unit within the larger group. There were now two tendencies at work: the one to private ownership not only of certain individual and family possessions but also of a definite part of the common means of life, whether flocks or land; the other to retain the idea of common possessions to which all are entitled as vested in the head of the community, the patriarchal leader or king who gives to each his share. A settled agricultural life, with the greater division of labour which it involved, and the growth of separate industries involving exchange of goods when no one could any longer produce all that he needed, tended to intensify the acquirement of personal property. On the other hand, a time of violence and warfare gave opportunity to the strong and powerful to seize the possessions of others and heap up their own, thus establishing extremes of riches and poverty which, more than any other factor, makes for instability in a community and the distortion of its values.

Where the amassing of property is the chief incentive to effort, not only are the social loyalties weakened or destroyed but the whole moral level is lowered by the

exaltation of selfish interests and a dulling of moral sensitiveness as to the means by which they are pursued. It is a commonplace of the poets and prophets that riches, whether in the form of possessions or of the means to obtain them, are a source of evil and a burden to which few if any can be subjected without loss of the finer qualities of spirit and the truest kind of happiness. Whoever increases his property beyond his actual needs—and these measured by a simple rather than a luxurious standard—increases his burdens; he can easily become a slave to his possessions, a slave none the less that the chain is of gold. To pile up wealth by exploiting the lives of other human beings—and in this there may be little to choose between naked conquest and industrial methods—is not merely the very negation of social morality; it is also a degradation of the life of the spirit which, if it can exist at all upon such terms, can do so only as the result of ignorance or at the price of more or less conscious intellectual self-deception.

The false values thus set up, together with the unstable social organisation that is based on them and promotes their worship, are the greatest danger and most urgent problem of our time. Yet, however harmful in its effects when as unchecked as it has generally been throughout history, the pursuit of private property has also been, like warfare, not only a constant spur to effort and a factor in the advance of civilisation but not without some gain to moral growth. The very fact that private possessions are a source of strife, and the desire for them an incitement to violence and fraud, has brought the need of a counter-influence. To property more than anything else we owe the establishment of law and all that this has contributed to social morality. In early times disputes as to ownership and use, if they were not to lead to a state of violence that would imperil the community, had to be settled by appeal to custom as known by the elders of the group. But administration of merely traditional rights and penalties could easily be wrested to personal ends; hence the need for a written code, so that all might know what

they had to expect if they wronged or were wronged by another.

Such a code is necessarily a compromise between primitive customs and later ideas; even in its successive modifications, therefore, it lags behind the moral sense of the age. But even so, the fact of having a code to appeal to has been a factor of no small importance in moral development. In the first place, it set up in visible form the authority of the community above the claims of the individual to act as he pleases, even in dealing with wrongs done to him; and thus substituted an ideal of impersonal justice for personal violence. This ideal, now established in civilised communities as an essential part of their social organisation where individuals are concerned, has yet to be equally firmly established in the relations of communities with one another, putting war as a means of settlement of national disputes no less outside the law than violence in the settlement of a private quarrel. And besides this, written law has done much to clarify ideas both in regard to the claims of the community upon the individual and to the rights of individuals towards each other. Though the fundamental purpose of law is to safeguard the community as a whole from injury through the anti-social tendencies of its members, in practice it is mainly concerned with preventing individuals from injuring each other. Thus law, which begins with enforcing the claims of the group, ends with upholding the rights of the individual. In this way was established the idea of justice not merely as the relations between subordinate and superior but as between man and man.

Such an idea, growing ultimately into an ideal of equality, so far at least as the meting out of justice is concerned, is only an abstraction gradually formed by reflection from attempts to prevent the break-up of a group by anti-social acts of violence or cunning. But abstract ideas, once formed, when they are imbued with strong instinctive feeling,—and justice rests upon both the social and the self-regarding instincts—become powerful sentiments that play a great

part in determining conduct. This, then, was the next great step in moral advance, when it was realised that 'ought' applies not only to the relations of the individual to the group or of the subordinate to the superior, but to his relations with other individuals, great and small alike, and theirs with him; that each, in a word, has duties towards all others with whom he comes in contact, and rights no less which they also must respect.

And further still, law also helped to foster the daring idea that the individual has rights not only against his fellows but even against the community itself. Although the community is bound to enforce the laws that it thinks necessary for its own safety, and most of all in time of danger, it is just at such times, when the herd-instinct is most strongly aroused, that its action is sure to be most passionate and unthinking. At such a time law can act as a check on mob-action and a safeguard of the rights of individuals and minorities. Social morality is but partial and short-sighted if it does not create such checks and safeguards for itself; legal formalities, for instance, to take the place of lynch law, and compulsory arbitration to delay the outbreak of a struggle between opposing groups and give time for calmer reflection.

Nor is it only hasty action on the part of the community in times of excitement that needs guarding against. There is always a tendency for public opinion to discountenance anything in conduct and in the expression of thought that differs from what is in vogue with the majority, and to insist on the regulation of such matters by law. There is always, therefore, need to guard against any unnecessary interference with the freedom of the individual whenever this does not encroach upon the freedom and well-being of others. In upholding the rights of the individual against infringement, law has established a principle that can be invoked against its own misuse. It has thus helped to develop ideas of personal freedom and responsibility as against mere acceptance of custom and external authority. The actual administration of justice, as embodied in the

laws of any community, always falls short of the ideal of equal justice for all its members that is felt to underlie it; yet this ideal has done much to shape the conception of morality not merely as social obligation but as a personal standard of conduct.

CHAPTER IX

MORAL GOOD IN ITS PERSONAL ASPECT

§ I. FREE-WILL

It was said in the preceding chapter that moral action—action, that is, in a situation in which we are conscious of an 'ought'—implies three things. Such action is only possible on the part of a sentient being; some power of choice is involved in it; and it is action in reference to some admitted claim. Morality in its social aspect is concerned mainly with the third of these conditions: with the claims of the community, that is, upon its members, and with the obedience and loyalty that are due from them in submitting their personal inclinations to these claims. In its personal aspect, on the other hand, morality is concerned rather with the second condition: with the choice, that is, between the various claims of which the individual may be aware. And here, at the outset, we are confronted with the question whether any freedom of choice is really possible.

On the answer that we give to this question our whole conception of moral good necessarily depends. The distinction between 'must' and 'ought' rests upon a presumed exercise, whether real or merely seeming to be so, of some degree of free-will. If there is no such freedom of will, then justice and love and the other moral values, social and personal, though they can still exist and serve a useful purpose, in the same way that nourishment and exercise serve a useful purpose, are not morally good in the common acceptance of the term and in the sense in which it is here understood. For if there is no freedom of choice, we are not ourselves responsible for our actions; in doing what we have to do there is no personal merit or guilt, and right or wrong are only descriptive terms, like useful or harmful, and have no further moral significance.

We are here face to face with a problem that has divided thinkers ever since it was realised that in nature there seems

to be nothing that is not determined by a preceding chain of causation. Especially has the growth of scientific knowledge and the scientific attitude of mind enforced the recognition of this universal concatenation of events in unbroken sequences, seeming to show that all that happens is determined by all that has gone before, and that there is no room for the intervention of anything that does not itself come under the same law. Not only is such determination of effect following upon cause, and the unbroken sequence of natural law, a fact of universal experience, on which all that we do is based, but it is also a logical necessity; for if things did not happen in fixed orders, no scientific knowledge of them and no assured mastery would be possible. But if this is no less true of our own behaviour and of the mental processes that underlie it than of events in the physical universe, how is it possible to reconcile the universal determination revealed and required by science with any freedom of the will? When we think that we are choosing between two alternatives, is there in actual fact any choice? or is what seems to us a purely voluntary act in reality fully determined by preceding events, and our sense of freedom to choose which course we will only an illusion?

Until recently there could have been no doubt that the whole weight of science was on the side of complete determinism, at least so far as the physical universe is concerned. This, however, is now no longer unquestioned. Certain conclusions to which physicists have recently found themselves brought, seem to show that some degree of uncertainty in the behaviour of the ultimate constituents of matter must be accepted. Amongst these is the "principle of indeterminacy" formulated by Professor Heisenberg, which shows that "so long as we can only explore nature by complete photons" (the ultimate 'particles' of light or of energy) "there is no hope of obtaining information which is perfectly exact with respect to both time and space. Exactness in either direction is obtained at the price of inexactness in the other."¹ Such conclusions have been seized upon by

¹ Sir James Jeans in *The New Background of Science*, p. 233.

some writers as though they had torpedoed the whole case for determinism and established the scientific validity of free-will. This, however, is a hasty assumption which goes far beyond the findings of the physicists themselves. Professor Einstein, for instance, has pointed out¹ that in spite of these new considerations "indeterminism is quite an illogical concept". Although, when the movements of particles are observed individually, their behaviour cannot be exactly predicted but is only a matter of probability, yet when taken in masses the chance movements average out and the resulting behaviour of the wholes that they constitute takes place according to fixed 'laws'. These laws of nature are to be regarded as statistical summaries in which the element of chance practically disappears, so that the total resulting movements follow a definite and calculable course. While, therefore, from the point of view of philosophic speculation there would seem to be warranty for the presence of some degree of spontaneity at the heart of natural processes, such considerations as the 'principle of indeterminacy' do not in themselves allow us to assume the reality of free-will. The behaviour of organisms, in so far as they are physical wholes, must conform to the same laws as these follow, and as such must be regarded as no less fully determined. The question, then, whether free-will can be exercised by living beings, or is merely illusory, is not to be settled by appeal to the indeterminacy recognised in present-day physics, but must be examined in the light of other considerations.

Before we pass judgment as to the validity either of complete determinism or of our own inner assurance of freedom, we must be sure just what we mean by the freedom of which we have this assurance. In the first place, we cannot be satisfied to regard it as being merely a legal freedom, which does not hinder us from doing certain things but is not concerned whether we have the power to do them or not. To say that we may choose, if as a matter of fact

¹ In *Where is Science Going ?* by Max Planck, quoted by Sir James Jeans, *The New Background of Science*, pp. 228-9.

we cannot do what we choose, is only a mockery of freedom. Nor, on the other hand, is ability to do what circumstances permit all that seems to us to be involved. Whether we can actually do a thing, and whether it is possible or not, does not affect the question whether we are free to will the action and so to do it of our own free choice. Such freedom implies some power of determination differing from that to which physical events, and mental processes so far as these are conditioned by physical events, are subject. It is not something negative, in being in some way exempt from this universal law of cause and effect, but rather something positive, a power of the will to act as a determinant in its own right; thus adding another element to the causal relations by which their course is determined. The question thus becomes: Is the introduction of a new determinant possible in a world in which events, including mental processes, seems to be fully determined?

In every situation involving moral activity there are three factors to be taken into account. In the first place there is the already existing situation, physical and psychological, in and by means of which the activity is to take place. Secondly, there is the element of value (the axiological factor, to give it a technical name) apprehended in the situation by the moral agent. And thirdly, there is the act of volition by which the agent deals with the situation in accordance with the values that he feels to be involved. In the problem of freedom the part played by each of these factors must be considered.

In the physical universe we may accept the strict determination of events by preceding events in unbroken sequences as being, if not entirely beyond question, at least a practical certainty. These sequences can only be diverted or transformed, as, for instance, the flight of a bullet can be diverted by an obstacle or its motion changed into some other form of energy. No causal factor is destroyed or diminished, but only transferred into a new direction. This transference is all that the intervention of will can effect. Even if we are free to choose between possible courses,

the nature of the choice and the course chosen are conditioned by the situation and by the possibilities that it offers. It is the situation which presents immediate goals of effort and possible sequences of events leading towards these; we can only choose between them and direct effort towards the one selected so as to bring it about. Without the causal determination of events no purposive action would be possible, for the outcome of any choice we could make would be equally unforeseeable.

But even if rigid determination of this kind obtains throughout the universe, this is not the only kind that we find at work there. With every new stage of emergent evolution a new kind of determinant appears, working within the general framework of the preceding stages, but adding some new power of directing events that was not present before. Thus while the physical universe can be fully described in terms of relations that can be mathematically expressed and of events proceeding in causally determined sequences, when life appears a new factor, not included in these relations, enters and gives a certain freedom of action that was not possible till then. A further factor appears when there has been a definite emergence of mind and consciousness; and yet again when the development of a sense of values has brought recognition of spiritual goals of effort for the direction of conduct and of the events in which conduct is embodied. In so far as psychological activity takes place within the framework of the physical universe, and so is conditioned by this, causal determination holds good for this kind of activity also; but with this difference, that with each advance a new factor is added, giving to the organism increasing power to utilise the more fundamental type of determination and direct this to purposes of its own.

The determination which rules in the physical universe seems, so far as any purposes and values of which we are conscious are concerned, to work blindly, tending, so physical science suggests (though now with less certainty than it once felt), to lead in the end to a universal dissipation of energy

and cessation of activity. The new type of determination, on the other hand, that enters with the appearance of life and strengthens with each advance of psychological evolution, is purposive; no longer merely pushing blindly from behind but exerted by objects of desire—ends consciously or unconsciously striven for—that lie in front. These ends, when we become conscious of them, are our values; and these are now among the determinants of our conduct no less than the lower types of determination, belonging to earlier stages of development, which still persist. Thus in so far as everything is determined, there are different factors at work. Each stage is determined by the earlier, but not entirely; each has more freedom in the sense that it brings in a new factor and can thus, at least in some degree, utilise the earlier in the pursuit of such values as it feels. The end, expressed in terms of value, to which activity is directed is thus something very different from the end envisaged by science as the outcome of a purely physical system of determination.

In giving rise to a new type of determination in addition to relations of the earlier type, psychological evolution has thus introduced a certain element of freedom found, not in immunity from determination of the lower type, but in the added power of giving to an otherwise blind sequence of events a particular purposive direction. And here also a second element of freedom enters. While the lower determination carries with it a necessity that nothing in the realm of physical activity can escape, the higher type associated with the activity of sentient beings does not seem to have, in their case, the same rigidly compulsive character. In moral activity the object of the activity is apprehended as a claim, an 'ought' to which, if the value is to be realised, conduct must conform; but conformity is not felt to be an inescapable necessity, like the 'must' of physical determination, but as being, to some extent at least, a matter of choice. When we speak of free-will a twofold freedom, therefore, is implied: it is 'free' as regards the lower type of determination in that it can direct this

to ends of its own choosing; and also it is 'free' as regards the 'ought' of moral values, so far as conformity to this is the outcome of choice. This twofold freedom constitutes free-will in the full meaning of the term: in relation, on the one hand, to the causal concatenation of events in which it works, and, on the other, to the values by which its activity is called into play.

Man thus finds himself at once free and unfree. As a being who is a part of the physical universe and subject to its laws, his actions are determined by the conditions under which he lives, exerting, as said above, a compulsion from behind. As a being who has reached a high level of psychological development, able to trace the sequences of events, to foresee the results of possible lines of activity and to apprehend future as well as present values, and higher as distinguished from lower, his actions are directed by the purposes that he forms and the values that he apprehends. It is evident that this power of direction by ends to be reached in the future instead of merely by events in the past involves a certain degree of freedom in respect of the earlier kind of determination. But although some freedom of action is given by the perception of ends to which it can be directed, this may be no more than the substitution of one kind of determination for another. There is no real freedom of will unless it is free to choose among the ends that are perceived, without being compelled to make one choice rather than another by a determining power either in its own past history or in the values themselves. But can we be sure that we are not compelled? May it not be that of the different values of which we are cognisant at the same time, the one which is most strongly felt, thanks to actual circumstances of the situation and the whole course of events that have led up to it, including the level of psychological development that we have reached, inevitably exercises a compulsive power, and forces us to make the particular choice which to us seems to be reached solely by our own volition?

This view finds support in the fact that all our voluntary actions have for object the pursuit of some value, higher

or lower, which, whatever the reason, is felt at the moment to be most worth striving for. When a sense of conflict arises, as is so often the case, it is not so much between this value and the blind urge of physical events as between different values that are present, in greater or less degree, in consciousness. Whichever course we choose, it is that which seems to us to have the greater, because at the moment the more urgent, value. It may well be, therefore, that the choice is determined solely by this value together with circumstances which increase its urgency. That circumstances have a great deal to do with determining the choice, no one will deny. The other factor which circumstances do not determine, and which gives us the sense of freedom in choosing, may be a determining power in the value itself; so that in so far as we are not merely pushed from behind we may be no less compulsorily drawn from in front, and have in reality no option in the matter.

The question of freedom of will turns, then, in the end, on the nature of value. If, for instance, we regard value as no more than a by-product of evolution, an 'epiphenomenon' associated with a certain degree of physical and psychological complexity, then, though there is here room for some freedom of will, it is a freedom which has no more meaning than the gratification of impulses hardly less blind in their working than the physical events which they use for this end. If, on the other hand, we hold that value is an integral part of the evolutionary process and that, when once it is apprehended, it has a determining power comparable, at the stage of evolution at which it appears, to that of causation in the physical universe, then we must admit that, in spite of any assurance of freedom that we may feel, there can be no actual freedom of choice.

But is this the only alternative? If emergent evolution in its progressive stages brings an increasing freedom of action as regards the type of determination that holds in the physical world, does it not also bring an increasing freedom of will as regards the further type of determination that holds in the realm of values? As long as the primary

values alone are apprehended, life is entirely motivated by them. To obtain satisfaction of its needs and to escape discomfort are its only aims. In this way, so far as it is not determined by physical conditions, it is solely determined by the values that it apprehends. But with every psychological advance which brings fresh values within its apprehension, and most of all with the spiritual growth which brings a sense of higher and lower values, there is also an increasing freedom in regard to the values themselves. Life is now no longer driven blindly by its needs nor drawn blindly by its desires, but can discriminate between them, refusing to surrender to one, preferring to follow another; learning, in short, to direct the new motive that it finds in values just as it has learnt to direct the earlier motive-force of physical determination. Thus man becomes a moral agent when he acts neither solely from the 'must' of physical and psychological causality nor from an even stronger 'must' of valuational attraction, but with sense of an 'ought' which he is free to reject or to accept. There is nothing irrational in regarding a freedom of this kind—which is neither a freedom devoid of meaning nor one that is illusory—as a further stage in the same process that has shown the successive emergence of life and mind and consciousness. If evolution may be thought of as an advance from material existence through life to spiritual activity, it is precisely in the appearance, in a completely determined universe, of purposive action and of a freedom of will which makes moral action possible, that its essential character is seen.

But though there is nothing irrational in such a view, we must not suppose that it is capable of scientific proof. It may be that man has no more freedom in the choice of the values that he attempts to realise by his activity than the physical universe is free to dispense with the relations which are to be found in it or to depart from the ordered sequences which its activity follows. But the fact that he does by his choices make values actual which without him would not be actualised gives some presumption of reality to the choice. Values, not being of the same order of exist-

ence as the events that constitute the physical universe, do not of themselves have any place in it or enter directly into its system of causal determination. This can only take place through the activity of sentient beings in whom psychological evolution is sufficiently advanced to bring apprehension of values. In moral activity man is thus the mediator between the 'ought' of moral value and the actual; only through him can the 'ought' be realised in the actual world of events. The consciousness of freedom that we all feel—the belief that we are free to choose or reject a particular line of conduct, and are ourselves responsible for our choice—does not in itself prove that freedom to be real. The very fact, indeed, that this feeling of responsibility has been of great service in the development of social life may be held to show that it is the product of social experience with no other basis than the utility of the belief. But it is at least unlikely that a conviction so deep-rooted should have *no* basis in reality; the more as the acceptance of personal responsibility for actions that we feel to be wrong and the consciousness of guilt are contrary to our usual tendency to find excuses for ourselves and to lay the blame elsewhere for wrong-doing or failure. Not only do we impute responsibility to ourselves and to others of like development while we do not do so to animals and children or to inanimate things, but in most situations we are indignant if such responsibility is denied to us and if we are treated as children or as being mentally incapable of responsibility.

We treat, in fact, this responsibility as a necessary postulate in conduct just as we treat the solidity of matter as a necessary postulate in dealing with the external world. Both are presumptions on which every act of daily life is based. If they have *no* relation to reality, experience is meaningless and the universe and our part in it unintelligible to human reason. It is, of course, possible that this may be the case. But in actual practice we must ignore the possibility if we are to form and carry out purposes in accordance with the values that we feel, and to master and utilise our surroundings for this end; we must act on the presumption

that there is an intimate relation between reality and the mental processes that have been evolved in us as the result of our contacts with it. Since experience is the only means that we have of discovering this relation and of directing to our purposes the energies by which we are surrounded, we are forced to accept it as our working guide. While recognising, therefore, to the full the extent to which our actions are determined by events beyond our control—a recognition which by increasing our sympathy and understanding may well make us chary of imputing guilt—we must in practice accept and act upon the presumption that there is nevertheless a core of free-will which enables us by our choices to realise values in actual events, and so makes of moral activity something more than submission to an external claim. Whatever the reality may be which underlies the sense of freedom of choice, it is in the acceptance of this freedom and of the responsibility which it entails that the moral character of activity consists.

§ 2. MORAL VALUES AS PERSONAL IDEALS

Moral activity, then, in the full sense of the term, involves something more than admission of a claim. It involves personal responsibility, resting on the possibility of choice, and the reality, in however limited degree, of free-will. Even if an action, when done under the pressure of authority may be objectively moral, from the point of view of the onlooker, in so far as it satisfies a social claim, it is only subjectively moral, so far as the individual doing it is concerned, if he chooses to do it because he feels it to be right. This act of choice constitutes the personal aspect of morality. An action is not moral in the fullest sense unless it is felt to be right not merely because it is in accordance with some social code or satisfies some external claim, but rather because it satisfies our own moral sense and is felt to be of our own choosing.

This inner sense of right and the personal code of conduct based upon it constitute for each of us his personal conscience. In touching upon the origin of conscience, it was

said above that it must be regarded as a development from the habit of obedience to parental and group authority, and as first coming into consciousness as a sentiment of loyalty, whether to certain individuals or to the group on which one's whole life and well-being depend. From this in the course of experience has developed a new loyalty to enlarge and change the old. Moral as distinct from instinctive life may be said to begin with trust: first that of the dependent on the power and wisdom of the superior, evoking a desire not to hamper or fail him which transforms the relationship from one of 'must' into one of 'ought', thus replacing a mere acceptance of compulsion by a sense of loyalty; and secondly a corresponding trust on the part of the superior in the obedience and loyalty of the subordinate. Such mutual trust, however far from complete, is the basis of all common life. Only when trust of the second kind is also present can there be sufficient sense of freedom to evoke pride in being trustworthy and the self-respect that comes from a sense of responsibility for one's own actions—conditions through which the personal conscience is developed.

Historically, no doubt, this development of responsibility on the part of the individual in place of complete dependence on the authority of the group was largely the outcome of new and easier conditions of life, in which survival, both for the individual and the group, no longer depended to the same extent on absolute obedience. When this is the case, individual variations, so far from being dangerous to the common welfare, are in many ways of advantage to it, so that individual initiative can be allowed and even, within limits, encouraged. But with initiative and individual responsibility a new factor comes into play. At first this takes the form of a claim to individual rights in addition to the duties owed to the community. But such a claim, when enlarged by sympathy, comes to include in addition to one's own rights those of others as well; and this can develop into a sense of justice whose criterion is not merely an external code but still more one's own feeling and judgment

of what is right. Thus arises a new loyalty not merely towards the community and its code but also to one's own ideals. Seeing that the code in force at any time is largely made up of customs that are partly if not wholly outgrown, and can only represent at best an average of public opinion, the beliefs and sentiments of the individual must often be realised by him to be in advance of those accepted by the group. It is inevitable, therefore, that this second loyalty to his own personal sense of right and wrong rather than to laws formulated by the group should come at times to seem to him to be the higher of the two.

Some, looking only at this later development of conscience, speak of it as the 'voice of God' in the human soul. If we think of each advance in thought and feeling as raising us further from the merely instinctive level towards some spiritual height that we call God, this description of conscience is an easily intelligible metaphor. What the metaphor seeks to express is that conscience, the 'ought' that we feel to be binding upon us, tends more and more to make ideal rather than merely social claims. We begin by accepting the rules and moral codes of those about us, and thus form our social values at second hand. But though conscience is at first no more than a sense of disloyalty aroused by any failure in observance of these second-hand values, it changes its character as one's personal sense of values develops. In proportion as this is the case, conscience is no longer content with any merely external code, but only with the ideal of justice which is usually only imperfectly expressed in such a code, and with the promptings of sympathy and affection which any code of social obligations is wont to ignore. These ideal claims of justice and fellow-feeling conscience, in its fuller development, recognises as laws of universal validity, whether enforced by the community or not. In most cases they reinforce the social claims that were hitherto our only 'ought'; but if they clash, it is, we find, to the higher laws, whose validity is a matter of personal rather than social insistence, that we owe most allegiance.

There may thus be a sharp distinction between the codes of right and wrong laid down by law and custom on the one side and by the personal conscience on the other. This we recognise in the distinction drawn in ordinary speech between a *crime* and a *sin*.¹ By the former is meant any offence against the law of the land or the moral code in general acceptance; such offences are looked upon as a crime against the community. But when we have come to feel that a course of conduct should be followed not merely because it is in accord with the authority of the community but because it is enjoined upon us by our own sense of what is reasonable and right, refusal to obey this inner authority constitutes 'sin'—a crime, that is, not merely against society but against one's better knowledge and feeling. There are many things that may be wrong in the light of conscience but are not regarded as crimes in the eyes of the law; these are matters which the community is content to leave to the individual judgment and does not regard as endangering its own existence. Of this kind are personal relations between individuals, so long as they do not contravene the law of the land or become a public nuisance. And conversely things regarded as wrong by law or convention or orthodox morality may not be sins in the light of the personal conscience. In this light, indeed, they may be right actions; either because the law which represents the will of the community is admittedly bad or wrongly administered, or, even if this is not the case, because the personal conscience sets a higher moral standard, and the sin would be in conforming to the judgment of the group. Thus a man may think it right to refuse to conform to, or pay levies in support of, a state religion that he regards as mistaken and immoral, or to undertake military service, and may prefer, rather than do what would offend his conscience, to undergo imprisonment or other forms of public obloquy.

¹ Since it is one of the chief aims of religion to develop this inner authority of the personal conscience, the word *sin* is used in association with ideas belonging to religion.

In the conflict between loyalty to the group and loyalty to our personal ideals each of us has to find some way to decide between them, or if possible to reconcile them. The claims of the group, the moral code imposed by the community as a check to anti-social actions, cannot be lightly set aside; not only because the compliance is expedient in view of the penalties the group may exact, but because the racial and environmental factors which have been at work in shaping the accepted moral code have also had much to do with the shaping of our several minds. Our morality is part of our inheritance as much as are the other customs of our time and country, its language, for instance, and its dress. We must adopt to a large extent the same clothes as others wear; we cannot discard them altogether—the average of public opinion, as expressed in group-authority, will not allow this even if the individual should think it healthier to do without them. We can alter them within limits, and choose our own cut, colour and material; we need not be in the smartest fashion nor yet in one merely of dull respectability. We can be individual, but we cannot be altogether unlike our fellows in things that have been evolved by experience to suit present conditions; only in moments of make-believe, or by changing our whole environment, can we adopt the dress of Red Indians or Vikings, of Arabs or Chinamen. So too it is only with some consciousness of unreality, or by changing the conditions of our daily life, that we can put in practice moral ideas suited to more primitive or more ideal conditions. For the current habits of our social life, our accepted moral, legal and political principles and codes, however far they lag behind our ideals, are, like our bodies, adapted in the main, though never completely, to the ordinary conditions of our life.

And yet the codes in which principles and habits are embodied change, however slowly; for the actual conditions of life at any place and time bring modifications, just as they have brought about the differences between the codes of different nations. But always the change follows, and lags behind, the growth of ideas and ideals, so that our rules

of morality are always partially obsolete and always incomplete. And for this reason, while preserving something of the old instinctive allegiance to the customs and claims of the group, we are bound also to use our own judgment and preserve our spiritual freedom and initiative, in loyalty to the 'ought' imposed upon us by the ideal self. For individual thought and sentiment are sure to develop faster than the general opinion and moral feeling of the group, which represent the average, or something less than the average, standard attained at the time; and this, in turn, can only be altered, and the level of public opinion raised, by the efforts of individuals in maintaining a higher standard.

The antagonism between the dictates of society and the authority of the personal conscience is thus as necessary a factor in the evolution of morality as that between the principles of continuity and variation in biological evolution. Not only is the refusal to allow external law to override the inner voice of conscience essential for the development of personal integrity, but it is no less essential for the advance of the common thought and feeling upon matters of conduct and the progressive adjustment of law to this advance. As the blood of its martyrs is the seed of a church, so also is the growth of the communal conscience—upon which will depend at any time both the letter of the law and the spirit in which it is observed—the outcome of the protests of individuals who are in advance of the main body of their age. Such protests are of double value; not only for upholding the supremacy of the individual conscience, but even more for helping to raise the moral level of the community as expressed in its laws.

On both grounds, therefore, the personal conscience must have freedom of expression, both in thought and in action, allowed to it by the community,—so far, at least, as this freedom does not seem to be destructive of the unity and safety of the whole. If it threatens to destroy these, the community is bound to act in self-defence, by removing, or at least segregating, the dangerous individual. It cannot, for example, allow fanatics in the name of conscience to

take life or to spread disease or refuse to bear a share of its burdens. Thus it is justified in imprisoning the 'conscientious objector', just as much as a criminal or other disturber of the peace, at times when his refusal to obey its authority seems likely by example, or otherwise, to endanger the existence or well-being of the community. But the individual is no less justified in following his personal conscience, when he is convinced that the highest good of the community is not served but even precluded by its own laws, or that in obeying them he would be sacrificing his highest ideals and destroying his own self-respect.

A point of difference should be noted between the social conscience—whether this is merely obedience to a code of behaviour imposed by external authority or sensitivity to the opinion of others—and the inner spring of conduct which is here distinguished as the personal conscience. Whereas the former is mainly negative, working mainly by inhibitions, the latter is positive, initiating action. The main concern of the community is to control the instinctive impulses of its members and to ensure that there shall be nothing in their behaviour that may bring about so much disharmony as to endanger its existence or the provision of its needs. Its code therefore consists mainly of prohibitions of all kinds of antisocial conduct. "Thou shalt not" is the normal expression of the law. Anyone, therefore, who trusts to this 'external' conscience for guidance is mainly concerned with avoiding breaches of the law and refraining from actions of which society would disapprove. The personal conscience, on the other hand, prompts to action of any kind that may be helpful to others and subserve the needs of the community, whether such action be undertaken to satisfy the sense of loyalty to the larger body of which one is a part, or out of good will to individuals and as expression of native impulses. Even if, that is, it begins with the 'ought' of duty to external law, it passes beyond this to the higher duty to a law within; and thus it comes back to a 'must' as the true source of activity—no longer the 'must' of merely instinctive impulse but the urge

of life realised in its fullest spiritual satisfaction. Whereas moralists are inclined to insist on the claims of duty and to exalt the external conscience with its inhibitions, the greatest teachers have upheld the higher value of the personal conscience, first in its new conception of duty, and still more in its spontaneity of motive, replacing the many "Thou shalt nots" of law by the sole "Thou shalt" of love.

It is abundantly plain, then, that while moral growth means passing from purely selfish to collective interests and aims, it also means passing from collective to personal judgments. Ultimately the moral sense, developed though it is by social experience, is the apprehension of something beyond the lessons and limitations of that experience. In this, as has been pointed out above, it has much in common with the apprehension of beauty; and it has a still more evident likeness with religion, for in religion also there is an 'ought' that awakens an instinctive response in man's heart. Religion has, indeed, been defined in a well-known phrase as "morality tinged with emotion", and morality, it has been suggested,¹ might be regarded as "practical necessity endowed with religious feeling". Incomplete as are both definitions, there is much truth in each.

But the fact that conscience is ultimately a matter of individual judgment and feeling, so far from making moral problems easier of solution, makes them in one respect more difficult; for not only does it substitute for a fixed standard one that changes with our growth, but it constantly presents us with no single 'ought' but rather with a choice between alternatives that seem to make equal claims. It is seldom that the right line of conduct is unmistakable and without qualification. In place of any clear-cut opposition between 'lower' desires and 'higher' duties there is usually some choice between co-existent loyalties, it may be to different groups, or to different ideals. To choose any course we have to ignore or reject conflicting claims, or in some way reconcile them; and practical morality consists in choosing the course that seems to us the best possible under the circum-

¹ By I. Levine in *Reason and Morals*, chapter ix.

stances. Once we pass beyond the claims of custom and social right, morality is no longer a simple or easy matter; but, in the development of the moral sense as in that of intelligence in place of instinct, we cannot, even if we would, turn back from the line of advance that mankind has taken. Through this development man has risen from the animal to the human level, and struggles on towards something higher still that we think of as divine.

§ 3. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE MORALITY

Activity of any kind, it has been postulated, is to be called moral when it is the satisfaction of an admitted claim. If the claim is generally admitted, as in the case of the majority of social claims, action in accordance with it is objectively moral—moral, that is, in the eyes of the onlooker and as laid down by the accepted code of the time—even if, so far as the doer is concerned, it is only chosen because it is customary or through fear of public opinion. But this is moral activity on its lowest level. In its fuller development it must be subjectively moral—chosen, that is, by the doer for its own sake, in recognition of a claim that is felt by him as higher whether it be equally accepted by others or not. In its subjective aspect, therefore, the essential quality of moral activity lies rather in the choice and intention than in the result of the act or its conformity with any accepted code. The claim that it has to satisfy is not that of loyalty to the community, but that made by some individual feeling which is felt to have a still higher sanction. Morality, in this aspect, is a matter of personal aspiration rather than of social constraint.

However different the two kinds of moral activity may have come to be, they have developed in the same way. The essence of any claim, it was said above, lies in some restriction and modification of impulsive action by the intervention of other feelings. All moral activity, therefore, like all intelligent activity, begins in the power of inhibition. Intelligent activity involves the holding up of response until, after examination of other possibilities of action than

the one immediately prompted by instinct, the one that seems most likely to be helpful can be chosen. So also moral activity involves a similar holding up of response until other feelings than the merely instinctive emotion of the moment have time to assert themselves. Thus the complexes of thought and emotion that have gathered round various kinds of experience are called into play, so that choice can be made of the line of action that commends itself most to the moral sense. This power of inhibition—or self-control as we call it in its moral aspect—is thus the basic virtue on which all others, social and personal, rest.

Like the fundamental social virtue of justice, self-control can be merely negative, and thereby of comparatively little moral value. Necessary as it is to restrain the unconsidered expression of impulse in order that response may be at once intelligent and in accord with our higher values, mere repression of impulse is seldom sufficient. Repression alone may easily lead to harmful results in the creation or intensification of a subconscious complex, or, if the process is habitual, in a narrowing and souring of the whole nature such as is exemplified by the type of Puritan so often held up to scorn in literature. Self-control is only of positive value if it serves for concentration of effort and leads to further action as the outcome of choice between the various claims that are felt to be involved. Its moral value, therefore, usually depends upon its association with some degree of initiative and courage in following out a line of action enjoined not merely by some external code but rather by the dictates of one's own better self. Habitual motivation of this kind is what we mean by self-respect; and this forms a large part of conscience in its personal aspect.

But the development of the personal from the social conscience is not simply a matter of the growth of self-respect. It is also the outcome of the widening range of affections and deepening sympathies with which social loyalty is continually enriched. While justice—giving to all their due—remains the great social value, love—giving to each all that we can—becomes the main expression of moral

value in its personal aspect, whose claims come to be felt as higher and further reaching than those merely of loyalty to the community. It is unfortunate that under the term 'love' have to be included so many relations for which more precise terms are not available, from the urge of sexual impulse up to the highest reaches of the human spirit in its apprehension of the divine. The fact, however, that a single term has to include so many meanings may serve to remind us how much in our highest moral values is due to the development and sublimation of the sex-instinct.

To one school of psychologists, indeed, the greater part of our mental life is the outcome of sex in some form, however it may be disguised. And in this there is an undeniable truth, even if we do not accept all the theories they base upon it, or the particular exemplifications of these theories in the various sex-complexes that they regard as matters of practically universal experience. An organic compulsion so insistent and so universal as the sex-impulse must necessarily permeate and colour the greater part of life. As in other living things, in human life also it has given rise to the finest manifestations of our nature. Some may more readily recognise this truth, so far as the mind of man is concerned, in Plato's conception of love as reaching through the apprehension and desire of beauty in an individual to an apprehension and desire of the ideal beauty which is one with truth and moral good. What begins in an impulse that we share with the animals can grow into the adoration of the mystic and the all-embracing charity of the greatest of religious teachers. In such love there is a standard of morality quite other than the sense of duty. It is one of the ways in which, in Nietzsche's phrase, man may pass "beyond good and evil" and find within himself springs of conduct whose sanction is not found in the recognition of any social claim but in an intuitional certainty of their own supreme value.

The sex-impulse, like those of self-maintenance, is a need to relieve an internal tension, and thus in origin is purely self-regarding. In its development, however, in both the

mating and parental relationship, it is capable of reaching the most complete unselfishness, in which the sense of self is merged in that of entering into the life of another. Such love in its fullest form loses all sense of need or advantage to be gained; it values the other for his own sake alone, seeking only his good even by renunciation of its own. Looking at the best in him, by expectation it helps to create it. When two love in this way, each personality is enlarged by the other, and their creative power is thereby heightened, bringing to each a sense of revelation of an infinite around and within them. Sexual love is, in the experience of most, the most intense of the emotions. It takes them out of themselves as nothing else does; and seeming to rise above time and individuality, it can thus give a foretaste of eternity. The new world that opens to the lover is the unknown depth of his own being, a higher self that is evoked and enriched by the new experience. In this way love is the very essence and epitome of the sense of values: beginning in an animal instinct it opens up realms of the spirit and gives a fuller meaning to life. And as with other ultimate values, the art of love lies in holding the knowledge and business of the actual shot through and through with vision of the ideal, finding the fullest of experience present even in the daily intercourse of life.

In estimating the significance of love in its influence on moral activity, we must not, however, think of it only in connection with sex-attraction. Difficult as it would be to exaggerate the importance, for spiritual evolution, of this passion both from the intensity of the experience and from the fact that, alike in sex-union and in parenthood, it passes beyond the limits of self-interest, the sex-impulse is not the only factor that has worked to this end. Ideas and feelings that help to form what is far the richest of the sentiments universal in mankind are due not only to the sublimation of this urge in many kinds of activity, but also to the coalescence with it of the sympathy that underlies any kind of cooperation. If the one has been the main

factor in heightening and intensifying the value of love, the other has been of no less service in broadening its range and application. The good will of fellow-feeling as a determining factor in conduct has spread outward through widening circles of kindred and neighbours, tribe, nation and race, till in some natures of rich development it seems able to embrace the whole of humanity.

And each enlargement has brought with it a wider conception of morality in the sense of claims made upon us by others also as well as by those who contribute to our welfare. The weak and the burdensome are no more to be excluded than the strong and helpful. To the philosophy that sees moral advance only in the "will to power", a love which shows itself in pity for the weak and helpless makes for retrogression in that it seems to work for the survival of the unfit.¹ Such a view assumes that its activity goes no further than obstructing the ultimately beneficial work of natural selection. But the purpose of love in the exercise of pity is not a negative one, to shelter weakness, but a positive strengthening and encouragement of all that is of value. It helps the weak because weakness of any kind prevents the free and vigorous striving towards things of worth which is the fullness of life. This is the goal that love seeks for all. A human claim takes the place of the social claim; and to this human claim love, at its fullest, will allow no exception. "Love your enemies", however hard an injunction to put in practice, is a moral ideal beyond the loyalty that we owe to the community as such; a nascent consciousness, rather, of a further outreach of the spirit of man towards an all-embracing sympathy which he recognises as divine.

Love is thus the complement of justice, thinking not of what is due to another, whether in his relation to oneself or to the community, but of what is within one's power to give which will most enrich his life. Love does not, like justice, weigh deserts, awarding their due both to merits

¹ This was insisted upon by the modern German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).

and defects. In this sense there is a deeper truth in the saying of the poets that love is blind. But with equal truth it may be said to be clear-sighted; for, looking not only at what is present but at an ideal that can be made possible, one who has some love sees more truly than one who has none. Ultimately no doubt, if both love and justice were perfect, taking everything into account, they would be at one; meanwhile they are often in sharp conflict, through a narrowness of purview on either part. In all our judgments and choices it is inevitable that we should be swayed mainly by the conditions and feelings of the time at which they are made, and have too little foresight and forward-reaching love to make full allowance for inevitable results. It is here, indeed, that love finds its fullest extension, feeling the claim of those to come who will inherit the world of our making; and here also it finds its most complete release from self-interest, since for any activity prompted by such love there can be no possibility of return.

In this sense again love is the essence and epitome of moral value, since all moral activity has its purpose in the future and is a striving to bring into existence a value which is not yet there. The foresight of intelligence and the fore-feeling of love—both of them modes of apprehension of an ideal that is possible of attainment—impose a claim upon us. Foreseeing or fore-feeling what is at once desirable and possible, we are bound to make the attempt to bring it about, whether we regard this as a duty owing to humanity, or to our self-respect, or to that spiritually highest that we call God. Love is thus the creator and revealer of values. Every act of loving-kindness adds something to the value of life and makes it more significant, for it helps to open the eyes of the spirit to the abundance of its riches. And in its exercise it transforms and ennobles the nature from which it emanates, giving to it a radiance as of sunlight falling on all around freely and without thought of return. Together with the sense of power, this radiant goodness is the crown of that total impress which an individual makes upon his fellows—his personality, as we call it, in which we

feel not only an abounding energy but also a spiritual fullness of life. In such a nature moral activity rises into a realm of moral good that lies beyond morality. From the conscience that is loyalty to the community and its claims it has passed to the conscience that finds its right only in loyalty to the claims of the highest it can apprehend; and still beyond this to a region in which the sense of claim gives place to the free outpouring of life for its own sake. The life that is spiritually fullest gives not because of another's need, but out of its own overflowing fullness, from love of one's fellows and from love of life itself. In such a giver the meaning of good is most fully revealed; for this outpouring is its own fulfilment, and life's highest value is thus to be found in the spending of life.

§ 4. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

Unlike the secondary values, which are desirable for the sake of something that we can get by means of them, truth, beauty and moral good resemble the primary values in that they exist for themselves as things that are directly experienced. All that we know about them is that we are so made that we apprehend them, in greater or less degree. That is the ultimate fact beyond which we cannot get except by conjecture as to a meaning and purpose in life. But while both the primary values of sensation and those highest values of spiritual feeling are ultimate in this sense, there is this difference between them. Whereas the former are the starting-point of experience the latter present themselves to us as its goal; they are given, indeed, in feeling, but only partially, with continual freshness of discovery. They are ultimate also in the sense that, while we seem to move towards them, they remain always beyond our reach. When we speak of truth or beauty or moral good, we are not to take them as states that can be achieved, or as the outcome of conditions that, once established, can be permanently maintained. Rather they are to be thought of as systems of relations that are continually developing with our psychological growth; directions in which we are moving as we

explore more fully the inter-connections that we discover in the world of which we are a part, and our own relations to the various aspects of reality of which we become cognisant. Our values thus inevitably change and unfold as our powers of apprehension grow. Truth, beauty, moral good, are not, so to speak, finite possessions that can be fully grasped and once for all made our own; we can only hope to get hints, approximations, partial revelations, that are necessarily different at different stages of growth and can never be considered final. Morality is no less subject to this law than the forms in which other spiritual values are expressed. What is good to-day will not be good—at least it will not be the highest good—under new conditions that are not yet the actual conditions under which we live. It is therefore to be expected, if psychological evolution is to continue, that mankind will outgrow morality as it is now understood. The moral leaders of mankind are, now as always, those who point out the direction in which further advance is most practicable and most to be desired.

To those who hold that our highest values are absolute and eternal, fully revealed to us if only we have the will to apprehend them and to realise them in our conduct, there seems something sacrilegious in suggesting that we can outgrow morality as already known to us, or that we should desire to do so. Yet even these will admit that, human nature being what it is, the attempt to realise moral good is necessarily attended with certain dangers and drawbacks. These are of two kinds: the one a danger that is attendant on every kind of mental advance, the other inherent in the nature of morality itself.

Like other lines of mental development, that of the moral sense is open to misuse. To be conscious of an 'ought', of a higher and lower in conduct, however painful the conflicts to which it may give rise, is a necessary stage in the spiritual ascent of man. But it is possible to become a slave to the 'ought', either in its social or in its personal aspect. Of the former the commonest case is to be seen in those who are so dependent on custom for every detail of their lives, and

so anxious to be like their neighbours, not only in external modes of life but in their very thoughts and feelings, that they can scarcely be said to have a self of their own but are only shadows and their existence one dull round of imitation. No better than this is the goodness that is merely negative, seeking only to be blameless. We have all known 'good' children of this type, high in favour, no doubt, with nurses and teachers because they give so little trouble, but docile chiefly through lack of vital impulse, and without the force of personality that we feel to be necessary for real goodness. It is even possible to incur this same loss of personality by being too unselfish and ready under all circumstances to give way to others; for, as Aristotle pointed out, a virtue can lose its goodness by excess as well as by default.

On its personal side the development of conscience is apt to lead to the other extreme, resulting in a character that is forcible indeed, but hard and intolerant, and judgment that is often narrow, lacking at once in sympathy and understanding. This is the failing, for instance, characteristic of one type of Puritan. In his very determination to let no personal impulse towards what is pleasant make him deviate from the narrow path of right, as he sees it, he is apt to starve in himself not only the lower but some of the finest promptings of his nature; and by so doing can easily become one who turns a sour face upon life and upon others, cold in his sympathies and intolerant in his judgments. Such moralists insist upon the duty of self-sacrifice, by which in practice they usually mean the repression of all spontaneous impulse; to them morality consists rather in the restraint of the lower nature than in the release of the higher.

To most of us, indeed, morality in general presents itself in its negative rather than in its positive aspect. Since, like the forms of government and law which are its crude expression, it begins in restraint it is natural enough that it should retain this character in our minds. There are times when, seeing it only in this negative aspect, we feel it to

be a prison of the spirit, and long to break through its fetters into greater freedom and spontaneity of impulse in place of the perpetual check of 'ought'. In such a feeling there is nothing unworthy or immoral. It is merely a recognition of the truth, expressed in the old story of the Garden of Eden, that the knowledge of good and evil involves banishment from the pre-moral life of unthinking impulse. But the poet of *Paradise Lost* could also write of Paradise regained. If behind us lies the conscienceless innocence of a purely animal existence, can we not discern before us another way of escape from the sense of conflict implied in conscience, an escape into a spiritual freedom of action as spontaneous as that of instinct, but enriched by purposes and ideals which have been shaped and established by means of submission to the 'ought' or moral law?

An idle wish, some will say, the outcome of repression, like so many of our wishes, as the psycho-analysts tell us. But the history of human evolution shows again and again that what was at one stage a necessary organ of bodily or mental life may be deposed from a position of primary importance and modified to other uses. Thus in the earlier stages of development fear was of the utmost biological value as a means of self-preservation; but in proportion as the growth of intelligence has shown how danger may be overcome or avoided, fear has become in many cases a hindrance by inhibiting activity or by suggesting less reasonable solutions of the problem. In all that concerns spiritual development, fear is an ally of the lower self, the source of cowardice and cruelty and hate; the line of psychological advance lies in leaving its lower forms behind and sublimating it, as in religion, into awe and reverence and devotion to high ends, thus transforming it from a negative avoidance of harm into a positive motive towards good.

Some such transformation of the moral sense from submission to custom and law, and from the dominance of conscience, to a freedom which is unconscious of restraint is thus no reversal of the normal course of evolution but rather a pushing forward along what seems the main line

of spiritual development. The only 'ought' recognised by morality in its highest aspect is the obligation to follow the highest that we know, the impulses of our highest nature. To the fully developed spirit this is to follow the values it apprehends without question of obligation or even a sense of choice. It is not merely, therefore, the impatience of youth that seeks to escape from the control of conscience, felt as a restraint, and to replace the motive of duty by something more impulsive and spontaneous. Those whom mankind has looked upon as its greatest men have always seemed to act in this way, of their own free-will and for the satisfaction of the promptings of their nature, rather than with any consciousness of 'ought'.

Two main directions have thus been shown in which the spirit of man seeks for further advance. The one direction is to continue still further the development of personal judgment rather than of social obligation and to make the individual will the final arbiter of conduct. This is the direction hailed by Nietzsche as the evolution of the Superman. To him the morality that is based on obedience to group-authority, or on conscience as the outcome of such obedience, is slave-morality, necessary and good for the weak, but to the strong a needless burden and one that saps their vigour. Opposed to this 'slave-morality' is 'master-morality', the sole obligation to develop one's will to the utmost and impose it on others who cannot rise to this height.¹ Not that the Superman of Nietzsche's ideal is necessarily a monster of selfishness and brutality. He may be, for example, by choice an ascetic or a disinterested devotee of science; but he must be free from any kind of altruism that would weaken him and divert him from his purpose, and must acknowledge no law beyond the satisfaction of his impulses and the development of his own

¹ It has been pointed out that 'slave-morality' is a more fitting designation for such an apotheosis of the will to power. For what is this but the ideal formed by a slave of what he would wish to be if he could become master? The 'will to power' is thus seen as an expression of an 'inferiority-complex' seeking compensation in dreams of strength and violence. (See *Reality*, by B. H. Streeter, chapter vi.)

nature. In a community that allowed to all who could make use of it the fullest freedom for development of this kind, the clash of such fully developed wills would be, so Nietzsche held, one of the conditions of healthy and vigorous life, tempered by the comradeship that would obtain between equals and the natural hero-worship of the weaker for the stronger. But even so, it would only be possible for a few to reach such a position; for conditions in which 'master-morality' is possible can only be attained where there is domination of the herd by those few in whom the will to power is most strongly developed.

The closest approximation to supermen of this kind that history has yet shown is to be seen in such figures as Alexander or Caesar or Napoleon: men, that is, of remarkable gifts of mind and force of character united in a personality that commanded admiration and won devoted service from their followers. If they used their powers to gratify an immense personal ambition, it was not merely—even if largely—for selfish ends but in seeking to bring order out of chaos, to secure and enlarge the domain of civilised life and to extend the bounds of knowledge. Not only did they tower above their contemporaries but they have continued to dominate the imagination of succeeding ages as figures far beyond the normal stature of mankind. In their own eyes, as in the eyes of those about them, they stood above morality, their own will the final law for themselves, to be imposed on others by voluntary submission or by force. To themselves, in a word, they were supermen of the true Nietzschean pattern; and the claim has been allowed not only by those over whom when living they cast their spell, but by mankind ever since, knowing them only by hearsay or from the permanent changes that they impressed upon the world.

But if they are examples of human nature that by force of will has advanced beyond the normal restrictions of good and evil, so also are they examples of the fate that overtakes those who stand so far above their fellows and use them, as an artist uses his material, to be shaped or squan-

dered in conformity with their plans. That fate may take the form of assassination or exile, dealt out to them by the jealousy of rivals or subordinates who could not submit perpetually to so complete a domination as such power implies, even if it be beneficent in its aims. But even if they could escape such an external fate they seem unable to escape the spiritual deterioration that follows upon power which raises a man so far above his fellows that he no longer associates with them as equals but only as subjects and flatterers. That is the tragedy of autocratic power. Even if, therefore, in times of difficulty and danger there may be need of those who, by sheer ability, can command the obedience of their fellows and wield an authority based on strength of will rather than on law and customary right, it does not seem to be in the direction of the irresponsible dictator, exerting domination over his fellow men by the exercise of 'master-morality' in disregard of the claims of humanity, that the line of moral development lies. The 'will to power', in which Nietzsche saw the fullest meaning of life, is not the sole factor in evolution; in moral development the true line of advance is not necessarily from slave to master but rather from slavery to freedom.

A development that takes a very different direction from a 'master-morality' that finds in the will to power sufficient ground for action, and the highest expression of the urge of life, is that of conscious sympathy as the main motive of conduct, with love rather than will as the criterion by which moral advance is to be judged. If the great conquerors and empire-builders, to whom the bulk of mankind have only been the raw material for the exercise of power, may stand as examples of the one line of moral evolution, we may see in certain of the founders of religions, and in some of their followers, examples of another line of advance by which men may rise above the limitations of 'must' and 'ought'. These, like the Superman, have also passed beyond the restraints of ordinary morality; not, however, in the sense of despising or rejecting it, or setting up their individual will as a superior authority, but as acting from the

spontaneous impulse of their nature, out of love towards their fellows instead of from obedience to any obligation of conscience. 'Ought' ceases to have a meaning when the individual no longer feels himself separated from his fellows, but can so fully identify himself with them that their good is his; he seeks it, therefore, with the same instinctive urgency with which, in the dawn of consciousness, he sought his own, and finds in it the same satisfaction, but at a higher level and with fuller consciousness.

This, then, is the second way in which man can seek to pass beyond the restraints of morality. Like the way of will, the way of love also has its pitfalls and dangers; for all feeling by itself is blind, and without the guidance given by reason may easily sweep its votaries into strange excesses or into mysticisms and ecstasies remote from the actual needs of life. In all single-hearted devotion there is something admirable; but it is apt to be one-ideal, and to few of the saints has it not been a narrowing influence, even if it has not made them into fanatics. For there is a close analogy between bodily and mental growth and functioning. The escape (by whatever means it is brought about) of some cells, and the tissues that they form, from the central control may lead, as in cancer, to growths that prey upon the life of the whole. So, too, in the development of any spiritual quality, however desirable in itself, out of its due relation with others, there is always a danger of the starvation of some that are equally necessary for spiritual sanity. The very fullness of absorption in one value may be the means of excluding the apprehension of others. Just as the will to power is apt to be vitiated by atrophy of the human sympathies, so also may the development of sympathy be rendered ineffectual for lack of other qualities of intellect and will needed to give it substance and direction.

If, therefore, love is to transcend the moral law it must be sane and far-seeing as well as all-embracing. But in this there is nothing contradictory, such as there seems to be in the reconciliation of human sympathies with the will to power. For whereas love is in essence the transcendence of

self, the will to power is the enlargement of self not by union with others but by domination over them. In this respect, therefore, love has a psychological right to replace the laws of morality that cannot be claimed by will; for it is the full development of the sympathy from which, as we have seen, morality springs. And so, while the will to power rejects morality as hampering the advance of mankind, and as being productive of weakness rather than of strength, it is by completing the purpose of morality that love ultimately transcends it. The great saying of Paul: "Love is the fulfilling of the law" holds good of the moral as of the Mosaic law. Of the moral law also it is true to say that it was our schoolmaster to bring us, by compulsions and constraints of 'must' and 'ought', to the freedom of love and the consciousness of one-ness with our fellows in ever-widening circles—from the mate and the family up to the furthest bounds of mankind—and beyond these, it may be, to embrace all living things in a still greater love that we can only conceive as divine.

CHAPTER X

LOOKING FORWARD

§ I. THE NEW PILOT

Whereas for untold ages natural selection has been, if not the sole, at least the main factor to determine which among the slight variations or sudden mutations of living things should be allowed to develop, during the last few thousand years, a new one has appeared to dispute its dominance. This new factor is the purposive selection exercised by man, who can himself now take a hand in directing the conditions that affect the continued existence and development of the various forms of life. Over a great part of the earth, for example, he decided what other organisms besides himself shall be allowed to exist and multiply; and among those that he selects for this purpose he has modified the characteristics of many plants and animals in order to supply his needs or suit his tastes. By obtaining practical control of the means through which it is exerted, he can now largely replace natural selection by selection of his own, so far, that is, as he knows what qualities he wishes to perpetuate and in what direction he wishes to guide further progress.

And this is the case also with his own development, depending as it so largely does upon those things in his environment over which he exercises an increasing control. Thus as regards the physical environment he has learnt to modify or to adapt himself to all conditions, however extreme, that affect life. There are but few parts of the world where he cannot live with some comfort and security; and he can transport the goods that he needs so easily and so rapidly from one part of the world to another that he is no longer at the mercy of local conditions. And still more is he able to modify the social conditions which are now the main factor in his further psychological development. This he does by the creation and recognition of law as

regulating his behaviour towards his fellows in all the relations of life, domestic and international; by the establishment of conditions, social, political and economic, by which every department of human life is affected,—conditions which can themselves be modified as experience may show modification to be desirable or necessary; and most of all by education in all its forms, direct and indirect. By such means he can mould the life both of the individual and of the community, and by so doing necessarily affects the further evolution of mankind. He has thus become, at least to a great extent, the pilot of his own destiny. This being so, it is all-important that he should recognise the fact and make up his mind in what direction he wishes to advance, and what, in order to attain his purpose, are the means that he must employ.

The most direct and apparently simplest way to give to evolution a line of advance in accordance with our desires, is the method of the stock-breeder. By selective breeding from such animals or plants as possess the particular characteristics that he requires, such a breeder is able to stabilise qualities that he values and eliminate those that he finds a hindrance. In this way stocks can be strengthened in particular directions and freed from particular defects. This also, as applied to human beings, is the aim of Eugenics. Instead of merely treating symptoms, its supporters urge, and allowing, by medical care, the survival of many weaknesses—thereby nullifying the stern but beneficial work of natural selection—we should deal with the causes of such weaknesses, which science has now shown to lie in the 'genes' of the reproductive cells. In addition, therefore, to anything that can be done for individuals by environmental change and curative treatment—which does little, in all probability, to affect the genes themselves—we ought, according to the Eugenists, by selective mating and by sterilisation of the defective, to help the upward trend of evolution instead of, as at present, encouraging racial degeneration.

Such a plan of action is easier to carry out on its negative

than on its positive side. Convincing reasons may be found for taking steps to prevent parenthood on the part of the physically unfit and the mentally defective. But when it comes to breeding for particular qualities, doubts and difficulties at once present themselves. In the first place, beyond a few well-marked physical characteristics—colour of eyes and hair, height, colour-blindness and so on—there is little certainty as to those that are carried by separate genes and how they are linked together. Much experimental work is necessary before greater certainty on such matters can be attained; and this—unless, indeed, selective breeding could be carried out entirely in the laboratory, as some think may be the case in a more scientific age—could hardly be done with sufficient thoroughness or on a sufficient scale to produce the desired results. But even if this were practicable, it would still be difficult, if not impossible, to find agreement as to the qualities that are of greatest value. Some would propose to breed for strength of will and daring, others for sympathy or prudence or even for submissiveness. Each, even if he could not prove his own case could disprove his opponent's; for all our powers can be misused, and are either helpful or harmful to ourselves and to the community according to the manner of their use and the ends to which they are directed. Any thorough-going principle of selective breeding could only be imposed by authority, whether exerted by a despotic ruler or by a committee of experts, if circumstances should ever place them in complete control of their fellows.

It hardly seems, therefore, as if we can look forward, at least as a matter of immediate moment, to the thorough application of a strictly scientific system of Eugenics. We may, indeed, look for some advance in this direction by the prevention of reproduction on the part of the defective and physically unfit, by the spread of scientific knowledge on the subject of heredity, and by greater recognition of responsibility towards the unborn. But in the main we must rely on the further development and more intelligent application of means already in use. When medical knowledge and skill

are devoted not so much to the cure as to the prevention of disease, and to the establishment of conditions and habits that promote health of every kind, bodily and mental, we may undoubtedly look for a far-reaching improvement in all that concerns individual fitness. And most of all must we look to education for the shaping of man's future and the direction that is to be given to his further evolution. For education, no less than Eugenics, is a means of conscious selection, though free from some of the difficulties that lie in the way of Eugenic procedure. Both directly, by its various methods of encouragement and repression, and also—if we do not think of education as confined to school methods only—indirectly, by modification of the environment, it seeks to reinforce whatever powers and qualities we find most immediately serviceable, or desire on general grounds to develop. And since it does this by methods and under conditions that are more tentative and more easily modified than those of Eugenics, it is not so impossible here to reach some agreement as to aims it must keep in view.

But there is still a question as to how much, by education or by any other means, we can hope to accomplish. Even if it be granted that man can now, in some degree, take a hand in guiding the course of evolution and deciding the direction of his own further advance, within what limits is this advance possible? Is not the appearance of power over his destiny, it may be urged, largely illusory? Even if he has now, as no form of life has had hitherto, the power to control his development and decide its direction, are not the limits to such development so narrowly laid down by his own past history that the range of possible change, and of choice as to its character, is in reality but small? Has he, in actual fact, shown any marked advance, either in body or brain, during the ten thousand years or so in which he has made such astonishingly rapid advance in civilised life? Is he not still fundamentally what he was before, a bundle of instincts, emotions, habits, that have undergone little change, except for a superficial veneer of civilisation with the inhibitions that it has imposed?

Man may, perhaps, be no better adapted physically to his natural environment than he was ten or twenty thousand years ago; in some respects, even, he may have lost through certain weakening tendencies in civilised life. But we must remember that he no longer merely has to adapt himself to his surroundings, but is more and more able to adapt them to his needs and desires. And even if what organic change there has been is not for the better, can there be any doubt that psychologically and culturally he has greater powers and a finer inheritance? In the hundred centuries or so of civilised life human nature has been educated and enriched by the development of social contacts; new qualities have emerged and established themselves, and these open up yet further possibilities of psychological evolution to which there seem to be no such narrow limits set as to organic change. In most of us, it is true, the higher developments of intelligent forethought and social feeling are still far from thoroughly established and liable to drop away in times of crisis or panic; but this does not mean that they are not real gains, and gains that may be made permanent if we will only plan the conditions of our life in such a way as to call them out and reveal their value.

But even so, it may be urged, the limits within which variation is still possible are narrowly determined by the inescapable heredity of each individual. Heredity, however, may be regarded in two aspects. From one point of view it is a limiting influence, confining each of us, for example, within the bounds of a particular type of humanity, with certain factors that must be, and others that may be, dominant in shaping our lives and those of our descendants. In this aspect it may be compared to the conditions governing the course of a river, of which the banks decide its breadth, depth, rate of flow, and so forth, the nature of its scenery and its availability for use. But while the banks thus represent the limiting aspect of heredity, they do not decide the volume of the stream itself, nor its enlargement by tributary streams as it advances, nor its distant goal. For, looked at from the other point of view, heredity renews

in each of us the urge of life, with its emergent powers, working through the particular combination of factors that makes each individual in some respects unique, and with a potentiality of novel combinations and mutations which renders its further outcome unpredictable. Of what this may be we know as little as—to return to our comparison of heredity with a river—one who had never seen the Thames below Richmond, and was only able to explore its waters backward towards its source, could know of its possibilities, in the new conditions of the tidal reaches yet to come, as highway and harbourage for a world-wide commerce.

And so it is with the future of mankind. For man is himself an emergent in evolution, and one whose potentialities are still only partially revealed. Phenomena such as telepathy and clairvoyance, for instance, and exceptional manifestations of mind-control exercised over bodily processes, are evidence of powers still so undeveloped that when they appear we marvel at them as supernatural, or dismiss them as incredible. And even those powers with which we are familiar are capable of much further development, as is shown by their occasional appearance in the supernormal degree that we call genius. While, therefore, it is true, from one point of view, to say that man is a bundle of instincts (or, if you prefer to call them so, inherited propensities) derived from his primitive and animal ancestry, it is no less true from another that, in the words of the apostle, "it doth not yet appear what we shall be". Though in some respects man is bound to react to his surroundings in the same way as do other organisms, in others he is no less bound to show himself to be a new product of evolution, with new powers and purposes and values. How far these can take him we cannot tell; but we certainly need not assume that it can be but little, if at all, beyond the point he has at present reached. When we seek to gain some prevision of his future, his past history gives a partial clue. But it is not only to historian or scientist that we must look for guidance but to poet and visionary as well,

for they not only tell us what man has been and what he is but also point the way to what he may yet become.

§ 2. "IF WE SHOULD FAIL"

But if there is no ground for asserting that man's further advance is inevitably confined within narrow limits, there is equally no certainty that any advance he may make will be in the direction of his higher values or will necessarily bring either material or spiritual betterment. Looking at the wide possibilities of activity and enjoyment with which evolution has endowed us, we may flatter ourselves that we are its final product and crowning triumph. But when we remember that the same powers can as readily be used for harm as for good, and how short-sighted we are in their use, we cannot but recognise that, if the direction of the further course of evolution is now largely in our own hands, we can easily in our ignorance or folly so misdirect it as to throw away the gains it has brought us, or use them for ends that may prove very different from those we desire. Whatever it be that has set the ship's course hitherto, human destiny may easily be wrecked by some failure on the part of the new pilot. With all his endowments of intellect and feeling and will, man is prone to weaknesses any one of which may bring ruin to the voyage. Ignorance of the ship and its potentialities and of the conditions, favourable and dangerous, by which it is surrounded; stupidity in handling craft and crew and in meeting eventualities as they arise; uncertainty as to the object of the voyage and the course that he should steer, or as to a compass on which he can rely; any of these may only too easily be fatal, so that, for all his efforts, he may be drifting at the mercy of chance currents or driving on destruction from which he cannot escape.

In the past man felt himself constantly to be the victim of chance owing to his ignorance of what the Roman poet called "the causes of things"—'laws of nature' as we should rather call them now—our growing knowledge of which makes us the masters instead of the slaves of circumstance.

Through his ignorance, for example, of the nature and causes of disease he was liable to individual enfeeblement or premature death, and to wholesale destruction by pestilence. At the present time it is not ignorance so much as indifference to the necessary conditions of health and of social well-being that is the danger. To our own callous disregard of the economic and industrial conditions on which these things depend we owe the physical and mental degradation of the majority of the population of every country, whether mainly industrial or agricultural; and in this degradation lies the chief obstacle to further advance. In a world in which our control of the forces of nature has given the means of solving the problem of adequate and continuous production that for long ages was the tyrannous preoccupation of mankind, we have left the no less urgent problem of distribution to solve itself by the primitive method of "each for himself and devil take the weaker"; with the result that in the midst of unprecedented plenty, life for a great part of mankind means existence on the verge of starvation of body and mind alike, an existence made the more wretched by the squalor and the heartlessness that are the outcome of a blind pursuit of wealth.

If ignorance alone were responsible for our mistakes we could be confident that they would gradually be realised and righted by means of the knowledge that experience brings. But the stupidity that cannot and the folly that will not make use of such knowledge as it has, except in harmful ways and for short-sighted ends, are a far greater danger. Stupidity relies upon instinct and habit instead of on intelligence; and however efficient instinct may have been in earlier stages of life and simpler conditions, its rough-and-ready responses are no longer sufficient to deal with the complex situations of civilised life. Habit also, helpful as it is in stabilising past gains if it thereby releases energy for further experiment, may easily become so rigid and mechanical as not to allow of readjustment to new conditions, and may thus be a bar to further advance. By the mechanical repetition of tasks within the same

narrow round we tend to make ourselves into tools that can only be used for one kind of work, machines to run only under fixed conditions, narrow specialists, whether in some industrial task or in the pursuit of knowledge. In his 'Robots' the satirist has pictured the outcome of such complete mechanical efficiency; and the sting of the satire lies in its painful nearness to reality. We know how whole races of prehistoric reptiles and mammals with their armoury of tooth and horn and claw were so highly adapted to one narrow kind of existence as to become the victims of their own bodily structure and thus doomed to extinction. And even if the bee-hive and the ant-heap (in which specialisation of function has been carried so far that none of the classes in the community can lead a life complete in all respects) present a marvel of efficiency to which has been awarded the prize of vigorous survival, they appear to have long ago reached the limits of their possible attainment. "Go to the ant," said the wise man of old, "consider her ways and be wise." If we follow his advice, it should be in order to avoid her fate. It is not along this line of highly specialised efficiency that the greatest mental and spiritual advance has been won.

To fail of our purpose and ruin ourselves by our own stupidity in not foreseeing the outcome of our actions, or in mistaken choice, whether of ends or means, is pitiable enough. To sin against the light is far worse if, in spite of our knowledge of the real nature of the ends we seek and the means we employ, we let some passion of the moment carry the day, and either revert to a state of blind instinct or deliberately use all the powers that we have won in order to destroy one another together with the best part of our inheritance. In past ages war may have been an inevitable method of overcoming obstacles and dangers and satisfying the imperious will to live. But we, who see more clearly the outcome of such methods, have not now that excuse. We can see clearly enough that war is neither a reasonable nor a necessary way of settling disputes and gaining our ends. Yet we let the old habits both of thought

and practice persist, until in some hour when irritation lets loose the primitive passions, we throw reason to the winds and set about destroying all we have built up by ages of common effort and mutual forbearance. When we see with what progressive acceleration the means of destruction grow in deadliness and ease of application, we may sometimes doubt if free-will is not its own greatest danger, and if by its exercise the human race will not end in self-destruction, or at least in the destruction of all that we mean by humanity.

But if passion of some kind—and passion is equally blind whether in itself generous or selfish—is usually the spark by which the conflagration is kindled, the real causes of war do not lie in the passions that inflame it, but in the mistaken policies that have been allowed to lead up to it, due ultimately to lack of insight or to misguided choices and misplaced aims. The most fruitful source of human strife and injustice has been the false valuation that mistakes wealth for well-being and supposes happiness to consist in multiplicity of possessions. In spite of every attempt by means of legal and moral restraint to control the greed for whatever power or privilege can amass, this is still the motive that is most widespread and most active in the world to-day. The results we see around us everywhere in economic chaos and in class-warfare and nationalist jealousies in place of the interdependence and cooperation which are essential conditions of well-being, if we do not think of well-being in narrow and selfish terms. The insight that we need to enable us to distinguish ends that are truly desirable from those that are only cheats, and to choose means for reaching them that will not prove useless or defeat their own object, is a matter of feeling as well as of reasoned understanding; and the blindness that we are so quick to blame in our predecessors, and so slow to recognise in our selves, is due as much to lack of sympathy as to lack of intelligence.

Our very power to produce the goods that we require in order to satisfy our needs brings with it a danger from which in his earlier stages of development man was free.

When life was precarious and its needs only to be satisfied by constant effort, there was little danger that he would be content with the pleasures it brought him, and would let the urge to extend his knowledge and his powers slacken and turn only to enjoyment. Of all our values pleasure is the most undeniable and the most insistent; and when the pleasures of the senses and instinctive satisfactions are easy to come by, we can easily be content with these and give little heed to other needs and higher values. There is here a danger that might well be fatal to further advance. In an age that has seen such stupendous increase of material power and its use for the creation of wealth of a kind which all can see and envy, and which a turn of luck may bring to anyone, it is not to be wondered at that values should be confused, that power should rank above creativeness and material goods should seem best worth having even if in getting them spiritual values should be lost. Instead of recognising them as good in so far as they contribute to a fuller life, the tendency of such an age is to regard these things as ends in themselves; and this is to narrow life and keep it on a lower level. Moreover, material success, if valued for its own sake, carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. For pleasure, if it is made the sole object of activity, inevitably palls, giving place in the end to a boredom which may become so complete that no sort of activity any longer seems worth while. If the one motive that has been allowed to supplant all others now fails to find its satisfaction, life itself becomes meaningless and devoid of purpose until at last, in losing faith, we may lose even the will to live. The emptiness of life that comes to the pleasure-seeker who has run through the gamut of sensation, or to successful people who have made money and have no further object and no pleasure in the things on which they spend it, is a warning of what may befall us as the result of a success too dazzling in its accomplishment and too narrow in its scope.

For to a race, as to an individual, there may come the weariness of satiety, a failure of motive and slackening of

will that sap the effort on which further advance depends. Such slackening may be due, as just said, to a material success which has removed the economic spur to effort without putting any other incentive in its place. Or it may come from disappointment, a sense of inability to reach our aims and of failure so complete as to make us hopeless for the future. When we realise, as at times we are forced to do, how little, in spite of our boasted powers, our blindness and stupidity decrease; how prone we are, in the pursuit of some immediate gain, to embark on action that must eventually bring ruin; or, even if the aim be sound, how often we take a road that does not lead to it, and how constantly we repeat the old mistakes and seem to learn little from past failures;—small wonder if at such times we grow disheartened and feel that nothing is worth troubling about.

Such a state of mind may also be induced by special circumstances: by the monotony of conditions, for instance, under which life for the majority has to be lived, and by reaction from the stimulation of unwholesome excitements sought in the attempt to escape from this monotony; or by a one-sided educational system that develops intellectual acuteness without setting before it any worthy purpose for which it should be employed, or giving any criterion of values on which such a purpose can be based; or again, by some conspicuous disillusionment, such as that experienced in the last war and its outcome, with the cynical distrust both of human motives and human possibilities that failure to attain a lofty ideal leaves. However it may come, loss of faith—loss, that is, of will to shape our surroundings and ourselves in conformity with a deeply felt purpose, and of belief that one purpose has a higher value than another—is loss of life; unless, indeed, all the great teachers have been wrong in holding that the struggle towards a life of which our higher values are the foreshadowing and pledge is the fullest manifestation of the will to live.

But though individuals and nations alike encounter such

periods of disillusionment and slackening of effort, they find—at least while they are still in the spring and vigour of youth—that, even after the shattering of their aims and ideals, fresh interests force themselves into active being, new ideals arise or the old return in more practicable form, and faith in life and its possibilities revives. And even if races, like individuals, must grow old, and a time comes when they can no longer renew their vigour, others, we may be sure, will take their place. For, measured on the biological scale, human life is still in its early youth. If up to now man's history is mainly a record of his failures and mistakes, showing how bungling a business he has made as yet of social relations of every kind, we must remember that, however old the setting in which it is enacted, the human drama, whether tragedy or comedy, is still in its early scenes, and history thus far only a prologue to what is still to come. Viewed from the standpoint of evolution, man is a thing of yesterday, a newcomer still in the infancy of his powers; his activities are but the first stumbling steps of one who has hardly yet arisen from the posture of the animal and learnt to walk upright.

It is therefore hardly to be wondered at if he is ignorant and short-sighted, liable to be distracted from his aims and uncertain in his discrimination of values; or if he is still in the clutch of childish terrors and his actions often motivated, as psychology is making plain to us, by the subconscious warpings that these old terrors have caused. To see their source and their groundlessness is to open the way of escape. If the more civilised races are at last outgrowing the old fears of supernatural powers of evil and the cruelties into which, through these fears, men have been driven in the name of religion, there is hope that we can also outgrow the stupidity, due to fears no better grounded, of behaving to our fellows as though we were in mid-ocean on an overcrowded raft from which we must push them or be pushed ourselves. Ignorance and folly, lack of insight and false valuations, are the inevitable shortcomings of childhood. It is the task of education to show

them in their true light and replace them by knowledge and understanding, by considered purpose and a truer sense of values. And this is as true for mankind as for individual childhood. To vision and to sympathies thus widened we must look to free us alike from the boredom of satiety and from the disillusionment of frustrated hopes.

§ 3. THE ECONOMIC BASIS

If spiritual growth is to be made more possible, whether for the average child or for mankind in the mass, a necessary pre-condition is the assurance of a satisfactory standard of physical well-being. Health, with all that it involves, for mind as well as body, is ultimately dependent on economic conditions. It is essential that these should be sound and stable if opportunity is to be open to more than a few favoured individuals; and even for such—so closely are we dependent on one another—the possibilities that life offers must be hampered and diminished if others are cut off from the favourable conditions that they enjoy. If we desire the spiritual welfare and advancement of mankind, we must not suppose that this end can be attained if we are indifferent to material needs or tolerate injustice in the conditions of their satisfaction. However far we may set the spiritual aspect of life above the material, it is a fundamental condition for the realisation of our higher needs—at any, at least, but the supreme moments of experience—that the primary needs must first be satisfied. To forget that the higher values rest on a material basis is as shortsighted and fatal as to overlook or deny their supreme importance when they come into conflict with the lower. Security of livelihood and the fullest amount of comfort and leisure that can be shared by all are essential conditions of well-being if our hold on the higher values is not to be at the mercy of circumstances.

The fact that these things are not so shared is no longer due, as in the past, to lack of means to provide them. Our control of nature can ensure supplies of food and raw materials amply sufficient for all our needs, and also power,

in forms readily available, for every process of manufacture. If to-day the whole world is suffering an apparent impoverishment which brings privation to vast numbers, this does not arise from lack of the goods they need, but from the breakdown of the existing industrial and economic system: from our inability, that is, to adjust ideas and relations that were well enough suited for self-sufficing communities, supported by manual labour, to a world in which machinery is continually replacing human labour, and one of which every part is closely linked in interdependence with the rest. To make such readjustment of economic theory and practice to the new situation which scientific advance has brought about, is therefore the first need that lies before us.

A necessary part of this readjustment, if it is to promote not only material but spiritual betterment, is a fairer distribution both of goods and burdens so that, by reducing the present monstrous inequality in the conditions of well-being, it may bring within the reach of all the possibility of fuller life. And this is not to be thought of only in terms of work and wages. Among the vital conditions of well-being, for instance, is the leisure that a community, if organised not merely for industry or for the welfare of a class, can readily allow to all its members. Education that is not cut short just when it is most needed, time for thought and study, the creation and enjoyment of beauty, opportunity for travel, freedom in which the graces of life may have room to grow as well as the sterner virtues: such things are among the essential conditions of spiritual growth. Leisure, with all the possibilities that it brings, is not to be regarded as the birthright of some fortunate few, while it is either denied to those who are condemned to a monotonous round of toil, or else forced, with neither the means nor the training to make use of it, on those whom the industrial machine, both through its defects and through its increasing efficiency, throws out as so much waste. With a less uneven distribution, both of the necessary work of production and of the goods that this work produces, there

would be ample leisure for all; and leisure enjoyed in conditions that could make of it a means of development rather than the source of demoralisation that lack of employment, at any social level, is bound to bring.

The present world-wide unemployment problem is a symptom not merely of a temporary industrial depression but of the new conditions in the economic basis of life, conditions which now make possible a new stage of social evolution. In earlier stages everything was necessarily subservient to the maintenance and welfare of the group, whether tribe or empire, and to its struggle for existence and for power in face of a precarious supply of the necessities of life and the pressure of rival groups. Only those comparatively few on whose actual leadership or traditional prestige the continued well-being of the community was held to depend could take advantage of their position to accumulate wealth; and so could form a privileged class to which alone a considerable amount of freedom is possible. This has hitherto been accepted by the subject mass of mankind as inevitable. But it is accepted with a continually growing impatience due to the realisation that, even apart from considerations of justice, it no longer rests upon a basis of hard necessity. The spread of knowledge and the development of invention of all kinds, including the means of intercourse at any distance, have brought, together with a growing mastery of the problems of production, a growing sense of the interdependence, in place of the old rivalry, between the various groups and classes into which mankind is divided. The two main reasons for the sacrifice of the individual to the community have therefore no longer the same force. It is more and more recognised that communities exist for the sake of the units of which they are composed, and their institutions are to be judged in the light of the kind of life that they make possible for each of their members.

Thus changes in the economic conditions of social life have helped to reinforce the importance attached by philosophers and religious teachers to the spiritual development of the individual as an end in itself. As well as being a link

in the evolutionary chain of being, passing on the cultural gains he has enjoyed and potentialities that may carry the race yet further forward, each of us is also a separate and unique personality with the right to enjoy the fullest experience of which he is capable. It is not enough, therefore, that opportunity for fullness of experience should fall only to the lot of some few, whether these are normal individuals raised above their fellows by accident of birth or wealth, or Supermen in whose service the mass of mankind is to function as the compost in which the flower is rooted. Individual experience cannot attain to the fullest life if it is isolated from the experience of others, or if it is bought at the cost of debarring them from that to which they might attain. The extent to which conditions of health and well-being, education and opportunity, are brought within the reach of all is therefore the true criterion of the wealth of a community. Without this, all the achievements of science, however wonderful, constitute but a poor and partial kind of progress, and our civilisation, like others that have perished in the past, is only a colossus with feet of clay.

§ 4. AND THEN?

To make the readjustments that are required by a new stage of social evolution is no slight task. But mankind will not much longer, in any part of the world, be content to let a state of things continue in which burdens are so unevenly borne and finer possibilities of life denied to so many. If the change does not come by forethought and agreement, it will come by the uncertain and wasteful method of violent revolution; but come in some form it must, and the main question for any nation is how soon and by what means it may be brought about. To make it successful there is need of careful planning, both of the ends in view and of each step required to reach them, in accordance with all that science, in any of its branches, can contribute to the solution of each problem. And in addition to all that knowledge and forethought can do, for the acceptance and

working out of any plan that may be made there must be cooperation inspired by enthusiasm and cemented by good will; and beneath all, as the foundation on which it rests, a sense of justice and a determination that to no one shall opportunity be denied, but the fullest life of which they are capable made possible for all.

The knowledge and forethought, backed by willing co-operation and by determination that opportunity shall be free to all, which are essential for any solution of our immediate economic and political problems, are also needed for the yet further advance of which some measure of social and economic equality is a precondition. If man is to take conscious control of the further course of evolution instead of wasting his powers in futility or drifting to disaster, he needs all the power that knowledge can put into his hands; and even more he needs wisdom in the use of it and an assured purpose to give it direction. Of these requisites power has always been the most obvious need and the chief object that men have set before themselves for attainment. Even in the animal stage of development this was not merely a matter of physical strength, in which man is markedly inferior to many of the animals, but rather of superior cunning, together with ingenuity in devising mechanical aids and skill in their use. These have won him the mastery of his environment, animate and inanimate; and to these, as what was at first casual and empirical has been organised and rendered permanent, his advance in civilisation is due.

Power, in short, is given by the control of organised knowledge and of the skilled use that can be made of it. The need of such knowledge few will question, or the service that science has done to humanity in facilitating the supply of our necessities and in giving a control of our surroundings on which the maintenance of life and a great part of its well-being depend. Hitherto science has concerned itself mainly with the external world, and its greatest triumphs have been won in the investigation of physical conditions, and in the command of physical forces to which

this has led. So rapid has been the advance thus made—an advance that could hardly have been dreamed of even a century ago—and so progressively more rapid does it become, that there is grave danger lest the power that it puts into our hands may outrun our capacity to use it wisely, and we use it instead for our own harm. The danger is all the greater since our knowledge of life and its requirements and possibilities lags far behind our knowledge of the physical world. In the application of science to sociological problems we are still only feeling our way and have got but little beyond the old rule-of-thumb methods of a pre-scientific era. Our descendants will marvel, we may be sure, that, while so much painstaking study was devoted to the constitution of the atom and the measurement of the remotest stars, we should have been content with such haphazard and fumbling methods as we follow in the training and use of our minds and in regulating our relations with our fellows. If it can give as much knowledge and as much control of ourselves as we have of our surroundings, science has a service to perform for mankind of even greater value than anything it has yet achieved.

But if it is thus to embrace the nature and potentialities of man as well as the physical conditions under which he lives, our conception of organised knowledge must not be too narrow. It must not be thought of as applying only to certain branches of science, pure or applied, but must include also the history of man's strivings and achievements and all the forms in which his quest for fuller life has expressed itself. These, the 'humanities' in the old academic term, are now apt to be regarded as of secondary importance, as being unscientific and of little application to our material needs. In an industrial and mechanical age there is all the more need to insist on the opposite point of view. Instead of being of less importance, they are even more needed in such an age in order to redress the balance between the material and spiritual needs of life.

Knowledge alone, however, whether of the physical universe or of human nature, does not of itself give power.

Great learning is no guarantee of wisdom, and the most erudite of men may be no more than a pedant. Besides knowledge we need also the skill to use it in the way that shall make it most efficient for the purpose in view. Action is apt to be hasty and ill-considered, the outcome of immediate desires or prejudices, if it is not carefully planned in accordance with the desired end and based upon well assured experience, with all the facts that are relevant taken into consideration and others excluded; and even so we must be ready to modify both plan and action as new conditions arise and further experience suggests. Thus in the present world-wide economic depression—the outcome, as said above, of failure to foresee the results of altered methods of production and to adapt to them our methods of exchange and distribution—neither the cut-throat competition of free-trade nor the attempt to foster national self-sufficiency by the erection of tariff walls can provide a satisfactory solution; both alike belong to a state of things that has been left behind. In a world which is forced to realise the close interdependence of all classes and communities, the true line of advance is to replace the old jealousies and the old methods of *laissez faire* by cooperation and international agreements, and to establish scientific planning both of production and exchange in accordance with local conditions and needs. And so, too, with other problems: only when knowledge and forethought are methodically applied to them can we hope to find solutions sound in themselves and contributing to the permanent well-being of mankind.

But here lies a danger all the greater that it is easily overlooked. Scientific method, utilising scientific knowledge, is the most potent of instruments with which to change either the face of the world or the conditions of our lives. But, as with all instruments, its final value depends on the uses to which it is put. Most of the pictures, from Plato's *Republic* down to the latest vision of a "brave new world", that imaginative writers have drawn, whether in earnest or in irony, of a life which is scientifically ordered, show

the danger clearly. Even without the added enforcement of Eugenics, education can be so used as to mould human beings to any shape that may be required either in the interests of a privileged class or of a Superman, or in pursuance of a doctrinaire conception of a super-State. Instinctive reactions of satisfaction and fear can be associated with certain conditions of life in the way in which experimenters have shown that the reflex responses of animals can be transferred to conditions different from, and even diametrically opposed to, those in which they normally occur. In this way it would, no doubt, be possible, if scientific methods were applied with ruthless efficiency, to produce a State in which every class was as completely adapted to its particular functions, and as content to carry them on in the service of the whole, as are the insect communities; and with the same result in the sacrifice of full individual development to a particular kind of efficiency. It is the old question of the worth of gaining the whole world at the price of losing our souls in the process.

Even if such a development should be thought desirable, it could only be imposed under the stress of some extreme need, as an alternative to complete destruction; for even if there were general acceptance of the principle, few would be agreed as to the details of any plan that philosopher or statesman could devise. If the attempt of so high-minded a thinker as Plato to plan a community of this kind, based on and embodying the ideal of justice, seems to his readers to-day to be in many respects so radically unjust, it is hardly to be expected that any other which involved, as any such attempt must, the complete sacrifice of individual freedom, could be more successful. For freedom of choice is an essential element in our higher values. Good that is imposed by authority is only a partial good; at best the condition and assurance of the higher good that depends upon our choice and is the spontaneous outreaching of the spirit. It is this more than any material good or social contentment that brings the sense of fullness of life which is the ultimate criterion of value.

Power, then, has its dangers, and is not in itself a certain blessing. It is an instrument, in itself neutral, potent for harm as for service, and easily capable of being so used as to cause the loss of what is of greatest value. Yet its value as an instrument is so evident that there can be little wonder if we have been dazzled by the prizes it holds out before us, and have pursued it, both in the practical affairs of life and in our educational systems, as though power were alone worth having. The purpose for which it shall be used we are apt to suppose will look after itself. And yet conditions of life and of education that are directed only to the acquirement of power, and leave to chance the development of purpose or confine it to immediate ends, are in the highest degree short-sighted. While we need for further advance all the power, both over our surroundings and ourselves, that science can give us, we need even more the insight and sense of values that will enable us to use this power not merely for securing material satisfactions but in the service of spiritual evolution.

It might be supposed, as Socrates held, that knowledge would of itself furnish the insight requisite for forming such a purpose and keeping it steadily in view; for if we only knew with sufficient clearness the nature of our actions and the results that must follow from them, we should surely choose only those that would be ultimately beneficial. But if this was true of a Socrates, who had reflected deeply upon experience and its values until thought and feeling, knowledge and desire, were fused in wisdom, yet for ordinary human nature, in which this fusion has not taken place, knowledge is not enough. For us, although knowledge may point out the wiser course, yet without some strong feeling the dead-weight of inertia may be too great to be moved; while if feeling urges in some other direction, it is likely to prove a stronger motive-force than knowledge. In the grip of fear or jealousy or some overwhelming desire we are, individually or collectively, ready to face any risks and "damn the consequences", even if, as in the case of war, the consequences are the certain havoc and misery that it

must entail upon all alike, non-combatants as well as combatants, and the possible destruction of civilisation itself.

Knowledge alone, then, can seldom if ever be enough to shape purposes that will be so compelling as to overcome the pull of inertia or of instinct when these are strongly opposed to the course that it urges. For this compelling force we need something that will arouse the will and inspire purpose with a feeling no less strong, though less blind, than the instinctive passions. There is only one thing that can do this. That one thing is faith; for it is something that has the fervour of religion that we need—if religion be not narrowed down to any system of dogma and ceremonial. To many, no doubt, 'faith' stands for some particular form of belief, not based on experience and the values of which this makes us aware but imposed upon us by traditional authority. Faith, however, is not to be confined to acceptance of a creed. Rather it is an attitude of the whole mind in which thought and feeling and will all have their function; in which, that is, feeling is not merely instinctive but enriched by experience and approved by rational reflection, and seeks to realise itself in activity that is the outcome of judgment no less than of desire.

If we are now to take up our full responsibility and to make conscious use of the opportunity that the course of evolution places in our hands, we cannot be content to wait upon events to shape our purposes and decide our fate. We must ourselves decide in what direction we wish to advance and must see to it that both our general policies and the immediate steps to be taken and, not least, our educational aims and the systems in which they are embodied, are in accordance with this purpose and not such as must thwart or direct it. Not that complete agreement can be reached either as to what is ultimately possible or as to the detailed measures that will lead with most certainty to the ends on which are agreed. Such unanimity, even if it were possible, would not be desirable. It would only mean a narrow orthodoxy of aim and a mechanical standardisation of method, both of which are fatal to continued progress.

This is no more to be desired than the reduction of all mankind into one world-state with similar institutions and ways of thought and life. It is not to the formation of huge empires with their levelling tendency that we must look, any more than to the extreme nationalism that would enclose each country in a ring-fence, hampering trade and other kinds of intercourse and sharpening international suspicions and jealousies; but rather to the federation of separate communities, at once independent and interdependent, not too large to foster national as well as personal individuality, not only in generous rivalry with one another but still more in cooperation in all matters of common welfare and common aim.

So also in other as well as in political matters it is from freedom of thought, with the stimulus that is given by the interaction of different approaches to a problem, and from constant experiment in trying out possible solutions, that the true line of advance ultimately emerges, and in the process the fullest life is found. But unless there were some recognition of the problem to be solved, and some conscious direction of experiment, there could be no approach to a solution other than leaving all to chance. So also, if there is to be any advance in a direction not merely forced upon us by circumstances but in some degree open to our choice, beneath all differences of opinion and belief, of habits and principles, of conviction and prejudice, there must be some community of purpose and some assurance that such advance is possible and is to be desired. Different creeds and philosophies, legal and moral codes, conventions and ways of life, depend mainly on accidents of birth and upbringing; but deeper than all such differences is the faith which, through all apparent divergences, gives purpose and direction to our lives.

This, then, is what matters most. Our faith, whatever it may be, will decide the use to be made of all the powers that science is putting, in continually increasing measure, into our hands. It is not something that can be comprised in a formula, a creed to be accepted or a rule to be obeyed.

It can only be "felt in the blood, and felt along the heart", as something that quickens the spirit and arouses the will; giving assurance—no matter to what sceptical or pessimistic conclusions either reasoning or disillusionment may lead—that in our life and in the universe in which we find ourselves there is meaning and value, and that these, however little as yet we can apprehend them, are not alien from our conception and experience of goodness and beauty and truth. Such a faith, implicit in the urge of life and at first unconscious, shows itself in the actions of children and simple folk no less than in the teaching of saint and sage. It has always been the spiritual core of life, the motive-source of spiritual growth; and with greater certainty and continuance of aim as we have grown more conscious of the powers that are ours or within our reach, and of the possibilities that lie before us, and have come to feel not only that our highest values give the clue to the riddles of existence, but that on us and on our realisation of these values in creative activity depends what further spiritual evolution may be to come.

But if knowledge needs faith to give it purpose and direction, faith no less needs all the knowledge and foresight that science can bring to bear on the problems of life if its aspirations are to be realised and its purposes fulfilled. The assignment of material and spiritual to separate and supposedly antagonistic spheres of experience has been harmful to both so long as they have been pursued as self-sufficient ends in themselves instead of being recognised as complementary aspects of experience. On the one hand a soulless conception of science has been accepted, the very term 'scientific' being held to be applicable only where the human factor and its spiritual implications are ignored; with the result that science is looked to as the giver of power without regard to the use to which it is put or its cost in human happiness. And, on the other hand, spiritual aspiration has been no less narrowed and misapplied, tending either to withdrawal from contact with the common concerns of humanity into mysticism or the quest of per-

sonal salvation, or else to waste itself in efforts doomed to futility for lack of the mundane knowledge that the most spiritual natures have usually been too ready to despise and fear. Instead of opposing faith and knowledge, and exalting one above the other, we must recognise that they are complementary and that we need them both. We need the power that knowledge gives, and the mastery of conditions of life necessary to liberate the spirit of man; and with it the faith and insight that alone can use power wisely and direct it to worthy ends, and the wisdom that comes from a true discernment of values. In so far as we can gain mastery over nature and over ourselves, with wisdom to guide our choice of the ends for which we shall use our powers, and so can realise in actual life more and more of the highest values that we apprehend, so far do we experience the best that life can give us now, and make it possible for those who come after us to live yet fuller lives than ours.

However restricted from the outset or warped by circumstances the course of our individual life may be, yet, unless we are pitiable indeed, we can see, as we look back, some enlargement in range of our powers and some development of purpose in their direction. This is our spiritual growth, the expression in each of us—unconscious, perhaps, or only dimly realised—of the will to fuller life. And so also with mankind. The quest has often been narrow in outlook and scanty enough in achievement; for the most part a stumbling in the dark. Yet even so it has brought the possession of power so immense as to make increasingly plain that some clearer purpose for its direction is imperative. It is at once the task and the hope of the future that our minds should be more fully alive to the potentialities within us and before us, and our spiritual senses to the finer values that life reveals.

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING

For those who wish to follow up any of the subjects here touched upon a short list is added of books that the writer has found particularly helpful.

Emergent Evolution : C. LLOYD MORGAN (Williams & Norgate, 1923).

Creative Evolution : HENRI BERGSON, translated by A. Mitchel (Macmillan & Co., 1911).

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Ethics : NICOLAI HARTMANN, translated by STANTON COIT, 3 vols. (George Allen & Unwin, 1932).

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A Preface to Morals : WALTER LIPPMANN (George Allen & Unwin, 1929).

The Revolt of Modern Youth : JUDGE LINDSEY and WAINWRIGHT EVANS (Brentano's Ltd., 1928).

Primitive Man : J. MURPHY (Oxford University Press, 1927).

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